Heavy Fine for a First Delayed Train

[whole diary]

[trainer]

This Report tells of a ^75k fine for the 'shambles' of a three hour delay to a First Captital Connect service in 2011.

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-24107132

A rail firm has been fined ^75,000 after passengers were stuck on a train in London for more than three hours.

The incident happened on a First Capital Connect service between St Pancras and Kentish Town stations in north London in May 2011.

The Brighton to Bedford train with 700 people on board became stuck due to power supply problems.

Sentencing at Blackfriars Crown Court, the judge said the incident was "an absolute shambles".

The judge also said there was a "litany of mistakes and poor judgements" by the firm and said the risk was "substantial".

The company pleaded guilty to a charge under section 3(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.
'Lack of care'

Some passengers who were stranded later claimed on Twitter they had been left in a tunnel with little ventilation, no water, and limited information.
Passengers at Kentish Town. Pic: Nancy Mandizha People were stuck on the train for about three hours

Up to 40 passengers eventually forced open the doors and walked down the track.

Ian Prosser, director of safety at the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about)) said: "ORR's investigation into First Capital Connects' response to a broken down train in north London highlighted that passengers were treated with a distinct lack of care, as the company committed a catalogue of errors.

"The company left hundreds of passengers trapped on a train for three hours with no air conditioning, toilets or communication system.

"The company's response significantly increased the risk of passengers independently leaving the train on to the tracks, when the safest place for them was to stay on board until told otherwise."

The regulator said since the incident the firm had "taken steps to rectify their management of similar situations".

David Statham, First Capital Connect managing director said: "We didn't live up to our own high standards in the way we handled this event which is why we took quick and decisive action afterwards.

"We commissioned comprehensive internal and external investigations that led to a range of actions to ensure this unusual combination of events is extremely unlikely to happen again."

Edited to fix link. bignosemac

[trainer]

Now my comment.

"We commissioned comprehensive internal and external investigations that led to a range of actions to ensure this unusual combination of events is extremely unlikely to happen again."

It was six hours the last time was it not?  Presumably a different combination of unlikely events.  Double the fine?  We shall see - in 2015.

[JayMac]

Are you not confusing your FGWs^▸ (First Great Western) with your FCCs^▸ (First Capital Connect) there trainer?

Wasn't the 6 hour delay on a FGW service? I'm not aware of an incident on FCC since this one from 2011 that has seen passengers delayed for longer.

In fact, since this incident FCC have implemented many changes, as evidenced by subsequent incidents where FCC trains were halted and unable to continue and the passengers were 'rescued' much more promptly. At Radlett in February of this year, passengers from five trains were rescued within 90 minutes after overhead lines came down. This past Sunday (15/09) an FCC train was brought to a halt, again by foliage in the OHLE. Train rescued by another unit in 63 minutes.

From First Capital Connect:

Response to today's verdict in relation to a stranded train in May 2011
16/09/2013

Responding to today's verdirct at Blackfriars Crown Court in relation to a stranded train in May 2011, David Statham, First Capital Connect Managing Director said:

^The safety of our passengers is our top priority and we deeply regret what happened back in May 2011.

^We didn^t live up to our own high standards in the way we handled this event which is why we took quick and decisive action afterwards.

^We commissioned comprehensive internal and external investigations that led to a range of actions to ensure this unusual combination of events is extremely unlikely to happen again.

^The safest place for passengers while a controlled evacuation or rescue is being arranged is on the train and we have new processes, techniques and equipment to speed the process whenever possible and to make it more comfortable for those on board.

^We will reflect on the comments made by the judge in court today and ensure they are incorporated in our ongoing process of learning from this incident.

^We would like to apologise once again to all those affected.^

Ends


Notes to editors

1. First Capital Connect has put in place new processes, techniques and equipment so that it is highly unlikely this unusual combination of events will happen again:

• Our processes are now focused on the conditions of our passengers in planning our response to the incident
• A specific process has been developed with Network Rail for dealing with stranded trains in central London and staff have been retrained
• Train door vent screens now allow doors on this particular type of train to be opened for ventilation while preventing passengers from getting down
• Emergency light sticks have been provided
• A technique has been developed to prioritise power to keep the train PA^▸ (Public Address) system going for longer to provide better information
• Staff have been re-briefed on the correct process for moving the train if the safety systems have to be overridden

2. The success of this approach was demonstrated when five trains were evacuated within 90 minutes in very difficult circumstances when overhead power lines came down at Radlett in February this year. On Sunday 15th September a crowded train was stranded near Kentish Town - again because of foliage in the overhead power equipment - and this was rescued by another train in 63 minutes.

One hopes that FGW are looking into all aspects of how they managed the incident near Pewsey on 4th August 2013. And I wonder if they are also due for meetings without coffee at both the ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) and the HSE^▸ (Health and Safety Executive)?

[SandTEngineer]

Notes to editors
On Sunday 15th September a crowded train was stranded near Kentish Town - again because of foliage in the overhead power equipment - and this was rescued by another train in 63 minutes.

