Train driver receives suspended prison sentence for ignoring safety systems

[whole diary]

[ChrisB]

From ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) email/Press release

10 November 2014

Former First Capital Connect train driver, Scott Walford, has received a three-month suspended prison sentence and been ordered to pay costs of ^500, after he ignored warnings and safety systems on the Cambridge to London train he was driving ^ placing passengers and staff on board in great danger. On 7 November, Mr Walford pleaded guilty following a prosecution brought by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) for a breach in health and safety law in October 2013.

On 8 October 2013, the 20:40 Cambridge to London Kings Cross, driven by Mr Walford, passed a red signal at Hitchin station ^ a signal which instructs a driver to stop their train. The train's warning safety system applied automatic brakes but Mr Walford deliberately reset the system and continued on without seeking the required authorisation. Prior to leaving Cambridge, Mr Walford had also failed to set up his Cab Secure Radio, which prevented any direct contact from the signaller. As a result of his actions Mr Walford's train ran "out of control" putting himself, passengers and train staff at risk of a serious incident, such as a collision with an oncoming train. Following the incident Mr Walford was relieved from all duties at First Capital Connect.

Sentencing took place at Stevenage Magistrates Court on Friday 7 November, following ORR's investigation into the incident. The investigation found that Mr Walford failed to take reasonable care of the safety of himself, passengers and other persons who might have been affected by his actions. Deliberate decisions to avoid safety procedures following a signal passed at danger, such as the choices made by Mr Walford, are rare but carry potential catastrophic consequences.

Donald Wilson, principal safety inspector, ORR said:

"Train drivers hold a position of great responsibility for safety on our railways. They must comply with health and safety law, and work in accordance with their licence and training.

"Mr Walford fell short of these standards, and, in doing so, showed a serious disregard for the safety of his passengers. His actions ^ ignoring warning signals and systems - could have led to a potentially catastrophic incident. He put his life, and the lives of others, at risk. This kind of incident is very rare, but where serious failings are found, those at fault will be held to account by the rail regulator."

Read the full press release: http://orr.gov.uk/news-and-media/press-releases/2014/train-driver-receives-prison-sentence-for-ignoring-safety-systems

Mod Note: Topic title amended slightly in the interests of accuracy - it was a suspended prison sentence.

[ChrisB]

That was the headline the ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) used.

Its still a prison sentence! Can be (re)called for any number of reasons

[Network SouthEast]

It may interest those that in this case, the driver was accused by the ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) of not setting up his radio.

This has generated a panic in the rail industry because until this court ruling it was a generally held belief that with CSR^▸ (Cab Secure Radio) (cab secure radio) it was permitted to be in service connected to the correct CSR area but not registered with a headcode from the signal number. With CSR it is possible for the signaller to stop trains in an emergency as long as a train is connected to the correct CSR area (which the train in question was).

The same also applies to GSM-R^▸ (Global System for Mobile communications - Railway.). It has been a generally held view (reinforced by statements from the RSSB^▸ (Rail Safety and Standards Board)), that if a driver could not register their radio the train could proceed in service as usual, provided "GSM-R GB^▸ (Great Britain)" was displayed on the radio screen.

The ORR alleged in their legal action (and subsequent press release) that the driver's radio wasn't set up. So as a knee-jerk, ASLEF^» (Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen - about) are advising drivers to now not take a train out of a station if their CSR or GSM-R radio is not fully registered and to immediately drop their speed to 20mph.

ASLEF have issued this circular:

One of the charges levelled against train driver Scott Walford which led to him
receiving a three month suspended prison sentence, was that he had not set
up his Cab Secure Radio (CSR).
^ The case summary states that his actions meant that he was ^in control of a
runaway train, placing railway passengers and staff at risk of serious harm
from a collision^ - an oxymoron. The intemperate and inflammatory language
used by the ORR is unbefitting an official industry body and is inappropriate to
the industry.

^ It also states that by failing to set up his CSR, he prevented ^direct contact^
from the signaller. This is simply inaccurate.

^ Setting up the CSR has two stages: First, logging on by entering the
appropriate area code. This puts the radio on the network. It means that the
driver is contactable by the signaller. The second stage is putting in a signal
number that identifies the train and produces a unique Train Reporting
Number (displayed on the radio). The signaller can then communicate with
the driver on a one-to-one basis.

