Derailment of empty passenger train at Paddington causes major disruption - 16 June 2016

[whole diary]

[ChrisB]

Indeed. But a moot point to discuss surely is whether the catch points & track layout ought to have been redesigned when putting up the stanchions etc for electrification? Surely they could still work *without* bringing them down? Is this an example of what happens when projects are done cheaper than they should be?

A goodly sum in compensation being paid by GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) to NR^» (Network Rail - home page) & HEX this time around. I'm assuming that GWR will be declaring void days on this? To save the processing of thousands of claims

[ChrisB]

If the driver has held his hand up & GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) have communicated that to NR^» (Network Rail - home page), with all the delays being attributed to NR these days, I suspect NR wanted to get this one apportioned quickly.

[a-driver]

True, but how much did speed did that stanchion absorb?  I know its not its job, and it probably wasn't even considered when the line was electrified but where would that unit have ended up if the stanchion had not been there. It'll be interesting to read the outcome of the investigation and the recommendations made.  It could prove very costly if a review and changes are needed to catch points up and down the country.

[plymothian]

A little day out in London turned in to an epic battle yesterday.

Arrived at Paddington at 1930 for the 1945.  Announcements at Lancaster Gate Tube stated no services running from Paddington and to call NRE^‡(resolve), but that's pretty much useless if you don't know what's going on.  Only advice given was you need to get to Reading via Waterloo.

Left PAD^» (Paddington (London) - next trains) at 1950 to find the Tube in disarray, so travelled via Earl's Court and Westminster to get to Waterloo - staff at Waterloo were clueless in any alternatives (especially having missed the 1945 to Exeter).  The 2050 was the only train advertised to Reading, which naturally then lost time and left loads of people behind at every stop.  Arrived Reading at 22.23ish.  All this time no one knew if there would actually be any trains waiting at Reading, and typically Paddington had by now partially reopened.

Every question posed to staff - no matter what destination - was answered with "about 20 minutes - wait for announcements".  However, true to their word for once, trains actually did start to be organised within 20 minutes!  

Left Reading at 23.10ish on a surprisingly lightly loaded train to Plymouth, but ended up being kicked out at Exeter St David's due to lack of onward train crew, on to the - literally - following service and arrived at 02.40ish.

No mention of compensation available at any time, so I mentioned it to nearby passengers, who were surprised they could even get compensation for delays.  Loads of people were seeking hotels, taxis etc, for which they would not be entitled for reimbursement.

[BBM]

What really surprised me about this was there was no mention of it on the morning BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page) breakfast local news travel update.

There was on BBC Wales opt out in the Breakfast programme at 8:30.

The BBC London local opt-out at 0755 led with the news of the derailment but in the travel section the presenter said that there was no service into or out of Paddington even though the on-screen caption said 'limited service'.

[stuving]

True, but how much did speed did that stanchion absorb?  I know its not its job, and it probably wasn't even considered when the line was electrified but where would that unit have ended up if the stanchion had not been there. It'll be interesting to read the outcome of the investigation and the recommendations made.  It could prove very costly if a review and changes are needed to catch points up and down the country.

Assuming the catch points were there long before the stanchion, it is fair to ask if their "operation" should have been reviewed. I suspect that somewhere in the huge volume of engineering standards is a requirements to do just that - triggered by any change in the area a derailed train might end up in. However, it would be background task, and it seems no-one ever got round to doing it.

In the case of this link line and those two sidings, you do wonder if it would have been more sensible to reclassify them as loops and the line as operational track. You might lose the capability to park trains (i.e. unattended) there, but is that actually useful? You could still hold trains in them, and it's not like Paddington has no other sidings for storing stock.

The link line only leads to platform 1 in any case, which looks very limited in its usefulness. I'm sure it could contribute more to operations if its connections were changed. Is there any plan for that (I've not seen any)?

[ChrisB]

True, but how much did speed did that stanchion absorb? 

If coming from a shortish siding, surely not that much?....

edit - or was it using the link line?

[stuving]

If the driver has held his hand up & GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) have communicated that to NR^» (Network Rail - home page), with all the delays being attributed to NR these days, I suspect NR wanted to get this one apportioned quickly.

Surely the driver's first duty is to contact the signaller, via cab radio or whatever else works. There may even have been other NR staff close by. The signaller's first concern will be to ask things like: Does your train pose a danger to other lines? Did you observe a signalling fault? Is your train stable or likely to fall over/catch fire/etc.?

So NR probably knew before GWR. As it happens, the state of the OLE^▸ (Overhead Line Equipment, more often "OHLE") would stop the trains in any case, though there may not be a scripted question asking exactly that.

[ChrisB]

Indeed.

My post was written assuming the driver was AOK physically & would talk to his bosses etc fairly quickly, and maybe admitted passing at red then. It could be quite quickly confirmed to NR^» (Network Rail - home page) from GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway), never mind what communications the driver & signaller had.

[Oxonhutch]

If coming from a shortish siding, surely not that much?....

edit - or was it using the link line?

In a photograph taken from the overbridge that was linked to in the Infrastructure thread, there is a 25mph speed sign for the link line in the opposite direction to which the train ran. There is also quite a distance between the exit signals for the two sidings SN6006/8 and the link line exit signal SN6004 after which the derailment occurred.

Edit: Looking at the Sectional Appendix (maps GW103-001/2) the line speed on the link line and the two sidings is 25mph.  Hard to tell from the SA but the link line could be 20 chains long, i.e. a quarter mile.

[paul7575]

Assuming the catch points were there long before the stanchion, it is fair to ask if their "operation" should have been reviewed. I suspect that somewhere in the huge volume of engineering standards is a requirements to do just that - triggered by any change in the area a derailed train might end up in. However, it would be background task, and it seems no-one ever got round to doing it.

Something I've wondered about in the past, but when I've seen instances where it looks risky I've just thought it must be part of their overall planning or risk assessment process.   

There's a good example south of Botley station, where the single line section starts.   From a passing train it looks as though anything running through the catch points at a reasonable speed will take out the local DC^▸ (Direct Current) power huts one by one...

Paul

[BerkshireBugsy]

What really surprised me about this was there was no mention of it on the morning BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page) breakfast local news travel update.

There was on BBC Wales opt out in the Breakfast programme at 8:30.

The BBC London local opt-out at 0755 led with the news of the derailment but in the travel section the presenter said that there was no service into or out of Paddington even though the on-screen caption said 'limited service'.

The last opt-out for BBC South did cover this but only very briefly in between the "Weather" bit and the "Shuffling of script papers and saying good bye" bit.

[plymothian]

In a situation like this the driver would have made a GSM-R^▸ (Global System for Mobile communications - Railway.) REC and requested an Emergency Switch Off.  
The REC stops all movements immediately, and the ESO cuts all power - so Paddington to the limit of the OHLE is up the creek anyway.  
Any questioning by the signaller beyond that is primarily organising emergency response and secondary restoring any service.

You never know the driver might have stated "This is an Emergency Call etc... I have SPADed SN6004..."

[stuving]

Looking at the picture in this BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page) report, you can see that the catch points didn't even do their job of protecting the following points. The train does appear to be lying foul of Platform 1 approach line.

[Sam290893]

Disruption is set to go into the weekend last night sounded bad at Paddington and apparently reading was chaos too!