Low speed collision at Norwich Station - 8 minor injuries (BBC News 21/07/13)

[whole diary]

[JayMac]

From the BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page):

Greater Anglia and East Midlands trains in Norwich station crash

Eight people have been taken to hospital after two trains crashed in Norfolk.

The collision happened on Norwich station's platform six at about 00:10 BST.

The Greater Anglia Great Yarmouth to Norwich service and a stationary East Midlands Trains unit were involved in the "low speed" collision.

The ambulance service said all eight people - including four who were stretchered away - had minor injuries.

The two trains remained upright after the crash.

Both the Rail Accident Investigation Branch and British Transport Police are investigating the collision.

Police said the Great Anglia service was travelling at about 10mph when it collided with the second train.

A spokeswoman for East Midlands Trains said its train, which was empty at the time, has been removed from service because of the damage caused.

'Welfare'

"Our first thoughts are for the welfare of those who have been injured in the incident," she said.

A spokeswoman for Greater Anglia said: "The train arriving at Norwich was travelling at very slow speed.

"There were 31 passengers on board.

"Our first priority has been and remains the welfare of the passengers and train crew involved."

The injured were taken to the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital.

[ChrisB]

No ne of whom were detained overnight, according to the Metro I read.

Which makes me think the stretchers were rather overdoing it?....

[JayMac]

If you've taken a tumble following a rapid deceleration (even from low speed) then as a precautionary measure paramedics will often immobilise casualties on stretchers prior to transport to hospital. Neck and spinal injuries can result from what appear to be the most innocuous of incidents. Better safe than sorry.

[ChrisB]

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) state....

The RAIB^s preliminary examination found that the collision occurred because the train was travelling too fast when it entered the platform. Consequently, it was unable to stop in time and collided with the stabled train. The RAIB also found that the length of unoccupied platform could not accommodate the full length of train 2C45.

Rap on the knuckles for the signaller....the driver probably expected the available space to at least take the full train length

[grahame]

RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) state....

The RAIB^s preliminary examination found that the collision occurred because the train was travelling too fast when it entered the platform. Consequently, it was unable to stop in time and collided with the stabled train. The RAIB also found that the length of unoccupied platform could not accommodate the full length of train 2C45.

Rap on the knuckles for the signaller....the driver probably expected the available space to at least take the full train length

The RAIB report goes on to state

The investigation will identify the sequence of events that led to the train being unable to stop in time when it entered a platform that was already occupied and the factors that influenced the behaviour of the driver. It will also include an examination the train operating company^s competence management system, the arrangements for signalling trains into this platform when it is occupied and the station operating regime.

Which doesn't seem to me to come to any apportionment of responsibility, so I think you're jumping the gun and speculating, Chris.  Please don't publish your own judgement and don't (however jocularly) suggest actions to be taken against those you consider to be responsible.

P.S.   The RAIB statement in full is at http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/current_investigations_register/130721_norwich.cfm

[ChrisB]

I thought this was a forum for opinions and discussions?

The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) also found that the length of unoccupied platform could not accommodate the full length of train 2C45.

I think this clearly suggests that the signaller shouldn't have put it on that platform?

Might I suggest better guidance for this forum as I don't notice this instruction.

Please don't publish your own judgement and don't (however jocularly) suggest actions to be taken against those you consider to be responsible.

Happy to accede to the request! I'd just ask that you make it clearer in forum guidance.

[grahame]

Might I suggest better guidance for this forum as I don't notice this instruction.

You may suggest it, Chris ... and it may be a good idea.   However, can I refer you to the following thread which you were actively involved in.   And I think the instruction was very clear there.

http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=9760.msg101592#msg101592

[ChrisB]

Which I have now read to its conclusion at last.

You will note that you locked my account so I couldn't do so at the time. Time had moved on by the time I returned.

An explanation/request in the guidance would make a lot of sense, as the last two posters also decided to voice their opinion & neither were pulled up on it...in fact they both state what I did, that it was undue speed that caused the accident.

We all need to pay heed to our host, eh?

