Great Western Main Line electrification - ongoing discussion

[whole diary]

[onthecushions]

Was BT with RC and FS ITSC's MPTSC's;  now its AT with ATF and there are ATFS and MPATS^▸ (Mid Point Auto Transformer Site - electrification) which is 50kV although the trains see 25kV ............ still 50Hz though

... Your LED's won't twinkle without a GSP!

OTC

[TonyK]

Trains were perceived to be, and often were, old-fashioned and dirty. Many people's memories were still coloured by horrendous journeys during the war or going on holiday - one summer Saturday in 1957 some 80 long distance trains ran through Newton Abbot on their way west and all of them were more than TWO HOURS late. People decided never to use the train again. And they told their friends. Steam traction was still being used and passengers got smuts in their eyes and dirty shirts. Many coaches were pre-war and frequently taps didn't work or the sliding windows jammed. The upholstery was often caked in dust and dirt.

Stations were grimy places - some of them hadn't seen a paint brush since, ooh, 1938. Even the new diesel locomotives were covered in dirt and oil after a few weeks use and scarely seemed a good advertisement for the Modernisation Plan. They also kept breaking down - including one embarrassing time on the Royal Train.

Cars were clean - and yours. They went when you wanted, where you wanted and on the route you wanted. You never 'missed' your car and it wasn't necessary to get a bus to the station first.

People voted against the railway. The closures had little or nothing to do with Marples' business interests or personality, but everything to do with a fall in demand and a collapse in receipts.

And Beeching was no pawn, he was a director of Imperial Chemical Industries.

Ah, happy days, eh?

Beeching provoked controversy by being paid more than the previous head of the British Railways Board and the Prime Minister (^24,000 pa against ^14,000 and ^10,000 respectively). That was his salary at ICI when he was seconded for 5 years.

As for the abbreviations (other than Imperial Chemical Industries), I can only say IDK.

FT,N!

[IndustryInsider]

There was a Paul Clifton report on tonight's South Today of a 1-year delay to the GW^▸ (Great Western) electrification programme, which is also covered in this from the BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page):

Can't say I'm too surprised to learn that there might be a delay as progress does seem to have been a little pedestrian and timescales are tight.

The key is to ensure that the one year delay to the first phase doesn't escalate to a two year delay to Cardiff, three years to Swansea etc., and plenty of testing time for the IEP^▸ (Intercity Express Program / Project.) trains isn't necessarily a bad thing, plus it gives more time to sort out an appropriate EMU^▸ (Electric Multiple Unit) for the suburban services.

[Chris from Nailsea]

... Steam traction was still being used and passengers got smuts in their eyes and dirty shirts. Many coaches were pre-war and frequently taps didn't work or the sliding windows jammed. The upholstery was often caked in dust and dirt.

But isn't that the absolute joy of travelling on a preserved railway?  If you don't finish the day with your eyes watering and your clothes stinking of coal-smoke, you haven't done it properly! 

[TaplowGreen]

There was a Paul Clifton report on tonight's South Today of a 1-year delay to the GW^▸ (Great Western) electrification programme, which is also covered in this from the BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page):

24 February 2015
Last updated at 17:41
Great Western electrification scheme 'one year behind schedule'

The job is bigger and harder than expected, but also dramatically more expensive, sources say

Plans to modernise railways in the Thames Valley are a year behind schedule after they proved to be "dramatically more expensive" than first thought.

The predicted cost to transform the old Great Western route has climbed from ^640m to ^1.74bn, the BBC has learned.

Senior industry executives have said the plans to complete the work by the end of 2016 will not be met.

Network Rail said work was "progressing well" but schedules could change.

Overhead wires need to be fitted between Reading and Oxford so that modern trains can run on the line and carry more passengers, ease overcrowding, and improve rail times.

New trains are being shipped from Japan, with the first due to arrive in two weeks.

But they cannot be tested on the Great Western line because the power supply is not in place.

Sources have told the BBC the job is bigger and harder than expected, but also dramatically more expensive.

Paul Clifton, BBC South transport correspondent
The first of a new fleet of electric trains is on its way from a factory in Japan, raising the prospect of brand new trains standing idle in sidings.

Officially, Network Rail is still aiming for the wires to be working late next year. But note the careful choice of language. "Aiming for" is not the same as promising.

I've now been told by four separate sources the target will not be met.

One told me the project was in complete disarray and the wires will not be up until 2017.

And when are the SETs^▸ (Super Express Train (now IET)) due to all be ready?

What a farce...........but then again massive delays on the railways are hardly a new thing are they?

