The much-delayed and consulted upon final report on this accident has finally been published.

The causes of the accident were that wheel/rail adhesion was very low in the area where the driver of train 1L53 applied the train’s brakes, that the driver did not apply the train’s brakes sufficiently early on approach to the signal protecting the junction to avoid running on to it, given the prevailing low level of adhesion, and that the braking systems of train 1L53 were unable to mitigate this very low adhesion.

The level of wheel/rail adhesion was very low due to leaf contamination on the railhead, and had been made worse by a band of drizzle that occurred immediately before the passage of train 1L53. This leaf contamination resulted from the weather conditions on the day of the accident, coupled with an increased density of vegetation in the area which had not been effectively managed by Network Rail’s Wessex route.

Network Rail’s Wessex route had also not effectively managed the contamination on the railhead with either proactive or reactive measures. RAIB’s investigation found that a probable underlying factor was that Network Rail’s Wessex route did not effectively manage the risks of low adhesion associated with the leaf fall season. RAIB also found that South Western Railway not effectively preparing its drivers for assessing and reporting low adhesion conditions was a possible underlying factor.

RAIB has also made two safety observations. These relate to the application of revised design criteria for the Train Protection and Warning System and the assessment of signal overrun risk and how this accounts for high risk of low adhesion sites. Two issues were found relating to the severity of the consequences. These were a loss of survival space in the driver’s cab of train 1L53, and the jamming of internal sliding doors, which obstructed passenger evacuation routes.

Since the accident, Network Rail has reviewed its training and competence framework for off track staff at network level, and is also reviewing its adhesion management standards. Network Rail’s Wessex route is reviewing its arrangements for proactively responding to reports of low adhesion, including how it undertakes railhead treatment.

South Western Railway has made changes relating to training and briefing of its drivers to ensure information on autumn arrangements has been effectively briefed and understood.

RAIB have just added this paragraph to their page for this incident:

That consultation is, I presume, just the routine discussion of the report with the concerned parties prior to publication.

RAIB’s draft investigation report into this accident has now been sent to interested parties as part of the statutory consultation process. RAIB expects to publish the final report shortly after the consultation process is completed. RAIB issued an interim report in February 2022 and continues to liaise with stakeholders on our findings and any arising safety issues.

RAIB’s draft investigation report into this accident is currently being reviewed prior to the start of the consultation. RAIB expects to publish the final investigation report before the end of the year. RAIB issued an interim report in February 2022, which discussed our initial findings, and has continued to liaise with stakeholders, including the rail industry, as the investigation has progressed.

I would have thought that most junctions would have had catch points fitted.

D1015 Western Champion was recently (Sept 2021) back out on Network Rail metals load testing with cement wagons in preparation for a return to use on mainline railtours. Sadly, she suffered an engine seizure on a trip to and from Avonmouth and has returned to the Severn Valley Railway for further work. Hopefully she will back on railtours in 2022.

Oh, and Clan Line. Cracking picture of D1015. A favourite loco of mine.

I was told by a railway professional, but would like it confirmed by legal minds, that the railway owns the land 6 feet beyond the boundary fence; this is to enable them to maintain said fence.

I was told by a railway professional, but would like it confirmed by legal minds, that the railway owns the land 6 feet beyond the boundary fence; this is to enable them to maintain said fence.

That hedgerow looks to me to be mostly rooted behind the fence. Encroaching onto the field.

This could be a really difficult "where was I today" .........................any offers ?

Trigger Warning: the piece includes a still photo of the location from 1954 that some viewers may find upsetting.

Surprised nothing is mentioned about this on GWR Journeycheck as it is affecting their services through Salisbury as well with the Brightons and additional services to/from Southampton starting and ending short.

Alterations to services between Salisbury and Romsey

Due to slippery rails between Salisbury and Romsey trains have to run at reduced speed on all lines.
Train services running through these stations may be delayed by up to 15 minutes or revised. Disruption is expected until the end of the day.