[grahame]

I felt that locking the account and explaining by email why we can't act as a kangaroo court was sufficient two years ago; I certainly remember the incident and it helped us on the forum learn where we should and shouldn't go.

As a generallity, a train runs into a platform and collides with a train already there.   It could be due to an error by a signalman.  It could be a fault in the signalling system.  It could be the driver going faster than he should. It could be a greasy railhead that means the brakes don't function as they should.  It could be something else that I've not though of / suggested.

Until RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) have looked at all the possibilities, we (who were not there, I assume?, and have not spoken with people who were) should not judge the party/ies responsible for an accident, nor pass sentence on them.  If someone does so, incorrectly, they may be being libellous.  And if the admins are notified of a concern and take no action, they become party to that libel.  Sorry, Chris - I'm not going to share that risk with you.

[ChrisB]

I'm not asking you to, at all. I haven't disagreed with your request - although I might have on the M5 accident, as if all vehicles had been going slowly enough, they'd have all stopped. Regardless of what caused the visibility problem, the only thing that caused the accidents was the speed of the vehicles.

Anyway, we've moved on. I was referring to the one sentence that the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) made, not making supposition or expressing an opinion - that there was insufficient room on the platform for this train. There's only one way that train could reach that platform and that's because the signaller directed it there. Routes don't set themselves. Routes interlock when set & the signaller knows if the one he sets hasn't properly. There is no doubt over this otherwise the RAIB wouldn't pronounce on it. I think you're safe.

Rapping knuckles was jocular, as you acknowledged. As I said, you're the Boss, happy to not even go that far.

[Southern Stag]

The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) also found that the length of unoccupied platform could not accommodate the full length of train 2C45.

I think this clearly suggests that the signaller shouldn't have put it on that platform?

The signaller may have thought the platform could take the full length of the train, but the two units already in the platform had taken up more space than they needed to, and the signaller thought they would. Best to wait for the RAIB report.

[Network SouthEast]

There's something known as Lime Street Controls, that only enables permissive working when the length of a train has been detected to be within the remaining space available on the platform to which it is being routed.

I have no idea if it is used at Norwich, as it's use it not universal on the network, however if there are no Lime Street Controls then in theory it is entirely possible an overlength train to proceed towards a platform.

I'm not prejuding the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch)'s report or offering any speculation about the Norwich incident. I'm simply mentioning this because non railway staff may not be aware that there is a technical solution in existence. In case anyone was wondering, Lime Street Controls are so-called because they were first installed at.... Liverpool Lime Street!

[grahame]

Report pubished

http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/reports_2014/report092014.cfm

The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) concluded that the accident occurred because during the last 20 seconds of the driver^s approach to the station, he either had a lapse in concentration or a microsleep.

The RAIB identified some factors which may explain the driver^s possible lapse in concentration (ie the noise made by the passengers immediately behind his cab and the various thoughts occupying his attention at the time of the approach). The RAIB also found that the driver had a previous operational history indicative that he was prone to lapses in concentration, and that this had not been identified by Greater Anglia^s competence management system.

Greater Anglia^s investigations of the previous incidents that the driver had been involved in had not raised any concerns about the driver^s ability to maintain concentration. This was because the driver manager who carried out the investigation had not been trained to consider that incidents, seemingly different in nature, could be linked by underlying behavioural issues. Opportunities to formally review the driver^s operational history were missed and this was also not identified by the internal audits conducted by Greater Anglia.

Furthermore, the driver was tired through a short-term lack of sleep, and his performance might also have been affected by the prescribed medication that he was taking. These could have been other factors leading to a lapse in concentration, or they could have led to the driver having a micro sleep.

Recommendations

As a consequence of this incident, the RAIB has made five recommendations and identified two learning points.

Four recommendations are addressed to Greater Anglia with respect to its competence management system, its accident and incident investigation procedures, its auditing processes and its fatigue management system. A further recommendation is addressed to Network Rail, with the support of Greater Anglia, to understand and mitigate the risk associated with permissive train movements at Norwich station.

The learning points relate to the importance of reporting all incidents to signallers, and the importance of providing occupational health physicians with all relevant medical information during consultation.