[ellendune]

It once again shows the difficulties of starting a project when it is not fully designed. Railtrack made that mistake spectaculallry over the West Coast Mainline Upgrade in the 1990's.  They had not even got a specification for what work needed to be done!  NR^» (Network Rail - home page) has tried to avoind this mistake, but politicians announce something and want it to happen quickly and NR falls into line because they want to investment. 

Even if they knew which bridges needed replacement each one is a project in its own right.  I know of at least two where they started off assuming they could have an extended closure only to have to change. I suggest there are more that I do not know about.  Utility service diversions on bridges always seem to take longer than you allow.  The electrification train also seems to have taken longer to arrive than originally planned. 

[TaplowGreen]

It once again shows the difficulties of starting a project when it is not fully designed. Railtrack made that mistake spectaculallry over the West Coast Mainline Upgrade in the 1990's.  They had not even got a specification for what work needed to be done!  NR^» (Network Rail - home page) has tried to avoind this mistake, but politicians announce something and want it to happen quickly and NR falls into line because they want to investment. 

Even if they knew which bridges needed replacement each one is a project in its own right.  I know of at least two where they started off assuming they could have an extended closure only to have to change. I suggest there are more that I do not know about.  Utility service diversions on bridges always seem to take longer than you allow.  The electrification train also seems to have taken longer to arrive than originally planned. 

.......so who came up with the original cost which has now trebled? Was that NR or the Government?

[Jason]

Maybe the extra ^1 billion is set aside to cover the costs of fines resulting from piling works wrecking the signalling cables ?

[Red Squirrel]

... Steam traction was still being used and passengers got smuts in their eyes and dirty shirts. Many coaches were pre-war and frequently taps didn't work or the sliding windows jammed. The upholstery was often caked in dust and dirt.

But isn't that the absolute joy of travelling on a preserved railway?  If you don't finish the day with your eyes watering and your clothes stinking of coal-smoke, you haven't done it properly! 

Ah, takes me back to an all-nighter on the Severn Valley a few years ago... fun for a while, but back in the real world I think a fast, efficient electrified railway wins the day!

[TaplowGreen]

Maybe the extra ^1 billion is set aside to cover the costs of fines resulting from piling works wrecking the signalling cables ?

............as FGW^▸ (First Great Western) proudly boast of all the huge levels of investment which "they" are making, perhaps they could chip in to covering the shortfall by returning some of the ^millions of compo which they get from NR^» (Network Rail - home page) in respect of signal failures etc and never pass on to their customers..............it must be sitting in a bank account somewhere.......unless it's set aside to pay bonuses? 

[TonyK]

I think both the original estimate and the new figure quoted are to some extent based in fantasy. The first estimate would have been done without in-depth surveying of every inch of the railway, but would not have been deliberately underestimated. Ellendunne makes this point well. The cost, in terms of time and money, in surveying and doing design work for the whole route for electrification would have been enormous, and unjustified without knowing that the project would go ahead. That sounds counter-intuitive when compared to other building projects, but as ellendunne again points out, this isn't a single buildinhg project, it is hundreds of them.

I hope the new cost is an over-estimate. It will otherwise cast a cloud over any further electrification schemes.

[stuving]

.......so who came up with the original cost which has now trebled? Was that NR^» (Network Rail - home page) or the Government?

That depends ... firstly on whether it's true.

I can't understand why so little effort is made to explain what these cost and time numbers mean. It makes most comments on them into nonsense - as happened for the channel tunnel, and more recently for HS2^▸ (The next High Speed line(s)).

Politicians want these time and cost numbers from the very start, before much work has been done on defining what the project entails. In a commercial contract senior management want that too. Inevitably those initial numbers have a large uncertainty, which the customer may accept - i.e. " as soon as you can for a reasonable cost". The equivalent cost estimate is a "known cost" basis, which means it goes up as more expensive problems become known.

That's fine if everyone understands it. But it is different from a guaranteed cost or delivery time, which involves extra payment and time allowed so as to reduce the risk. If we (or the press) think it's a "promise" when it's a "target" (the distinction Paul Clifton was making, but not clarifying, yesterday), we all get confused.

