That report to the minister by
SNCF▸ has appeared today. That means they have produced a 28-page report, with graphics, in less time than the incident itself lasted. That kind of impressive, but maybe not in the way they'd like.
The story is still that it's some cabling fault, almost certainly an intermittent short to earth. However, describing it as "
isolement fugitive" sounds wrong to me, and I'm baffled as to where it was - in a signal or power supply. The signal box dates from 1987, and is a big shed full of relays (i.e. a power box) but now controlled remotely.
The process of fault-finding was that they disconnected each bay of relay chassis where all cables were connected via multipole connectors. That didn't find it, so they moved on to the few bays with individual wire connections. At the same time they rechecked the earlier tests, and found the fault in a cable - which was disconnected during those tests and thus not tested. This cable had been put in during work in the last month as part of the "modernisation" for the new
LGVs▸ .
On Sunday, after the first fruitless night of searching, the planned restart at noon was delayed due to cable faults introduced by all the frantic plugging and unplugging done overnight. Hence they kept running trains until 3 a.m., and so had little time for testing the next night.
They did, in fact, fix the problem this morning. Services won't quite be back to normal until tomorrow for the usual reasons of trains and crew being out of place.
That's not quite true: having been running with a single track in and out, all points clipped, and all signals red - stop and proceed by sight - they were able to turn the block signalling on, but still with only the one clipped path. However, by still using Austerlitz that allowed more trains to run.
There's more about the plan - basically what not do do in future - and also how they got their information systems so screwed up, notably on Sunday. Basically, because the late start meant the plan had to be reworked too late, and so the implications of trains in the wrong place, and inaccessible depots, were missed and led to frantic replanning. As the various information systems are driven from separate data sources, and mostly captured by overstressed humans, they often made no sense. Plus for example the big departures board at Montparnasse can't show "from Austerlitz", blocking ticket sales for a train meant it showed as cancelled on voyages-sncf.
com, etc.
The report is
here - nowhere does it say the technology is relays, but there are photos at the end.