Further Information

If you hold a valid single, return, or weekly ticket, you will be able to claim compensation for delays of 15 minutes or more. Please keep your ticket and visit GWR.com/DelayRepay

Last Updated:17/11/2021 14:17

.  Train services running through this station may be cancelled, delayed or revised. Disruption is expected until the end of the day.
What We're Doing About It:
We have been informed that there are poor railhead conditions (poor railhead adhesion) caused by external seasonal factors (leaf fall/heavy rain etc) in the Salisbury area. Trains take longer to accelerate and brake in these conditions and so will incur delays.
Until further notice, the following service alterations will take place
- Shuttle services are running between Salisbury and Exeter St Davids
- Shuttle services are running between Basingstoke and Yeovil Junction/Salisbury
- Services running between Salisbury and Romsey will be cancelled
- Some services between London Waterloo and Poole/Weymouth will call additionally at Basingstoke and/or Swaythling

Slippery rails in the Salisbury area mean that South Western Railway services at the station will be disrupted today.

The following alterations will be in place:
Services between Exeter St Davids and London Waterloo will be reduced to one train per hour. Other services will terminate and restart at Salisbury.
Services between Salisbury and Romsey via Southampton Central will be cancelled.
Some services between London Waterloo and Poole / Weymouth will call additionally at Basingstoke and / or Swaythling.
 
Tickets will be accepted at no extra cost on the following services:
Great Western Railway between Salisbury and Southampton Central. These services will call additionally at Redbridge and Millbrook.
Great Western Railway between Exeter St. Davids and London Paddington
London Underground between London Paddington and London Waterloo
 
A replacement bus service has been requested to run between Salisbury, Dean, Mottisfont & Dunbridge, Romsey, Chandlers Ford and Eastleigh, but this is not yet confirmed.

Update 15:45
Fault placed in order by S&T , normal working resumed. S&T will go in tonight in a possession to rectify

RED Incident: UPGRADED Red: Salisbury Tunnel Junction- T/C Failure RN
Salisbury SB contacted control to advise that RN track circuit is currently SOWC and as a result has route locked the tunnel junction with the only moves being permissible at this stage to be trains on the Up Main towards Andover. Salisbury signaller to advise on a method of work once capabilities of the infrastructure have been explored.
Update 12:54-
Incident has been upgraded due to meeting the threshold for passenger impact.

Situation:
An intermittent fault is causing track circuit RN at Salisbury Tunnel Junction to flicker. The signaller will route trains and talk past respective signals. S&T are currently on site. However delays are having a high impact due to the location of the fault. We are currently talking past signals to allow trains to run through the area but this is causing severe delay, S&T, ARM to liaise and discuss a method of work, that will initiate a train service plan.

Customer Message:
Buses have been requested for
2 x SAL to BSK to run all stations between
2 x SAL to SOU via Romsey running between.
2 SAL to ESL via Chandlers Ford running between.
Ticket acceptance requested on Xelabus X6/ X7 ESL-CFR
Disruption is expected till 15:00.

From the BBC


snip

A railway line which has been closed for more than two weeks following a train crash has reopened.

Commuters and residents have faced major disruption since two trains collided on the approach to Fisherton Tunnel near Salisbury on 31 October.

Repairs and safety checks have now been completed, allowing a full service to resume on Tuesday morning.

Mayor of Salisbury Caroline Corbin said it was nice for everyone to get back to normality.

Both trains derailed and travelled into the tunnel before coming to a standstill, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch said.

SWR driver Mr Tandy was praised by the operator for "acting impeccably" to keep passengers safe.

Managing director Claire Mann said Mr Tandy was being looked after very well in hospital and it was hoped he would make a full recovery.

She said: "We cant pre-empt what the investigation will conclude but the initial findings showed low rail adhesion, so the contact between the rail and the wheel was difficult on this day.

"So before reopening today there have been some extra water-jetting and leaf-busting trains that Network Rail have run to ensure that it's as safe as possible."

NR news release in full:
Source: Network Rail

Network Rail, South Western Railway and Great Western Railway joint statement: Salisbury railway to reopen fully from Tuesday, 16 November



Following last week’s accident, Network Rail, South Western Railway and Great Western Railway today announce that trains through Salisbury will begin running again on Tuesday, 16 November.

The rail industry has been working together to clear the line and make it safe to run trains again, with repair works set to be complete by Monday. Following two weeks of the line being closed, Network Rail will spend a full day using its leaf-busting Rail Head Treatment Trains to jet wash the tracks free of any debris or leaf mulch. A series of test trains will also run on the new infrastructure to check it is operating correctly before passenger services begin on Tuesday morning.