^ Scott Walford had completed the first stage. His radio was therefore live on
the network. He was contactable through a General Call or Train Stop
message. A General Call or Train Stop goes directly to all the drivers on a
specified area within the network. When he received the General Call on his
radio, Scott Walford stopped his train.

One of the charges levelled against train driver Scott Walford which led to him
receiving a three month suspended prison sentence, was that he had not set
up his Cab Secure Radio (CSR).

^ The case summary states that his actions meant that he was ^in control of a
runaway train, placing railway passengers and staff at risk of serious harm
from a collision^ - an oxymoron. The intemperate and inflammatory language
used by the ORR is unbefitting an official industry body and is inappropriate to
the industry.

^ It also states that by failing to set up his CSR, he prevented ^direct contact^
from the signaller. This is simply inaccurate.

^ Setting up the CSR has two stages: First, logging on by entering the
appropriate area code. This puts the radio on the network. It means that the
driver is contactable by the signaller. The second stage is putting in a signal
number that identifies the train and produces a unique Train Reporting
Number (displayed on the radio). The signaller can then communicate with
the driver on a one-to-one basis.

^ Scott Walford had completed the first stage. His radio was therefore live on
the network. He was contactable through a General Call or Train Stop
message. A General Call or Train Stop goes directly to all the drivers on a
specified area within the network. When he received the General Call on his
radio, Scott Walford stopped his train.

Following the court^s decision that by not acquiring the train reporting number
on the radio and relying only on the area code Scott Walford had broken the
law, ASLEF has decided to ensure our members are not liable to prosecution
and are advising the following that as from 1st December 2014:
 
1. If you are unable to register the train reporting number on either the GSMR
or CSR radio system then the train should not enter service and if in
service the train should run at a maximum of 20mph.

2. ASLEF will advise Network Rail and all TOCs^▸ (Train Operating Company) and FOCs^▸ (Freight Operating Company) that where there
is no cab radio working, ASLEF members will run at a maximum of 20 mph
in the affected area.

What hasn't helped is that the rule book has always been vague about the definition of what a working radio actually is. Hopefully the RSSB will work with the ORR to shortly clear up matters once and for all.

[ChrisB]

Hmmm, a tad smoke & mirrors me feels. If he hadn't run the red light & reset the emergency stop systems, and had simply failed on this 2nd stage of his radio, would the ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) have prosecuted? we'll never know, but I suspect possibly not. The driver also pleaded guilty to all charges in court.

So yes, I think ASLEF^» (Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen - about) are possibly going too far with this, but I agree it is probabnly the quickest way of getting the RSSB^▸ (Rail Safety and Standards Board) to act.

[stuving]

If the case has been heard, why are ASLEF^» (Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen - about) going on about mistakes in the prosecution case? Wasn't that part of the defence? Was it rejected by the court? Is the ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about)'s subsequent statement wrong?

Whether ASLEF were involved in the defence or not, it seems odd to describe the case how they have.

[JayMac]

I'd like to read the court transcript, particularly the judges' summing up prior to sentencing, to form a rounded opinion. The driver has been convicted by pleading guilty. That plea would likely have been made after his defence team reviewed the prosecution's evidence.

I agree with others that the serious offence here is the SPAD^▸ (Signal Passed At Danger) followed by resetting the safety systems and failing to report. CSR^▸ (Cab Secure Radio) is but a sideshow.

[ChrisB]

Does the judge do a summing up if the plaintiff pleads guilty?....

[stuving]

It was Stevenage Magistrates Court.

I guess the real story goes like this:

"Part of the ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about)'s case was, according to ASLEF^» (Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen - about), wrong. However as the driver pleaded guilty this was never tested in court. This needs to be settled urgently by other means, i.e. discussions involving ORR, RSSB^▸ (Rail Safety and Standards Board), and other railway organisations."

[ChrisB]

And the 20mph instruction is the fastest way to get that done.

[trainer]

And the 20mph instruction is the fastest way to get that done.

Or possibly the slowest. 

[ray951]

Also if drivers are liable to prosecution shouldn't ASLEF^» (Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen - about) be advising their members to put this into action now and not from 1st December.

[ChrisB]

It's a type of industrial action - they probably need to give notice of their grievance - hence the letter .....

