Problems with IET trains from April 2021

[whole diary]

[IndustryInsider]

Details of an ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) review:

https://www.orr.gov.uk/search-news/orr-lessons-learned-review-hitachi-train-cracks

[stuving]

Details of an ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) review:

https://www.orr.gov.uk/search-news/orr-lessons-learned-review-hitachi-train-cracks

I find this a bit weird. The content is given as:

ORR will work with Hitachi’s design and manufacturing teams and all relevant parties to:
● find the root cause of the
    – cracking in the jacking plate
    – cracking at the yaw damper bracket/anti-roll bar end of the bolster
● examine the industry processes relating to
    – identification of the problem
    – assessment of the safety risk
    – withdrawal of the trains from service
    – return of the trains to service
● identify potential improvements

Parts two and three make sense: they involve looking at procedures and processes and how well they worked. But the first part? This, and the first steps in the next part, are:

The criteria for selecting the materials, the joining methods and any post-joining treatment when designing vehicles to operate for the life of the contract.
● How the design, manufacturing and testing processes addressed the potential for stress corrosion cracking and fatigue cracking in the design.
● Hitachi’s processes to identify cracking in components during the life of the train.
● The background to the identification of the cracks in the bolster area, and how Hitachi managed the subsequent investigation and development of solutions.
● Whether the cracks in the jacking plates could have been found earlier.

So, ORR are going to contribute expertise as mutallurgists, are they? Who'd have thought! Even one step back, if it's about the engineering design and production quality processes, I'm not convinced it's expertise they can claim.

What was the next process in the chain? I think it's the customer's product design acceptance and quality assurance process. I can't work out exactly how that was done or by whom. Note that the requirement/specification probably doesn't say "shall not fall apart" (but we all know it shouldn't) so it may mall under the heading of quality.

There are several kinds of product acceptance process for rail vehicles, of which the main one is for NR^» (Network Rail - home page), to give a certificate to run on the network. But that's mainly about systems and interfaces - will it work with our track, signals, power supply, and everything else. For those areas, and operational ones, there are safety cases to by filled in too (largely done by Ricardo for the 800s). Apart from crashworthiness, I don't think structural integrity is part of NR's acceptance process.

Now, it would make some sense to look at this area and see whether the various bits worked together well enough. There is also the question of whether this issue (of potential cracking) had safety implication at acceptance, and might that have been found at acceptance time. But none of that is on the ORR's list; instead they will be playing the at being amateur metallurgists.

[stuving]

Actually, there was no customer in the normal sense (i.e. purchaser) for the IEPs^▸ (Intercity Express Program / Project.). They were retained by Hitachi (or perhaps formally sold to Agility) to fulfil a kind of lease. Some trains bought by ROSCOS might also not be bought by anyone who would fit as buyer then owner in the railway procedural sense. Note that most trains have been acquired by a TOC^▸ (Train Operating Company) to the certification stage, then transferred to a ROSCO^» (Rolling Stock Owning Company - about) in a kind of sale and leaseback.

That makes Hitachi responsible for everything, so their internal quality processes - as customer and manufacturer talking to themselves - are relevant. What requirement they have to meet, and where it is, might be worth a study in itself.

[IndustryInsider]

I can not remember which trains were advised as being 3 car instead of 5 car, but believe that there were several earlier today.

After checking daily for the last couple of weeks, I can confirm I’ve finally found one IET^▸ (Intercity Express Train) diagram today (on a Paddington<>Oxford diagram) that is being covered by a 3-car turbo on an unplanned basis.

