Thames Valley infrastructure problems causing disruption elsewhere - 2023

[whole diary]

[NickB]

I don’t think that was what TaplowGreen was implying. He was asking whether lessons about ineffective evacuations have been learnt to prevent them reoccurring.

[Electric train]

The Lewisham incident was investigated by the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch). Has there been any indication that this incident will be investigated by them?

RAIB will be interested and will be investigating 

[ChrisB]

They have yet to send out their notification of thus doing

[Electric train]

The Lewisham incident was investigated by the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch). Has there been any indication that this incident will be investigated by them?

The Lewisham incident involved a mass self detraining of passengers, the recent GWML^▸ (Great Western Main Line) incident outside Paddington did not involve a mass self detraining.   

Passengers in the GWML outside Paddington may have been greatly inconvenienced and the lack of welfare (heat, water, toilets) but they were is a place of safety i.e. not immediate threat to life or of injury by remaining on the train.

The RIAB I am sure will have been in contact with Network Rail and the TOCs^▸ (Train Operating Company) and they maybe satisfied that the internal railway investigations are robust enough.  The RAIB investigators are hold a warrant (same as the police) so when the RIAB interview a witness the witness is placed under caution, the witness will say they want their solicitor present which adds time and cost.  Internal investigations whist not having the power of under caution are more collaborative, however if the lead investigator (and these are trained individuals to a similar level as RIAB) come across anything that is criminal of serious safety related they will not hesitate to had the case over to BTP^▸ (British Transport Police) or RIAB   

[Gordon the Blue Engine]

Sorry, ET, I have to disagree.  The fact that the passengers were in a “place of safety” (although that is arguable) is no excuse for managers not acting more quickly to evacuate the trains. 

The management of safety requires a balanced and informed approach to risk and benefit.  It seems to me that to-day’s managers and/or management systems tend to find reasons – particularly around the interpretation of H&S^▸ (Health and Safety) - not to take decisive and quick action when things go wrong.   

Managers should have the competence and confidence to use their judgment to act decisively and solve problems quickly.  That’s what they’re paid to do. 

[ellendune]

The management of safety requires a balanced and informed approach to risk and benefit.   

Yes, there were the inconvenience of being where they were, but also remember that evacuating a train is not risk free.  The two risks do have to be balanced.  I cannot judge which side the is correct, but I know it is not a simple decision. 

[TaplowGreen]

Sorry, ET, I have to disagree.  The fact that the passengers were in a “place of safety” (although that is arguable) is no excuse for managers not acting more quickly to evacuate the trains. 

The management of safety requires a balanced and informed approach to risk and benefit.  It seems to me that to-day’s managers and/or management systems tend to find reasons – particularly around the interpretation of H&S^▸ (Health and Safety) - not to take decisive and quick action when things go wrong.   

Managers should have the competence and confidence to use their judgment to act decisively and solve problems quickly.  That’s what they’re paid to do. 

Exactly the point and makes me wonder whether some of the key lessons of the Lewisham stranding were learned and recommendations taken up - and there are a lot of relevant points in that report about speed of decision making, communications and speedier evacuation.

Furthermore, the public in general and those who were caught up in (to be frank) this s***show in particular have the right to know exactly what went wrong, what should have been done, who was responsible and what will be done to ensure it doesn't happen again or is at least managed in a more professional and responsible manner, and this requires a report by a body such as the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch), perhaps incorporating testimony from passengers on the stranded trains rather than a "circle the wagons" type affair produced by NR^» (Network Rail - home page) & the TOCs^▸ (Train Operating Company)

Some of the more defensive answers on this thread give a clear indication as to how customer experience is too far down the list of priorities for the railway and that remains a huge cultural challenge.

My final comment would be that having a Regional MD responsible for region in question who lives in Aberdeen is probably not conducive to swift action and decision making at the necessary level in these circumstances, although she does appear to have paid the price, if not just for this but for numerous other failings.

Haines said "we failed as a system" and "we can do better" in the conclusion of his statement following his own stranding on one of the trains involved - let's hope so - I am sure we all look forward to hearing how that will be achieved in future, and why it wasn't on this occasion.

[ChrisB]

They absolutely could not evacuate until safety could be assured. That as a minimum means no movements of any kind possible and sufficient staff to ensure the evacuations are safe without allowing passengers to wander anywhere except the direction they are meant to go in. If eitrher can't be assured, they stay in a place of safety. If that means urinating on the train, so be it. Uncomfortable, horrible, but it ain't going to kill you! If RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) are assured that no one was put at risk, or harmed, then they won't investigate a slow detrain.