Network Rail’s route director for Wessex, Mark Killick, said: “I really appreciate how patient everyone has been with us over the past week and a half, from customers who have had their journeys disrupted, to our neighbours who have had cranes outside their houses, London Road closed for a period, and people working 24 hours a day to repair the railway right in the middle of their neighbourhood.

“That work is going to continue until Monday, as we finish replacing damaged equipment and making sure the railway is fit for action again.

“Our railway is one of the safest in the world and when a rare incident like this happens, we have to find out exactly what went wrong. That’s why we’re working closely with the Rail Accident Investigation Branch, British Transport Police and Office of Rail and Road on their investigations and we will be transparent and open with everyone when we know more about exactly what caused this.”

Claire Mann, Managing Director of South Western Railway, said: “This has been a difficult time for all those affected by last Sunday’s incident and I’d like to thank the Salisbury community, our customers and colleagues for all their help both on the night and over the last ten days.

“Many people rely on our services every day and I am sorry for the disruption this incident has caused and am grateful for their ongoing patience. We have worked tirelessly with Network Rail and our industry partners to reopen the railway and I look forward to welcoming customers back to our services on Tuesday”.

Mark Hopwood, Managing Director of Great Western Railway, said: “Our staff have been overwhelmed by the support shown by customers and the community over the past ten days. The incident last Sunday was challenging for everyone involved, and we are grateful for everyone’s support and patience in the days and weeks since.

“The rail industry has put every effort into reopening the railway as soon as possible, and we’re looking forward to customers returning from 16 November.”

The accident involving an SWR train and a GWR train, occurred on Sunday 31 October, blocking the line just outside the Fisherton Tunnel, where routes from London and Southampton merge on their way into Salisbury.

Since then, the line between Salisbury and Andover has been blocked, with SWR and GWR providing alternative travel arrangements through diversions or rail replacement services. 

Network Rail has been working with partners from across the industry to reopen the railway. So far, five damaged train carriages have been craned out from the accident site, which is in a cutting below the level of the surrounding area near London Road, in the Fisherton area of Salisbury. Almost 1,500 sleepers – the cross-ties that support the track – are being replaced, along with three sets of points, that allow trains to move from one track to another. In addition, 1,000 yards of new track is being laid in the tunnel to provide a smoother ride for passengers.

Signalling equipment including track circuits – which tell us where trains are –  are also being repaired, replaced and thoroughly-tested before the line reopens.

To support passengers’ journeys, buses are running from Salisbury to Andover for South Western Railway customers, and from Salisbury to Romsey for Great Western Railway, with tickets accepted on diversionary routes via Reading.

While London Road was closed over the bridge, a minibus provided transport for neighbours who needed to get round the block, and two local meetings were held to keep the community updated on the work.

   Following two weeks of the line being closed, Network Rail will spend a full day using its leaf-busting Rail Head Treatment Trains to jet wash the tracks free of any debris or leaf mulch. A series of test trains will also run on the new infrastructure to check it is operating correctly before passenger services begin on Tuesday morning.

BTP will be there also investigating for criminal activity which may have lead to the accident, the video quite posible will go on their case file to be used should the need arise.

Accidents like these are investigated by the ORR, BTP, RAIB, NR and the ToCs usually the industry (NR and ToC's) is done as a joint investigation and is always subservient to the RAIB, ORR and BTP who have statutory powers, in the case of BTP and ORR they can arrest, charge and present a case to the CPS

I can't see that it's in any way unusual for NR to put out an early explanation of what has happened, or even for it to be not just incomplete but wrong. But they do need to flag that clearly, and might do better to put that out themselves rather than relying on the media or insiders leaking stuff. What I saw that was found leaked was on Politics For All (maybe not quite mainstream?), and was an incident log from Wessex Integrated Control Centre at Basingstoke:


So right from the start the basic sequence of events was wrong. That looks as if it was concocted from the drivers' initial radio calls, and remember that the way 1F30 split will have given that driver a false impression of what had happened (until he had a good look outside). Add some more reports from the first MOM on site and some signallers, and you can get what was put out.