[Electric train]

Details of an ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) review:

https://www.orr.gov.uk/search-news/orr-lessons-learned-review-hitachi-train-cracks

I find this a bit weird. The content is given as:

ORR will work with Hitachi’s design and manufacturing teams and all relevant parties to:
● find the root cause of the
    – cracking in the jacking plate
    – cracking at the yaw damper bracket/anti-roll bar end of the bolster
● examine the industry processes relating to
    – identification of the problem
    – assessment of the safety risk
    – withdrawal of the trains from service
    – return of the trains to service
● identify potential improvements

Parts two and three make sense: they involve looking at procedures and processes and how well they worked. But the first part? This, and the first steps in the next part, are:

The criteria for selecting the materials, the joining methods and any post-joining treatment when designing vehicles to operate for the life of the contract.
● How the design, manufacturing and testing processes addressed the potential for stress corrosion cracking and fatigue cracking in the design.
● Hitachi’s processes to identify cracking in components during the life of the train.
● The background to the identification of the cracks in the bolster area, and how Hitachi managed the subsequent investigation and development of solutions.
● Whether the cracks in the jacking plates could have been found earlier.

So, ORR are going to contribute expertise as mutallurgists, are they? Who'd have thought! Even one step back, if it's about the engineering design and production quality processes, I'm not convinced it's expertise they can claim.

What was the next process in the chain? I think it's the customer's product design acceptance and quality assurance process. I can't work out exactly how that was done or by whom. Note that the requirement/specification probably doesn't say "shall not fall apart" (but we all know it shouldn't) so it may mall under the heading of quality.

There are several kinds of product acceptance process for rail vehicles, of which the main one is for NR^» (Network Rail - home page), to give a certificate to run on the network. But that's mainly about systems and interfaces - will it work with our track, signals, power supply, and everything else. For those areas, and operational ones, there are safety cases to by filled in too (largely done by Ricardo for the 800s). Apart from crashworthiness, I don't think structural integrity is part of NR's acceptance process.

Now, it would make some sense to look at this area and see whether the various bits worked together well enough. There is also the question of whether this issue (of potential cracking) had safety implication at acceptance, and might that have been found at acceptance time. But none of that is on the ORR's list; instead they will be playing the at being amateur metallurgists.

It will be more the ORR asking Hitachi to demonstrate via evidence and if the ORR need to expertise they will buy it in.

It is better they are doing this pre accident than as part of a post accident investigation

[stuving]

It was expected that Hitachi would instrument an IET^▸ (Intercity Express Train) (inertial sensors, strain gauges, etc.) and run it as part of their investigation to find out what the bogies have been subjected to. There was a report on railforums that this has been out running under 3Zxx codes, and that this is also to clarify an ongoing dispute with NR^» (Network Rail - home page) as to whether their track is more bent than Hitachi were told. Of course this relates to the issue of these trains' ride as well, though just how good or bad it is is still a matter of argument - it's notoriously subjective.

Looking back, the earliest outing I can see was in 15th (Tuesday). So far the train has been operated out of North Pole, unsurprisingly, by GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) as ECS^▸ (Empty Coaching Stock) non-stop. We have had, all booked as STP:

15/6  PAD^» (Paddington (London) - next trains) 3Z91 PNZ 3Z92 PAD
16/6  PAD 3Z10 SWA^» (Swansea - next trains) 3Z11 PAD
17/6  PAD 3Z20 WOS^» (Worcester Shrub Hill - next trains) 3Z21 PAD (3Z23 WOS 3Z23 PAD cancelled)
18/6  PAD 3Z91 PNZ 3Z92 PAD
19/6 (PAD 3Z40 SWA 3Z41 PAD cancelled)

and next week some more are already booked:
21/6  PAD 3Z10 SWA 3Z11 PAD
21/6  PAD 3Z20 WOS 3Z21 PAD 3Z23 WOS 3Z23 PAD (presumably both won't run!)
22/6  PAD 3Z91 PNZ 3Z92 PAD
23/6  PAD 3Z10 SWA 3Z11 PAD
24/6  PAD 3Z20 WOS 3Z21 PAD 3Z23 WOS 3Z23 PAD
25/6  PAD 3Z91 PNZ 3Z92 PAD

If you want to look at these, they are easier to spot using RTT^» (Real Time Trains - website) with "non-passenger services" selected. .

[Worcester_Passenger]

21/6  PAD^» (Paddington (London) - next trains) 3Z20 WOS^» (Worcester Shrub Hill - next trains) 3Z21 PAD 3Z23 WOS 3Z23 PAD (presumably both won't run!)

3Z20/21/22 are routed via Evesham but 3Z23 is via Stroud.