In the CP5^▸ (Control Period 5 - the five year period between 2014 and 2019) delivery plan, for project W001a, there are two "Regulated Outputs" - for "Entry Into Service" - in June 2016 to Newbury, Oxford, Chippenham, and in May 2017 to Bristol TM^‡(resolve). Both stages had passed GRIP^▸ (Guide to Railway Investment Projects) 3 (single option selection) by July 2014, and GRIP 4 (single option scope defined) is due by August 2015. But the real start time is "First timetabled public use of the infrastructure", for which the "indicator" is December 2016 or May 2017 for the two stages. Of course the work for GRIP 4 is what tells you how much money, resources, and in practice (resources being very much finite) time is going to be required. So I conclude that the "regulated "outputs" are not really fixed and firm or promised dates, just two performance criteria on which NR will be formally judged by ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) but allowed to miss them if their excuses are good enough.

This may all be explained somewhere, but if it is I expect it is hidden inside documents so long, jargon-ridden, and numerous as to make it invisible.

The situation with costs is similar, but it is harder to find single-project costs anywhere. About all I can find is the 2013 Periodic Review* by ORR, dealing with NR's capital plans for CP5. Here, in the introduction, it says:

81. Around ^7bn of projects are at an early stage of development and hence the costs are uncertain. Fixing this cost now could involve paying a large ^risk premium‟. So to ensure better value for money we have taken a new approach to setting the efficient level of costs for these projects, building on a proposal made by the Rail Delivery Group (RDG^‡(resolve)). We have made a provisional cost assessment now but we will finalise the total efficient cost progressively by March 2015 as project plans become more mature.

The idea that this is new to ORR is very worrying.

Later it expands this a bit:

[9.86] We considered Network Rail‟s response to the draft determination, where we agreed with some of its points and acknowledged that costs for some projects may have changed considerably since the SBP as scope has developed further.
9.87 The enhancements cost adjustment mechanism is a new process that will deal with changes to cost estimates (both up and down). We think that this process will address Network Rail‟s points as we will agree more accurate efficient costs when the projects reach a more advanced stage.

When assessing costs, it aggregates projects rather than showing them separately. In Chapter 9, on enhancements, we read:

9.14 Network Rail proposed in its SBP that the outputs and funding for some of these should only be fixed once they have reached a later stage when a single option has been selected (i.e. GRIP 4). This was the main issue we faced in determining efficient costs and is explained more fully in the section ^major issues in assessing enhancements‟.

Again, that suggests a lack of an agreed basis between NR, ORR, and DfT^» (Department for Transport - about) on this fundamental issue.

Electrification schemes, i.e. all the current projects added together, were ^3.2 Bn in the Strategic Business Plan.

9.58 A further point made by Network Rail was that, since the SBP submission the costs for Great Western electrification, Midland Main Line electrification and East West rail have increased by about ^376m in total as a result of further development and design work. It acknowledged that the new approach is specifically designed to deal with this happening but considered that it would be sensible to include this additional amount in our assumptions for the determination. As the portfolio of projects develops costs for some may increase whereas costs for others may decrease. We have not added the amount Network Rail suggested at this stage, just as we have not assumed any further cost reductions. This will be addressed through the enhancements cost adjustment framework.

That suggests a modest cost increase which is covered by this "cost adjustment" mechanism, acknowledging that the initial costs were not meant to be complete. But it well short of what is being reported now.
 
If the cost increase of nearly ^1Bn is even roughly right (and it probably is not, but how would we know?) that cost increase would be a serious concern.

The timescale may not be, though it would be hard to spend all that extra money without taking time to do so. And while there is that gap of 6 months from EIS^▸ (Enters Into Service) to new timetable, introducing a timetable can't be put off at short notice - that 6 months does not sound generous for proving runs over the whole network before the deadline for committing to the timetable change.

*Periodic Review 2013: Final determination of Network Rail^s outputs and funding for 2014-19 October 2013

[lordgoata]

Even if they knew which bridges needed replacement each one is a project in its own right.  I know of at least two where they started off assuming they could have an extended closure only to have to change. I suggest there are more that I do not know about.  Utility service diversions on bridges always seem to take longer than you allow.  The electrification train also seems to have taken longer to arrive than originally planned. 

I don't know if the footbridge at Goring needed to be replaced for electrictrification purposes (as opposed to being knackered), but the temporary one they are installing is MUCH higher than the current one. However, it is taking them forever to finish assembling it - the one we had a couple of years ago when they refurbished the old bridge went up in half the time. It really seems to be going at a snails pace at times, despite starting off rather quickly.

From Goring to Reading there are a lot of posts installed now, some with bits hanging off them, but there is still a lot to do - nothing is in place around the Gatehampton bridge - and I assume something needs to be in place at stations, but there doesn't appear to be any evidence (to us uneducated types at least) of electrification process at Goring, Pangbourne or Tilehurst stations themselves.

