France - railways, public transport, services and incidents (merged posts)

[whole diary]

[stuving]

BEA-TT issued a short interim report (really just a short note) in February, which I didn't spot. It starts with a restatement of the facts based on on-board recordings.

• The accident occurred where the speed limit comes down from 320 km/h in stages to 160 km/h for the curve that runs over the bridge and joins the old line towards Strasbourg. The test run was meant to happen at +10% overspeed, but the actual target speeds were rounded up a bit. Remember that the speed must be reduced before a lower speed limit (PSR^▸ (Permanent Speed Restriction)), which is what ERTMS^▸ (European Rail Traffic Management System.) (or the equivalent SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways) systems) does. More than that, it compares speed during the deceleration with the nominal speed profile and adjusts the braking to ensure it hits that new PSR at (or just below) its speed. The test was driven with ERTMS off, so the driver needed to do that by eye, based on the plan he had been given. Two other drivers were there to "help" him.
  
  1: normal PSR V320, x1.1 = 352, test planned at 360
  
  2: from km 398.77: normal PSR V300, x1.1 = 330, test planned at 330, actual run 331.2 km/h; planned braking for next PSR at km 400.7.
  
  3: from km 403.809: normal PSR V160, x1.1 = 176, test planned at 176, actual run 265 km/h. Derailment occurred at 243 km/h versus a design figure of 235 km/h.
  
  
• They go on to say that the braking point left very little room for error, and that on that run braking started twelve seconds after that point (1.1 km at 330 km/h).  Those figures imply a deceleration of 0.97 m/s/s over 3109 m, or 1.50 m/s/s over 2009 m. Even the higher figure is within the range of emergency braking in good conditions, at least at lower speeds. However, at this high speed the power flux required may not be feasible, so maximum deceleration would be lower - that depends on the design of these trains. The reasons for the delay in braking were still under investigation.
  
  
• Their final point is to question whether these overspeed tests are still needed, or really a survival from an earlier age. A modern instrumented trails train should pick up track defects at much lower speeds, so the overspeed test adds very little - except a big safety issue in how the trains is to be driven. Ever higher train speeds make the result of getting this safety regime wrong more severe as well.
  
  They note that the trials staff seemed very concerned to run every part of the track at the full V+10%, where possible. That is why the braking was scheduled as late as possible; in effect this practice turns the maximum speed (plus 10%!) into a minimum to be achieved.
  
  They referred this question to other parts of the industry (including the safety regulator EPSF).

[stuving]

In today's Le Parisien (and Aujourd'hui en France, its provincial version) there is a report based on unpublished information from the enquiry (i.e. the customary leak to the press). This says that:

• On the same run three days earlier, the train ran too fast as the driver had difficulty following the trials plan. There was a video made that shows the several drivers and trials managers debating where to start braking, and missing some of the speed targets by a substantial margin (e.g. 298 km/h rather than 230 - but not at a formal speed limit point). What's really of concern is the implication that they were working this out as they went along, rather than sticking to a plan or using some technical help (like a modified ERTMS^▸ (European Rail Traffic Management System.)).
  
  
• The report makes much of the fact that the trials plan had been modified to raise the top overspeed to 360 km/h in place of 352 km/hr. That speed, of course, was not implicated in the accident.
  
  
• The "cadre transport traction" (senior driver, supervising the actual driver), who was standing behind the driver, admitted telling him to brake 1 km later just before the accident. He said this was based on having managed easily on the last run (though I think that was run on the "down" line, while the accident happened when running "wrong road" on the "up" line*). That bears out the concerns in the interim note about being too concerned to reach the full overspeed wherever possible.

(*French railway tracks are not up or down - they are even or odd. I have no idea why, nor how anyone remembers which is which.)

[Chris from Nailsea]

Thank you for your detailed posts, stuving, and for your helpful and reasoned explanations. 

My own schoolboy French certainly isn't up to it. 

[stuving]

Le Parisien / Aujourd'hui en France have got hold of an interim judicial (prosecutors') report on this accident, which adds a little more detail to the earlier explanations. The train did brake too late, for a combination of reasons all related to the conduct of these particularly risky overspeed trials.

The correct braking point would have been km 400.2, but the trials plan had decreed km 401 (the initial BEA-TT report said 400.7), and the senior driver overseeing the run changed that to km 402 on the day. Since the speed monitoring and automatic braking systems were turned off, this offhand way of fixing the speeds is the real culprit.

They have other examples, such as where earlier runs went faster than specified but no-one bothered to investigate why, and one of those was the previous run over this section. Elsewhere, the speed was worked out based on the dynamic limit (i.e. when the train overturns) rather than the signalling system's limit (which determines speeds in service).

Apparently those directly involved on the day are facing prosecution, while SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways) and their trials subsidiary Systra may do too.

[stuving]

BEA-TT has published the final report on the accident to a TGV^▸ (Train a Grande Vitesse) test train on 14th November 2015 at Eckwersheim.  BEA-TT don't seem to do English summaries of their reports any more, even for those important ones that would justify it.