[broadgage]

I can see the merit of running a specially instrumented train for test purposes/data gathering, but why run such a service as ECS^▸ (Empty Coaching Stock) and not carrying passengers ?
Whilst the weight of passengers and luggage is a small part of the total gross weight, it might possibly be significant and a test train running normally loaded might give more representative data. Sand bags are only a partial substitute as they do not move around.
It is just about possible that the problems are caused by full power at low speeds, as when accelerating away from station stops.
Use on a good selection of passenger workings would be representative of normal use.

I appreciate that test equipment and perhaps staff monitoring this may need a fair bit of space, but surely a 9 car, or a 5+5 with one vehicle locked out of use could be used.
The reduction in passenger capacity would be regrettable, but much less than that caused by withdrawing a whole train from passenger use in order to use it for test purposes.

[IndustryInsider]

I’m sure Hitachi are doing it this way for a reason.

[stuving]

I’m sure Hitachi are doing it this way for a reason.

I'd guess the main reason is operational - wanting to run or not run it based on that last recorded readings, change the set-up, repeat a route or do a new one, etc. It's not as if for the primary purpose it's needed for very long.

On the other hand, I can't understand why Hitachi hadn't got a few units fully instrumented from the start (assuming they didn't). Even more obviously, before that during trials and commissioning, wouldn't you want that kind of feedback about how the design was working? After all, some of the fleet have built-in monitoring of OLE^▸ (Overhead Line Equipment, more often "OHLE") and track geometry as standard, as well as forward CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision). There's no such thing as too much information!

[BBM]

BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page) Political Correspondent Chris Mason has tweeted the following this morning:

https://twitter.com/ChrisMasonBBC/status/1411261195064156165

Social distancing not really an option on this @gwrhelp train from Swansea to London Paddington. Very busy since Bristol Parkway, standing room only after stopping in Reading.

@GWRHelp
Hi there, sorry to see this Chris. Can you confirm which service you are travelling on please? - Brad

0822 Swansea to London Paddington. The explanation appears to be the train is half its normal length, for some reason.

[IndustryInsider]

I note the previous train from Reading, a 10-car from Bristol, was late due to an earlier fatality, so that would explain the heavy loadings after Reading, as there had been a twenty minute gap since the previous fast train.

It’s a train that was only booked to be a 5-car, but is one of the ones that should really be a 9/10 car.

As passenger numbers continue to rise, especially at weekends, there will be occasions when social distancing isn’t possible on every train.  I’m afraid that just has to be expected and accepted.

[TaplowGreen]

I note the previous train from Reading, a 10-car from Bristol, was late due to an earlier fatality, so that would explain the heavy loadings after Reading, as there had been a twenty minute gap since the previous fast train.

It’s a train that was only booked to be a 5-car, but is one of the ones that should really be a 9/10 car.

As passenger numbers continue to rise, especially at weekends, there will be occasions when social distancing isn’t possible on every train.  I’m afraid that just has to be expected and accepted.

Not sure it has to be accepted. Surely it's incumbent on train & platform staff to at least make an effort to prevent this type of scenario in the current environment especially at a station like Reading?

Couldn't announcements be made that the train approaching platform X will be setting down only due to overcrowding? Sure some won't listen but many will.

Elderly/vulnerable people especially will look at this with alarm.

[broadgage]

Better get used to it.
New shorter trains are the future.
I will let others argue as to the reasons for the short forms, cracks ? other mechanical faults ? only booked to be a 5 car and therefore OK ?

I am not aware of any timetable for repairs, so the present covid mode/cracked train mode looks likely to continue for some years. By which time something else will probably go wrong.

[IndustryInsider]

Not sure it has to be accepted. Surely it's incumbent on train & platform staff to at least make an effort to prevent this type of scenario in the current environment especially at a station like Reading?

Couldn't announcements be made that the train approaching platform X will be setting down only due to overcrowding? Sure some won't listen but many will.

Yes, every effort should be made to inform and encourage passengers of alternatives, but it must be expected and accepted that social distancing still won’t always be possible.