Of course it should not have been put out in that form. Someone ought to have cut it to the minimum known to be true, that there had been a collision involving two trains and the reported injuries. NR really should known by now that once BTP and RAIB are involved it becomes almost impossible for them to make further comment on the accident itself, even to correct their own errors.

As a further comment on that WICC incident message, I've just noticed it is timed at 19:21 and marked "NEW". But the collision was at 18:42, and first reports must have come in in minutes. So why is that message so much later but apparently with only the first reports in? Is it not what it appears to be?

I would hope one of them will include an investigation as to why almost completely spurious information was putvout to the press immediately after the accident.

No hitting ‘something’ on the track by the rear GWR carriage
No 7 minute gap before the SWT train then hit the GWR
No signal failure after the GWR train ‘derailed’

One might ask whether someone or somebody was thinking there may be need to cover something up…it was quoted by some MSM as coming from Network Rail. Even the BTP quoted from it in initial TV interviews that night.

There was also twitter comment at the time that an unnamed member of staff had passed a staff log of some description to part(s) of the MSM. The S*n was mentioned it one twitter thread I saw.

This is the first time I think this has happened. Usually waiting for ORR or RAIB to make an initial announcement. Something (almost) got out of control & wasn’t stopped quickly enough.

I would hope one of them will include an investigation as to why almost completely spurious information was putvout to the press immediately after the accident.

No hitting ‘something’ on the track by the rear GWR carriage
No 7 minute gap before the SWT train then hit the GWR
No signal failure after the GWR train ‘derailed’

One might ask whether someone or somebody was thinking there may be need to cover something up…it was quoted by some MSM as coming from Network Rail. Even the BTP quoted from it in initial TV interviews that night.

There was also twitter comment at the time that an unnamed member of staff had passed a staff log of some description to part(s) of the MSM. The S*n was mentioned it one twitter thread I saw.

This is the first time I think this has happened. Usually waiting for ORR or RAIB to make an initial announcement. Something (almost) got out of control & wasn’t stopped quickly enough.

The human cost aside, the financial burden of this derailment must be... considerable.

I would hope one of them will include an investigation as to why almost completely spurious information was putvout to the press immediately after the accident.

BTP will be there also investigating for criminal activity which may have lead to the accident, the video quite posible will go on their case file to be used should the need arise.

Accidents like these are investigated by the ORR, BTP, RAIB, NR and the ToCs usually the industry (NR and ToC's) is done as a joint investigation and is always subservient to the RAIB, ORR and BTP who have statutory powers, in the case of BTP and ORR they can arrest, charge and present a case to the CPS

...and a BTP officer was videoing recovery of at least one of the carriages because...? I would expect a BTP presence to deter 'trophy hunters' but I hardly think filming the recovery operation would be part of their remit. I am of course prepared to be corrected on this.

Possibly, either that or they were worried in case the Class 59 lost grip if standing exactly on the crossover.

Do you mean they plain lined it before the recovery in order that it was possible to put it back afterwards undamaged?

Suggestions elsewhere is that the crossing was plain lined because they anticipated track damage caused by the removal method using the class 59.

Another picture, showing that the crossings of the junction have been 'plain lined' in favour of the london bould route, so Romsey to from Salisbury route ot to reopen for some time or via Laverstock and Andover??

https://twitter.com/vickycahoy/status/1456677842851356672

Maybe, as NR seems to have admitted there will be serious to their infrastructure, they need to ask if MoD can provide an ARV (Armoured Recovery Vehicle) and creww to assist. 52 ton straight pull, 104 ton presumably at 2:1. Would need some serious ground anchors and the dozer blade. Would be quicker than cutting up on site.

Video and photos of the recovery:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-wiltshire-59163323

South Western Railway said its driver Robin Tandy had acted in an "impeccable way in a valiant attempt to keep passengers safe"
The driver of the SWR train Robin Tandy, 74, suffered "life-changing" injuries in the crash, with 14 passengers out of the 92 on board requiring hospital treatment.

SWR said it hoped the early assessment by the Rail Accident Investigation Branch, showing the driver reacted correctly to the signals, would help "stop speculation".