[Network SouthEast]

It's a shame so many people have misunderstood my previous post in this thread. The state of the radio was not an excuse for the shocking act of what is termed a "reset and continue". And ASLEF^» (Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen - about) are not excusing that.

I'll repeat myself.

ONE of the issues this case has raised is that the ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) have said that a radio not registered with a headcode is not considered a working radio. But until now the generally held view was that a CSR^▸ (Cab Secure Radio) radio IS a working one if it was connected to the correct CSR area even if not registered with a headcode. The ORR's press release is a little misleading because it says the train had "no direct contact" with the signaller. This is only true for a one to one call. It would have still been possible to stop the train with an emergency group broadcast (and I've read a susuggestion that this is what actually happened).

On GSM-R^▸ (Global System for Mobile communications - Railway.) failed registerations are much more common, but again, the instruction from the RSSB^▸ (Rail Safety and Standards Board) was that if you have "GSM-R GB^▸ (Great Britain)" in the display you were ok to continue in service.

The reason ASLEF have given for the 1st December start date is to give the TOCs^▸ (Train Operating Company) time to respond and for information to filter through to members.

It's pathetic to suggest this is a type of industrial action. It's not.

[ChrisB]

It's also pathetic to assume we misunderstood you.

ASLEF^» (Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen - about) have taken this action as they deemed the conviction was for the radio, and therefore assumed this has moved from a legal way of working to an illegal one.

As was pointed out above, this is incorrect. Yes, the ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) included this in their legal case, but as the driver pleaded guilty to all charges, it remains untested. It is even possible that, had it simply been for the radio, he may not even have been charged, but because of the most serious action of passing signal at red AND resetting emergency stop afterwards, which the driver WAS tightly charged over, the lesser radio problem was added to the charges.

But ASLEF are instructing drivers unnecessarily in my (and possibly others view) instead simply of waiting for the RSSB^▸ (Rail Safety and Standards Board) to amend the rule book.

[Network SouthEast]

Chris you are wrong to say that ASLEF^» (Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen - about) "deemed the conviction was for the radio". ASLEF have simply noted that this was one of the points raised by the ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) in the prosecution. It is the opening line in their circular which I quoted in my first post in this thread!

Why would the ORR mention the radio being unregistered it if they, the regulator, did not believe it to be an issue? The charge was a breach of the Health & Safety at Work Act, not anything railway specific. ASLEF have not publicly condoned any part of the driver's behavior.

As even you say, the situation around an unregistered radio remains untested. Therefore it may never have been legal to have an unregistered radio. We don't know. Something doesn't suddenly go from legal to illegal because a court says, the court simply rules on what the law always was.

I feel ASLEFs action is reasonable, because in recent years the RSSB^▸ (Rail Safety and Standards Board) have been gradually withdrawing rules from the rule book in the expectation they will become TOC^▸ (Train Operating Company) specific instructions/policies. For example, did you know GSM-R^▸ (Global System for Mobile communications - Railway.) used to have a rulebook module (although it never covered registration), but it was abolished a few years ago?

Did you know that the RSSB have issued a statement in response to a CIRAS^▸ (Confidential Incident Reporting and Analysis System) report saying...

If a train fitted with a GSM-R radio system must be registered and with a signal before a
train can enter service from a station?
If a GSM-R cab radio cannot be registered for any reason, but it displays ^GSM-R GB^▸ (Great Britain)^,
indicating that it is attached to the network, it should be assumed that the train radio is
operative and capable of sending and receiving calls (including railway emergency calls).
Therefore the train can enter service.

The above statement appears to be at odds with the ORR.

At least ASLEF are doing something. There's not even a statement from the RSSB right now that they are even looking at this. Historically the RSSB only updated the rulebook twice a year. Do you remember the Liverpool James Street incident? The guard involved was found guilty in November 2012, but it wasn't until June 2013 that the RSSB updated the rule book to say that guards should remain at the door controls until the train has left the platform (a rule which the RSSB previously abolished in 2006).

That's why I don't think it is unreasonable for ASLEF to take the lead on this as the RSSB do not move quickly.

The thing that puzzles me about this is why there doesn't seem to be much in the way of communication between the ORR and RSSB. What if there are other practices on the railway that the RSSB are fine with that cause concern for the ORR?