Cal Sleeper runs away at Edinburgh 1st August

[whole diary]

[bradshaw]

It is being reported on Twitter that stock for the above ran away from Haymarket through Waverley to Abbeyhill.
More brake problems?
https://twitter.com/thesatnav89/status/1156875855165083648?s=21

[grahame]

It is being reported on Twitter that stock for the above ran away from Haymarket through Waverley to Abbeyhill.
More brake problems?
https://twitter.com/thesatnav89/status/1156875855165083648?s=21

The Scotsman has a lot more on the story ..

Major commuter rail disruption was caused today by a Caledonian Sleeper train breaking down after failing to stop at Waverley Station.

The train ran through the station before stopping at Abbeyhill to the east, blocking a junction and halting trains to and from North Berwick, Dunbar, Tweedbank and London.

The Sleeper driver is understood to have sent an emergency message to signallers to be able to pass through the station.

[snip] ....

Ryan Flaherty, Serco’s managing director for Caledonian Sleeper, said: “Our northbound Lowlander service into Edinburgh Waverley this morning overran the platform, due to an earlier operational issue at Carstairs.

"An investigation is underway into the cause of the incident, but early indications are that there are no technical problems with the rolling stock.

"We have notified the relevant authorities.

[ChrisB]

Ryan Flaherty, Serco’s managing director for Caledonian Sleeper, said: “Our northbound Lowlander service into Edinburgh Waverley this morning overran the platform, due to an earlier operational issue at Carstairs.

"An investigation is underway into the cause of the incident, but early indications are that there are no technical problems with the rolling stock.

"We have notified the relevant authorities.

Hmmm. But there should be designed in something to *prevent* operator error. It shouldn't be possible to leave something set erroneously.

[TaplowGreen]

Aren't braking systems supposed to be failsafe?

[ChrisB]

If all the cables/pipes are connected up, yup

[TaplowGreen]

If all the cables/pipes are connected up, yup

…….and from what I understand in that respect, a certain shunter may be having a rather "difficult" interview with his Boss, at which coffee will almost certainly be absent.

[Oxonhutch]

If all the cables/pipes are connected up, yup

Hence the brake and continuity test before before you move off - I thought ...

[stuving]

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) have decided to have a look at this incident. They give a short description of what happened:

At about 07:26 hrs on Thursday 1 August 2019, train 1B26, the Edinburgh portion of the 23:36 hrs ‘Lowland Sleeper’ service from London Euston, failed to stop as scheduled at Edinburgh Waverley station. It was brought to a stand approximately 650 metres beyond its intended stopping point. There was no damage or any injuries as a consequence of the incident. However, the outcome could potentially have been much worse, had it led to a collision with another train.

The train comprised eight Mark 5 coaches hauled by a Class 92 electric locomotive that had been attached at Carstairs. On the approach to Edinburgh the driver discovered that his train’s braking performance was well below normal. The RAIB’s preliminary investigation indicates that he had no control of the brakes on the coaches because a brake pipe isolating valve was in the closed position when the train left Carstairs station. This meant that the only effective brakes on the train as it approached Edinburgh were those on the locomotive, which were insufficient to maintain control of the train. The train was brought to a stand by the operation of an emergency device in one of the coaches by the Train Manager, which caused the train brakes to apply.

That is, I guess, the obvious way to achieve that result.

[GBM]

The train was brought to a stand by the operation of an emergency device in one of the coaches by the Train Manager, which caused the train brakes to apply.

Would that be the emergency chord in all coaches, or does their (some TOC^▸ (Train Operating Company)'s) TM^‡(resolve) have a different stop mechanism?

[Electric train]

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) have decided to have a look at this incident. They give a short description of what happened:

At about 07:26 hrs on Thursday 1 August 2019, train 1B26, the Edinburgh portion of the 23:36 hrs ‘Lowland Sleeper’ service from London Euston, failed to stop as scheduled at Edinburgh Waverley station. It was brought to a stand approximately 650 metres beyond its intended stopping point. There was no damage or any injuries as a consequence of the incident. However, the outcome could potentially have been much worse, had it led to a collision with another train.