[ellendune]

Of course one of the issues that contributed to this was the failure to install toilets on the Elizabeth Line Trains

[ChrisB]

The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) investigators are hold a warrant (same as the police) so when the RIAB interview a witness the witness is placed under caution, the witness will say they want their solicitor present which adds time and cost.

The RAIB say

Our investigations focus on improving safety. We're not a prosecuting body and don't assign fault or blame, or determine liability.

[Timmer]

If that means urinating on the train, so be it. Uncomfortable, horrible, but it ain't going to kill you!

Yeah, perfectly acceptable in the 21st century for people to be expected to **** in the corner of a train. Come on Chris, think of the female passengers who needed to go.

[ChrisB]

Unacceptable, but if needs must it won't kill you, whereas the chances are far higher if evacuation starts & the public wander off in all directions

[Gordon the Blue Engine]

I think we all agree that it needs railway people to guide evacuees from the trains to a place of safety.  The issue is why did it took so long for this to be organised, in this case within a few hundred yards of Paddington station.  The sooner “guides” are mobilsed with a controlled evacuation, the less chance there is of people self-evacuating and wandering off – that WOULD have been a safety hazard.

[ChrisB]

Indeed - BUT the trains were from 3 different TOCs^▸ (Train Operating Company), spread out along the inner GWML^▸ (Great Western Main Line) - so that's 4 (5 if =you include BTP^▸ (British Transport Police)) rail companies that have to talk to each other & find enough staff to attend to their services, meaning each team needs to be assembled at the nearest track access point to each failed train, handle all the HSE^▸ (Health and Safety Executive) requirements and obtain permissions.

All that *after* ascertaining (probably from an initial site inspection, as to whether they might get them moving again in the time that evacuation takes)

So just where are all these staff 'hanging around' (working) such that they can all drop whatever they are doing straight away to mobilise to wherever their access point might be? And how long do *yoyu* think this ought to take?

[Electric train]

I think we all agree that it needs railway people to guide evacuees from the trains to a place of safety.  The issue is why did it took so long for this to be organised, in this case within a few hundred yards of Paddington station.  The sooner “guides” are mobilsed with a controlled evacuation, the less chance there is of people self-evacuating and wandering off – that WOULD have been a safety hazard.

Indeed - BUT the trains were from 3 different TOCs^▸ (Train Operating Company), spread out along the inner GWML^▸ (Great Western Main Line) - so that's 4 (5 if =you include BTP^▸ (British Transport Police)) rail companies that have to talk to each other & find enough staff to attend to their services, meaning each team needs to be assembled at the nearest track access point to each failed train, handle all the HSE^▸ (Health and Safety Executive) requirements and obtain permissions.

All that *after* ascertaining (probably from an initial site inspection, as to whether they might get them moving again in the time that evacuation takes)

So just where are all these staff 'hanging around' (working) such that they can all drop whatever they are doing straight away to mobilise to wherever their access point might be? And how long do *yoyu* think this ought to take?

The Network Rail staff who carry out train evacuations are the MOMs^▸ (Mobile Operations Manager) (Mobile Operations Managers) they are mobile in the sense they are in road vehicles and are actually quite thinly spread out.  The Network Rail Maintainenance teams who could assist the MOMs at that time of the day also quite spread out.  Both the MOMs and Maintainenance are spread out to react to the normal run of the mill faults.
It would take time to get MOMs from other areas to the Paddington area basically they had to drive there, in traffic, in Network vehicles with a 56 mph speed limiter fitted.

BTP and the civil Police would not attempt to evacuate trains unless there was an immediate threat to the life of the stranded passengers, we are after all talking about stranded trains and not a crash.

As I have mentioned before the track is a very hostile environment especially in the dark, the risk of serious injury (broken bones) from just walking in unsuitable footwear is very high,

If an evacuation is not manage there will always be the impatient persons who will wonder off because they know better which means it will take even longer before trains can be allowed to move because the whole area has to be searched.

At the time of the incident I am guessing that between Reading and Paddington Network Rail possibly had less than 20 staff with the training and equipment to evacuate that many passengers, it is likely MOMs were called in from adjacent Routes to assist but that can only be done when cover is arranged for their area.