Collision between passenger trains at Salisbury Tunnel Junction

Investigation into a collision between passenger trains at Salisbury Tunnel Junction, Wiltshire, 31 October 2021

At around 18:45 hrs on 31 October 2021, train reporting number 1L53, the 17:20 hrs South Western Railway passenger service from London Waterloo to Honiton, collided with the side of train 1F30, the 17:08 hrs Great Western Railway passenger service from Portsmouth Harbour to Bristol Temple Meads. The collision took place at Salisbury Tunnel Junction, which is on the immediate approach to Fisherton Tunnel, near Salisbury in Wiltshire.

This junction allows the Up and Down Dean lines which lead to and from Eastleigh to merge with the Up and Down Main lines which lead to and from Basingstoke. At the time of the accident train 1F30 was using the junction to join the Down Main line from the Down Dean line, while train 1L53 was approaching the junction on the Down Main line from the direction of Basingstoke.



The impact of the collision caused the front two coaches of train 1L53 and the rear two coaches of train 1F30 to derail. Both trains continued some distance into Fisherton tunnel following the collision, before they came to a stop. Thirteen passengers and one member of railway staff required treatment in hospital as a result of the accident, which also caused significant damage to the trains and railway infrastructure involved.

RAIB’s preliminary examination has found that the movement of train 1F30 across the junction was being protected from trains approaching on the Down Main line by signal SY31, which was at danger (displaying a red aspect). Train 1L53 passed this signal, while it was at danger, by around 200 metres, immediately prior to the collision occurring.

Preliminary analysis of data downloaded from the On Train Data Recorder (OTDR) fitted to train 1L53 shows that the driver initially applied service braking to slow the train on approach to the caution signal before signal SY31. Around 12 seconds after service braking started, the driver made an emergency brake demand. As the train approached signal SY31, and with the emergency brake still being demanded by the driver, a second emergency brake demand was made by the train protection and warning system (TPWS). These emergency brake demands did not prevent the train from reaching the junction, where the collision occurred. OTDR analysis indicates that wheel slide was present both when the driver applied service braking and after emergency braking was demanded. This was almost certainly a result of low adhesion between the train’s wheels and the rails.

Our investigation will seek to identify the sequence of events which led to the accident. It will also consider:
* the level of wheel/rail adhesion present on the approach to Salisbury Tunnel junction
* the status and performance of the braking, wheel slide protection and sanding systems on train 1L53
* the behaviour of both trains during and following the collision
* South Western Railway’s policies relating to low wheel/rail adhesion
* Network Rail’s policies relating to low wheel/rail adhesion and how it managed the risk of low adhesion in this area
* the processes used to assess and control the risk of overrun at signal SY31
* any relevant underlying factors, including any actions taken in response to previous safety recommendations.
Our investigation is independent of any investigation by the railway industry, the British Transport Police or by the industry’s regulator, the Office of Rail and Road.

We will publish our findings, including any recommendations to improve safety, at the conclusion of our investigation. This report will be available on our website.

You can subscribe to automated emails notifying you when we publish our reports.

I think your question is overtaken by the latest RAIB explanation, the driver was already emergency braking, so AIUI in that case TPWS just duplicates the demand, but there’s no additional effect?

Paul

I hope they look at the part TPWS played in the incident. Once the train passes the red the driver loses all control and is effectively a passenger. I’d be interested to know if the emergency brake application made the slide worse.

Driver is 75…..is s/he the oldest on the railway?

Preliminary analysis of data downloaded from the On Train Data Recorder (OTDR) fitted to train 1L53 shows that the driver initially applied service braking to slow the train on approach to the caution signal before signal SY31. Around 12 seconds after service braking started, the driver made an emergency brake demand. As the train approached signal SY31, and with the emergency brake still being demanded by the driver, a second emergency brake demand was made by the train protection and warning system (TPWS). These emergency brake demands did not prevent the train from reaching the junction, where the collision occurred. OTDR analysis indicates that wheel slide was present both when the driver applied service braking and after emergency braking was demanded. This was almost certainly a result of low adhesion between the train’s wheels and the rails.

RAIB’s preliminary examination has found that the movement of train 1F30 across the junction was being protected from trains approaching on the Down Main line by signal SY31, which was at danger (displaying a red aspect). Train 1L53 passed this signal, while it was at danger, by around 220 metres, immediately prior to the collision occurring.