The train comprised eight Mark 5 coaches hauled by a Class 92 electric locomotive that had been attached at Carstairs. On the approach to Edinburgh the driver discovered that his train’s braking performance was well below normal. The RAIB’s preliminary investigation indicates that he had no control of the brakes on the coaches because a brake pipe isolating valve was in the closed position when the train left Carstairs station. This meant that the only effective brakes on the train as it approached Edinburgh were those on the locomotive, which were insufficient to maintain control of the train. The train was brought to a stand by the operation of an emergency device in one of the coaches by the Train Manager, which caused the train brakes to apply.

That is, I guess, the obvious way to achieve that result.

The train was brought to a stand by the operation of an emergency device in one of the coaches by the Train Manager, which caused the train brakes to apply.

Would that be the emergency chord in all coaches, or does their (some TOC^▸ (Train Operating Company)'s) TM^‡(resolve) have a different stop mechanism?

If the Train (air) Brake Pipe isolating valve (this is the red painted pipe) was closed, the only way the train could have moved was because all the train brakes had been bled down; this also means the Train Main Reservoir Pipe valve (this is the yellow painted pipe) was also closed.   There are 2 reasons why the train brakes would have been bled down, the train needed splitting in the depot for shut reconfiguring or for maintenance by fitters.

The only brake available to the Train Manager would be the hand brake in the guards compartment, which is limited in its effect.

I suspect the RAIB will focus on the train prep process when trains leave a depot or stabling.  Was the driver required by the TOC to carry out a brake test or is this done by the shunters, what are the duties of the TM remember these are different to Guards 

[Trowres]

The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) report has now been published:

https://www.gov.uk/government/news/report-052020-loss-of-brake-control-on-a-sleeper-train-approaching-edinburgh

The driver was unable to stop the train because the brake pipe isolating cock on the leading end of the leading coach was closed. This prevented the brakes on all the coaches from operating when demanded by the driver, although the driver still had control of the brake systems on the locomotive.

The isolating cock became closed during coupling operations when the Edinburgh train was split from the Glasgow train at Carstairs station; this happened after the mandated brake continuity test had been completed. The closure of the valve was therefore undetected prior to the train’s departure from Carstairs. The effectiveness of the brake systems on the locomotive also masked the absence of the coach brakes until the train was approaching Slateford, on the approach to Edinburgh.

RAIB has made two recommendations. One is addressed to RSSB^▸ (Rail Safety and Standards Board) to change the wording of the railway rule book to make it clear that the brake continuity test should be undertaken after all coupling-related activities have been completed. The second is addressed to Caledonian Sleeper to review the vulnerability of the isolating cocks on its rolling stock, to prevent inadvertent operation by persons or objects.

The report is over forty pages; the above summary doesn't quite do justice to the number of subtleties at work on the night of the incident. The isolating cock was closed accidentally when the crew returned to the coupling area between loco and train to complete the coupling of ETH and communication cables - activities they couldn't perform until the Glasgow portion had been uncoupled.

There are some interesting details about how closing the isolating cock should have vented air from the connection between coaches and loco and why this wasn't detected.

Also notable is the vulnerable position of the isolating cock and connecting piping. This forum has noted incidents in this country and over the channel in which brake systems have been compromised by damage from objects on the p-way, although the RAIB report does not mention these.

[GBM]

I was intrigued by the driver NOT sending a GSM alarm as that could scupper his chances of a through road somewhere by stopping everything.
Although the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) seemed to imply that wasn't a good idea.  It was a 'do I', 'Don't I' situations and, to me, he did the right thing.
Whilst it's easy to look back on something, when it actually happened, the driver had a lot to do in a very short time.
A brown trouser incident without doubt.

[eightf48544]

Reading the report it seems to me tha the splitting and adding a loco to rear is a complicated process. Involving working in cramped conditons almost under the coach with  a sensistive isolating cock in the way.

The 61 way jumper also intrigues me. Is it used on other stock? Not like the old days when you could bang two EPBs togther and couple up one jumper and two brake pipes.


Also why do we not have standard couplings?

It reminds me of my OU course on Human Factors in System Design (which was basically a study of various disasters) where by there nearky always a previous non fatal occurance.

Is this the non fatal occurance?