So far there has only been a short note from BEA-TT, and some longer reports from SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways). However, the narrative of the accident has appeared in various leaks to the press, reported above. The final report tells the same story, though in much more detail.

The recommendations look rather anodyne, and in measured language that I find hard to translate exacltly. Most of them produce the response "you mean they really weren't doing that?". Roughly, they are:

  Recommendation R1 (SNCF Réseau and EPSF - the rail safety body)

Conclude the review of the documents and regulations that govern proving trials for new high-speed lines, including the UIC in this.

  Recommendation R3 (SNCF Mobilités, and any other train operators involved)

To provide drivers for test trains, set up a process to select and suitably train them.

  Recommendation R4 (SNCF Mobilités, and any other train operators involved)

Provide tools to support trials teams planning braking. [For overspeed tests - remember the KVB and equivalent train protection systems were disabled for this.]

Give a clear definition of who does what in conducting the test runs, with respect to driving the train.

  Recommendation R5 (Systra, and any other potential trials managers)

Review the reference documents for trials conduct based on what has been learnt from this accident, in particular to ensure:

• that the manager of the trial has suitable qualifations and experience
• that the timetable allows enough time for preparation and debriefing for each run
• that the manager of the trial and the driver manager coordinate their work by direct contact
• that the role of "pilot" is redefined so he is not the communications link between the manager of the trial and the driver manager
• that a realistic division of functions between the manager of the trial and the driver manager is defined

  Recommendation R6 (SNCF Mobilités, and any other train operators involved)

Install recorders for any telephone link between the drivers' cab and the trials team, and for sounds within the cab.

How the driving function is shared among the on-board team was important in the accident. It is also very much based on the SNCF way of doing things, and not likely to match anyone else's. The functions and names of the four key actors perhaps need a bit of explaining.

1. The Chef d'essais bord (my manager of the trial) is in charge on the train. Back at the office, during planing and similar work, he will be part of a team, but during the trial he's in the cab and is The Boss.

2. The Cadre Transport Traction (my driver manager) directs the driver, based on the agreed "script", and is responsible for safety on board and during planning.

3. The pilote traction (my "pilot") provides detailed knowledge of the line, its speed restrictions, etc. On board he monitors whether driving actions happen in the right place, and watches for signals. He can also direct the driver.

4. The conducteur (driver) drives the train, watching the line and the instruments, but not needing to read the script and think about trials issues as well.

5. There is also a chef de train (train manager) who looks after the doors, and whom to allow into the train and where, as directed by the manager of the trial.

[stuving]

According to reports today (initially from F3 Grand-Est) the enquête judiciaire has been finished, and the prosecutors' office has told the families of the results. While the specific details quoted look a bit garbled (they don't tally with the BEA-TT report), the key point is that both SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways) and Systra are almost certain to be prosecuted. That is hardly a surprise, given their lack of clear direction from above. Three employees of the two companies have already been charged with something answering to manslaughter.

[SandTEngineer]

https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/892396/School-bus-crash-train-TER-Millas-crossing-injured-children-police-France

Sounds quite serious and distressing.  The level crossing appears to be an AHB.

FOUR children have been killed and at least 19 people are 'seriously injured' after school bus was "cut in two" when it was hit by a train this afternoon.

The vehicle, which was traveling between Perpignan and Villefranche-de-Conflent, is believed to have entered a level crossing at Los Palaus in Millas, France, while the barriers were down before being hit from behind by the regional TER train.

[ChrisB]

Photo on BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page) News of the bus showed it seriously damaged but appsrently intact. Sad incident, of which France seems to get more than average just lately

[stuving]

Photo on BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page) News of the bus showed it seriously damaged but appsrently intact. Sad incident, of which France seems to get more than average just lately

This does sound all too much like a repeat of Allinges in 2008 (earlier posts here and here). In that case there was an obvious issue with the crossing, which was on a slope and a bend and hard to get a bus over without stranding. In this case the crossing is flat, in open level ground on a straight road. However, there is a turning on each side - 17 m away in one case. So for the traffic to be blocked is not so unlikely, though of course the standard rules for level crossings should cope with that. 

[stuving]

The reports are still rather contradictory about how such a thing happened, but presumably it will become clear once the driver has been interviewed. Everyone has now been rescued from the train, though that took some time as a crane was needed to move wreckage to get access. A few details I can find out:

• The bus came from the new secondary school (college), which opened on 2015 in the south of Millas.
  
• A minor road along the south edge of town (Cami Ralet) was widened to provide access for buses without going through the town.
• This road comes out onto the Route de Thuir 17 m south of the level crossing. The bus would turn left, cross the railway, and go straight on to the D916 and along that to Saint Feliu d'Amont.
• There are eight trains a day each way between Perpignan and Villefranche-de-Conflent/Vernet-les-Bains.
• This TER was the 15:56 at Millas towards Perpignan, about ten minutes late.

[SandTEngineer]

Photo on BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page) News of the bus showed it seriously damaged but appsrently intact. Sad incident, of which France seems to get more than average just lately

I don't think so.  The photographs clearly (unfortunately) show the bus cut into two.