Preliminary analysis of data downloaded from the On Train Data Recorder (OTDR) fitted to train 1L53 shows that the driver initially applied service braking to slow the train on approach to the caution signal before signal SY31. Around 12 seconds after service braking started, the driver made an emergency brake demand. As the train approached signal SY31, and with the emergency brake still being demanded by the driver, a second emergency brake demand was made by the train protection and warning system (TPWS). These emergency brake demands did not prevent the train from reaching the junction, where the collision occurred. OTDR analysis indicates that wheel slide was present both when the driver applied service braking and after emergency braking was demanded. This was almost certainly a result of low adhesion between the train’s wheels and the rails.

This cab-view video shows the state of the vegetation in the cutting west of the tunnel in 2015.

In this video, signal SY31 is passed at around 38:33 (having become visible at around 38:21), and the junction is passed at around 38:45.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FLV_D2RHeMc

Any idea why the train operator would ask for it to be cancelled?

The scheduled RHTT run for earlier in the day on Sunday was cancelled 'at the request of the train operator' and doesn't appear to have run in the days beforehand either. It would have passed through Tunnel Junction four times.

Thinking of Google Streetview, the condition of the cutting sides over the last ten years ago contrasts sharply with their appearance in, ok, 1970, which I know is a different era, but they were clear of scrub and trees (photo from Flickr). The allotments to the right are still there, but even they are now losing out as they too are shaded by the full grown trees at the top of the cutting.

The google streetview is from June 2015 and provides the human interest of a couple of people in orange hi-viz gazing at the tunnel approach.



Mark

I managed just under 2 miles several years ago with all wheels locked. Luckily plain track with no restrictive aspects, applied the brakes at about 60mph, a mile or so later, I hit the platform ramp doing 55mph.

Or perhaps an insufficient number of RHTT workings over that stretch of line in the days leading up to the collision?

From the photos/pics I can find, the signal protecting the junction is well back before the tunnel & seems to be the other side of the A30(?) overbridge. [...] Am I right?

I wouldn’t describe that as a heck of a long slide at all, and I certainly wouldn’t want to make even the vaguest of guesses as to what speed the impact was based on a couple of photos!

Yes, looks like the root cause is wheel slide then.  Probably what most of us within the industry suspected.

Further investigations will no doubt check whether the railhead treatment plan for the location was appropriate and followed properly, and that the driver was driving the train up to the point of impact as per SWR instructions (and whether those instructions are appropriate).

Leaves on the line then?

The following statement was given this afternoon by Andrew Hall, Deputy Chief Inspector, Rail Accident Investigation Branch.

"A team of RAIB inspectors arrived on site on Sunday evening and were joined yesterday by additional inspectors and our support team. We are working alongside partner organisations including the Office of Rail and Road (ORR) and BTP. Our investigation is progressing well.

"Yesterday our focus was on evidence retrieval, we have been working with Police scene officers to examine the train. We have also undertaken a close examination of the track and signalling in the area and started to talk to those involved. Analysis of downloads from the trains’ data recorders, electronic data from the signalling system and CCTV imagery is ongoing.

"From the initial evidence we have collected, we know that that the passage of the Great Western train travelling from Eastleigh across Salisbury Tunnel Junction was being protected by a red signal. At this junction, trains coming from Eastleigh merge with those from Basingstoke, so the South Western service coming from Basingstoke was required to stop at that signal.

"Unfortunately, it did not stop and struck the side of the Great Western train at an angle such that both trains derailed and ran alongside each other into the tunnel just beyond the junction.

"Initial evidence indicates that the South Western train driver applied the brakes as it approached the junction and the red signal, but the train was unable to stop before passing the signal.

"This evidence suggests that the most likely cause of this was wheelslide, almost certainly a result of low adhesion between the wheels and the track. We are continuing to pursue this as a line of investigation amongst others.

"In consultation with other parties, we continue to work with the railway recovery engineers to ensure that the site is handed back in the shortest time possible. We intend to begin releasing parts of the site back to Network Rail later today.

"Later this week we’ll be releasing the initial findings of the investigation, these will be publicly available on our website."