So NR^» (Network Rail - home page) gets away with it quietly again.........

[trainer]

Are you not confusing your FGWs^▸ (First Great Western) with your FCCs^▸ (First Capital Connect) there trainer?

Nope - I know they are separately run companies within the First empire, which is why I didn't post in an FGW related thread.  However, is there no corporate sharing of experience within the group?  FCC have clearly learned what to do and all credit to them for that.  FGW may have acted absolutely correctly and with all the haste that could be mustered - the various inquiries will tell us.  My point was that a First Group company promised lessons would be learned and, superficially at least, it appears that another First company was not passed the lessons.  In view of the judge's strong comments, I would hope for everybody's sake this is not true and I'm barking up a dead tree.

[Southern Stag]

On the face of it the incidents seem quite different. The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) report into the Kentish Town incident painted a picture of eventual chaos on board, with passengers left with little information and often left to their own devices. None of the reports into the Pewsey incident suggested anything as bad, passengers were given information and the situation managed by the staff, there were no passengers opening doors and evacuating onto the tracks at Pewsey. The rescue of the train at Kentish Town should have been fairly easy but IIRC^▸ (if I recall/remember/read correctly) from the RAIB report was a complete cock up. As I think has been previously discussed rescuing the train at Pewsey was anything but simple because of the nature of the fault, and it was hardly in the best location.

[stuving]

On the face of it the incidents seem quite different.

Indeed. The relevant industry guide, (Association of Train Operating Companies See - here)/ATOC%20Good%20Practice%20Guides/ATOCNR%20GPG%20SP01%20Iss%202.pdf" target="_blank">ATOC / Network Rail Good Practice Guide GPD SP01 ^Meeting the needs of passengers when trains are stranded^ says:

TOCs^▸ (Train Operating Company) vary considerably in the nature of their operations ^ the geographical areas served the types of service provided, the number of on-board staff and the numbers and types of passenger carried. There can be no single definitive plan for managing the consequences for passengers when trains are stranded and this Good Practice Guide does not attempt to provide one.

I can't find anything explicit in this guide, or in the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) report of the incident, that says "when the time to complete plan A - fix train - might plausibly be too long for passengers to be left on the stranded train, plan B - rescue passengers, with a train if evacuation is not feasible - should be initiated". That might be a relevant read-across to Pewsey. It is, however, in line with the general intent of the guide.

The prosecution was all about treating passengers so poorly they felt they had to force they way out onto the track. ORR^» (Office of Rail and Road formerly Office of Rail Regulation - about) prosecuted this as a 'lack of care' breach of  section 3(1) of the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 , and presumably judged that NR^» (Network Rail - home page) were not responsible for this in any relevant manner.

[Super Guard]

FYI^▸ (for your information), I am aware the review into the handling of the Pewsey incident is still ongoing.

[ChrisB]

It also is internal, not with RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch)

[broadgage]

The Pewsey incident no doubt could have been handled better, but was not IMHO^▸ (in my humble opinion) as bad as the FCC^▸ (First Capital Connect) one, despite the delay being about twice as long.

IMHO, FGW^▸ (First Great Western) do not deserve prosecution for the Pewsey incident, but FCC DID^» (Didcot Parkway - next trains) deserve prosecution.

To be stuck on an HST^▸ (High Speed Train) out in the open with the lights working, public address available, and air conditioning in at least some vehicles, is nothing like as bad as being confined below ground in the dark and without ventilation.

One must also consider the consequences of anyone being taken seriously ill during the breakdown, stuck in a tunnel they might well die before assistance could be rendered, even the most basic first aid treatment presumes room to lay the sick person down, and enough light.
At pewsey, the air anbulance, a police helicopter, or even the armed forces could have assisted as a last resort. Not much help stuck in a tunnel though.


FCC are the worst of any TOC^▸ (Train Operating Company) that I use regularly, both as regards everyday service and the seemingly shambolic response when anything goes wrong.

I now often use the much slower, but more reliable, more comfortable, and less stressful bus instead of FCC. I have never been stuck in a tunnel on the bus !

[Trowres]

To be stuck on an HST^▸ (High Speed Train) out in the open with the lights working, public address available, and air conditioning in at least some vehicles, is nothing like as bad as being confined below ground in the dark and without ventilation.

It is important that lessons are learned from incidents with (fortunately) minor consequences ready for the time when good luck runs out. There have been too many incidents where rescue time has dragged into several hours.

I have scanned through the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) report. Did I miss something. It's clear in the report that the driver was overloaded and should have had assistance. Perhaps it's "not the done thing" to suggest that a good 'ol guard might be an answer (or maybe instead a model like airlines - those hostesses are not there just to serve food).

Also the report seems to let equipment designers and standard setters off the hook, in spite of a catalogue of contributory factors: incompatible couplers, software that might not work if units are coupled in unusual combinations, communications equipment not up to the job (how big a battery do you need to power PA^▸ (Public Address) for a day?).

My thoughts, and apologies in advance if I have misrepresented anything.