This photograph from the SUN https://www.thesun.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/nintchdbpict000373203598.jpg?strip=all&w=870

[stuving]

There are now, sadly, two more deaths reported - two 11-year old girls. Since ten are still critically ill, the total of six deaths is likely to rise further. The bus driver is too badly injured to have been interviewed, but there was a  second bus right behind it. That driver presumably has been interviewed, as has the train driver. No doubt both are suffering greatly from what they have seen happen.

There is a load of rather pointless speculation about the operation of the crossing, based on a picture from just after the accident showing the relevant barrier raised and intact. Obviously that rules out some possibilities, but note that the barrier is 5 m from the track centre and a bus is about 12 m long. SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways) are limiting themselves to saying what was recorded by their signalling based on detection of the crossing systems: that it worked correctly.

I have heard nothing of front-view CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) from the train - maybe they don't have it. (I've not even seen what type of train it was.)

[Chris from Nailsea]

From the BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page):

France Millas train crash: Children killed as bus cut in two

A train and a school bus have collided near Perpignan in southern France, leaving at least six children dead.

Eighteen people were injured, some of them critically, after the crash on a level crossing between Millas and Saint-Féliu-d'Amont.

The bus had picked up pupils from a nearby secondary school before it was hit by a train travelling at about 80km/h (50mph).

Pictures from the scene showed the bus split in two by the force of the crash.

Train operator SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways) said witnesses had reported seeing the barriers at the level crossing down at the time of the collision, although that was not confirmed.

The bus, which had left the Christian Bourquin College in Millas, was on the crossing when it was hit by the train, which was travelling from Perpignan. Visibility was described as good.

Four children died at the scene on Thursday. Two 11-year-old girls succumbed to their injuries on Friday morning.

A witness who was on the train told local news website l'Indépendant that "it was a very violent crash - it seemed as if the train would derail".

Some 30 people were on the regional train at the time.


Pictures from the scene showed the school bus sheared in two

Investigators are waiting to interview the driver of the bus. She was slightly injured in the crash. The train driver also escaped serous injury.

Carole Delga, president of the Occitanie regional council, said the level crossing appeared to be in very good condition and had been upgraded recently. "The level crossing was very visible," she said. SNCF said it had an automatic barrier with standard signals and was not considered particularly dangerous.

But the grandmother of an injured 11-year-old girl who had been on the bus told a very different story. The girl said the barrier had not come down but remained raised. "The red lights that normally flash did not come on," she said. "The (bus) driver went through and stopped half way, and that's where the train crashed into it."

Rail operator SNCF has modernised level crossings across France in recent years, following numerous accidents, the BBC's Chris Bockman reports from Toulouse.



More than 150 emergency workers and four helicopters were deployed as part of the rescue effort.

Transport Minister Elisabeth Borne called the crash a "terrible accident" and Education Minister Jean-Michel Blanquer was due to visit a counselling centre set up at the Christian Bourquin College on Friday.

A statement from the education minister's office said he would visit "to support students, families, teachers and the entire educational community".

In a tweet, French President Emmanuel Macron offered his condolences: "All my thoughts for the victims of this terrible accident involving a school bus, as well as their families. The state is fully mobilised to help them."

[stuving]

It now seems that the earlier report of two further deaths was not correct. Its source was not actually official, and the prefecture now says the total is still four.

And that second bus, similarly, was more likely in front and not behind. I saw only one source that said it was following, and for it to have crossed first makes a lot more sense of the events.

[stuving]

The current state of the enquiry was given in a press conference, by the head prosecutor, this afternoon. This started with the official death toll having risen to five.

He gave some information about witness statements, while warning that it was incomplete and contradictory. The main item was that of 14 witnesses interviewed, most said the barriers were down. That led to his being cross-examined by the journos to reveal what that means - which of course he can't say. Why is it the press have this fixed world-view that someone official must know everything and is just being secretive? He got rather irritated by this, unsurprisingly.

Of course the question is not was the barrier down, but did it come down and exactly when relative to the bus and train passing. The bus driver hasn't spoken to the gendarmes, but did to her boss last night. He gave a version of her story, followed by accusing SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways) of blaming her (which I don't think they did, except by implication by not admitting their fault), saying that unlike them he would wait for the results of the enquiry, but added "at which time I hope SNCF will accept their responsibility". Not helpful, really.

It now appears there were at least three buses, one of which was following and "provided assistance". However, if they weren't close they won't provide evidence of the events. As often in this kind of case, all of those in that bus (including the driver) came from the one village of Saint-Féliu-d'Avall.

There were two train drivers, in fact, a trainee and supervisor. The prosecutor gave the speed as 75 km/hr where the limit is 100, and that they had possession of the bande graphique. This appears to be from a kind of souped-up tachograph, which draws a line for the speed vs time, and also marks all on-board bells, buzzers, etc. that derive from signals. But electromechanical, rather than a modern OTDR^▸ (On Train Data Recorder)/OTMR^▸ (On Train Monitoring Recorder), and given the implied age of the train CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) should not be expected.