I'm also surprised by the variety of post sizes, shapes and spans - it all looks very random at times (I know it isn't!).

Out of interest, does anyone know how they plan to handle the wires over Gatehampton bridge (over the Thames) and in areas where its too narrow for the posts ? What about through the actual stations, will there be posts installed on platforms, is it going to hang from the canopies ? I assume they can't have a post at each end as the span will be too long for the cables ? Never really thought about it until I realised how close the posts are the other day.

This months Goring Gap had an update on the progress, hopefully John will add it to the forum again like he did before. But there is also a notice to all residence that Network Rail have stated as of now (February) all OHLE components are to be classed as live and avoided at all costs.

[Rhydgaled]

This view of Marples is common - but inaccurate. He was admittedly a rogue but if Marples hadn't been Minister of Transport then someone else would have been and very similar changes would have taken place. It was not just Marples who thought cars were the future. Most people did so too - which is why they bought cars. The number of cars on the road doubled in just 10 years -  from 4.9 million in 1960 to 9.97 million in 1970 - so it's hardly surprising that there was pressure for new or re-built roads.

This demand had nothing whatsoever to do with personalities or politics and everything to do with car manufacturers gaining the cost savings of larger production volumes. And this increase in the number of cars played merry hell with passenger numbers, especially on the branch lines and shorter distance main line journeys.

Yes, yes, cars were taking off, and clousure of branch lines was therefore understandable. What I particularly object to is the construction of the motorways and similar major roads,  presumably taxpayer-funded. If all roads were like the A487 today, or worse, maybe the car would have been limited to rail-heading and the core main line network would have remained a part of most long-distance journeys. Although I suppose the 1960s were a few years before people realised (in 1980s??) that climate change would be a problem, so they possibily had an excuse whereas the current governments wanting to bypass the M4 etc. are totally inexcusable.

And Beeching was no pawn, he was a director of Imperial Chemical Industries.

I meant in the context of rail closures, I assume the government decided the policy and Beeching was employed to implement it.

There was a Paul Clifton report on tonight's South Today of a 1-year delay to the GW^▸ (Great Western) electrification programme, which is also covered in this from the BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page):

Can't say I'm too surprised to learn that there might be a delay as progress does seem to have been a little pedestrian and timescales are tight.

The key is to ensure that the one year delay to the first phase doesn't escalate to a two year delay to Cardiff, three years to Swansea etc., and plenty of testing time for the IEP^▸ (Intercity Express Program / Project.) trains isn't necessarily a bad thing, plus it gives more time to sort out an appropriate EMU^▸ (Electric Multiple Unit) for the suburban services.

There did seem to be rather alot of route planned for electrification by 2016, but a whole year (2017-2018) allowed for extending wires from Cardiff to Swansea, so I wonder whether things could be reprofiled, to minimise bad press. For example instead of Oxford, Newbury and Bristol in 2016, just Oxford or Bristol could be targetted. Then in 2017 Cardiff and Newbury and finally in 2018 Swansea and the remaining one of Oxford/Bristol.

[stuving]

There did seem to be rather alot of route planned for electrification by 2016, but a whole year (2017-2018) allowed for extending wires from Cardiff to Swansea, so I wonder whether things could be reprofiled, to minimise bad press. For example instead of Oxford, Newbury and Bristol in 2016, just Oxford or Bristol could be targetted. Then in 2017 Cardiff and Newbury and finally in 2018 Swansea and the remaining one of Oxford/Bristol.

More likely the opposite. Times for Cardiff-Swansea past GRIP^▸ (Guide to Railway Investment Projects) 3 are all "indicative". Bristol TM^‡(resolve) to Cardiff missed GRIP 3, and  the CP5^▸ (Control Period 5 - the five year period between 2014 and 2019) Enhancements Delivery Plan* says:

* GRIP 3 missed for Bristol Temple Meads and Bristol Parkway to Cardiff Central. The new date is subject to change until the programme has been re-examined, revised and communicated to the stakeholders. It is acknowledged that this section of the main line includes relatively complex locations that require further and greater study to deliver the best whole-life cost solution. This is supported by the client. The locations agreed in this category ^ and required to complete GRIP 3 Single Option Selection and fully signed-off Integrated AiP ^ is limited to Bristol Temple Meads Station and Bristol Parkway Station.

If the first two stages are bigger than foreseen, something will have to give. Almost certainly this third stage plus the South Wales Main Line will have to be delayed further so that 2+2 only needs to come to 6.

* As last revised in December 2014.