France - railways, public transport, services and incidents (merged posts)

[whole diary]

[JayMac]

Is this line left hand running throughout? Reason for asking is that I've read elsewhere that the norm is right hand running in the d^partements that border Germany (Moselle, Alsace?).

Are LGVs^▸ (Large Goods Vehicle) left hand running within France regardless?

[stuving]

Is this line left hand running throughout? Reason for asking is that I've read elsewhere that the norm is right hand running in the d^partements that border Germany (Moselle, Alsace?).

Are LGVs^▸ (Large Goods Vehicle) left hand running within France regardless?

Yes, the LGV follows the normal French rule of the road up to the connector at Vendenheim. However, all lines are built and signalled for bidirectional use, hence the need to test them in both directions.

The Germans swapped most of the lines in Alsace-Lorraine over to right-hand running very soon after 1870, though the line from Strasbourg down to Basel had always been that way round. When the French came to reintegrate the A-L network with the French in 1918, swapping back would have been expensive, and in operational terms it was never a big issue, so they didn't. A bit later some of the main lines were equipped with grade-separated "leapfrog" crossovers close to the old border, such as the one at Xouaxange near Sarrebourg (and yes - that's a genuine French spelling, barbaric though it looks). At least one line built since then, like the LGV, runs on the left and has a flyover crossing (or two, I think) just before Metz at Frescaty.

[stuving]

The press conference today adds only a little to description of the accident. The initial technical report does describe how the train derailed; essentially it toppled over centrifugally on the curve (of only 945 m radius). Calculations give a speed of 220-240 km/hr for this to happen, and that the outer ends of the carriage rake and inner ends of the power cars should lift first. That is what happened, and the coupling at this point broke early on leaving the carriages to run off the track and straight over the canal, on their sides. The rear power car never made it over the canal, and most of the (shared) bogies were eventually ripped off.

The leading power car hit the bridge parapet and ended up in three main parts - the body crossed the bridge, scraping along the parapet/girder, and slid down the bank. The rear bogie destroyed the end of the parapet and was embedded in the end of the girder. The transformer went over the side of the bridge, and its oil burning was the source of the fires visible in the pictures.

Given that, it is remarkable that so many people survived, and in particular those in the leading power car.

The press conference, and the full statement, list four sets of actions:

• Suspend all testing at increasing speed on LGVs^▸ (Large Goods Vehicle), and tighten both the rules on not letting outsiders onto test trains and their enforcement.
  
• Conduct a review of the testing methods for new lines, and the implications of this accident for the management of human factors, to report within six months.
  
• Certain individuals will be subject to immediate suspension and disciplinary procedures.
  
• A wider review of operational (not just testing) safety management and human factors is already underway, will take the review of this accident into account.

Obviously much more investigation is needed - this "immediate" report took only four days - and one area where this is true is this question: who was in the driving cab? The report says there were seven - four drivers and test managers and three others. Both of those numbers are surprising; does it need that many drivers? and doesn't driving a train at over normal line speed on the fastest line in Europe call for undivided attention?

The four staff were a driver, a second driver (who was watching), a test manager (also meant to be supervising), and a "pilot" working for Systra (the SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways)/RATP in-house engineering consultancy). Guillaume Pepy's prepared words included a rather oddly-worded section; something about ill-judged behaviour of individuals both in the driving cab and between it and the train.

All in all, it's obvious they did know speed was the cause from the start. Probably they wanted to check against the recordings before going public on that. So Pepy's insistence that this could never happen in service because of the train control systems was based on that knowledge, rather than being reassuring hyperbole. His saying the cause was unknown, which looked incompatible with that assurance, was a legal fiction (i.e. we know but need to know what the prosecutors know).

[stuving]

I've found a report that gives some more detail about the distribution of the casualties. I think we can assume that none of those on-board had any kind of seat belt, in which case the protection given by the body shells was pretty good.

Of the eleven people who died, none was in the front power car (and the report said that most of them were standing). That vehicle slid to a halt over 150 m, an average deceleration of 1.5 g, which helps to explain the survival rate. However, it hit the parapet very hard, and turned on its side, so I still think that survival was surprising.

Five of those killed were Systra engineering staff, and four worked for SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways); the other two were outsiders. The highest fatality rate was in the last but one carriage, and from those figures it looks like that was a laboratory vehicle.

Sixteen people are still in hospital; two of them are still in a critical state.

[Chris from Nailsea]

The five "missing" persons are now believed not to have been on board, so the casualty number is as in that last report: 11 killed and 5 still critically ill in hospital. One of those killed was a child, and their presence has still not been explained. Other reports suggest this kind of "treat" was common practice, though unofficial.

An update on the casualties, supposed to be final apart from four people on the danger list in hospital:
There were 53 people on board, of whom four were minors.
Eleven were killed, but none of the children.
All of the rest were classed as "injured", either slightly or now in a stable condition.

So, are we now sure that no children were among the dead? 

[stuving]

So, are we now sure that no children were among the dead? 

Yes, the figures are now given as definitive. However, the identity of the two still on the danger list has not been made public. You will understand that in this kind of accident, with carriages sliding along on their sides, it was always going to be difficult to count the number of those killed and no longer inside.

[SandTEngineer]

I would like to thank Stuving for finding and posting all of the relevant information concerning this very tragic incident.

And just to add a little bit to it, this article has a graph showing the train speeds involved:
http://www.railjournal.com/index.php/europe/late-braking-blamed-for-tgv-est-derailment.html?channel=537

[stuving]

The identity of some of the victims is now known. Of the five Systra staff, four held senior positions either for the trials or for the LGV^▸ (Large Goods Vehicle) Est as a whole. The wife of one of those was also killed, as was another female guest of a Systra employee who survived.

One of the four SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways) staff killed was Alain Cuccaroni, director of the LGV Est project for RFF and SNCF R^seau since its construction was approved in 1998.

Yesterday's report does contain pictures of the site and the wreckage, much of which can be followed without reading the text. The reason for the high death toll in the last but one carriage is visible in one of the pictures; it went across the canal sideways and hit the far bank upside down.

Thanks for the mention, SandTEngineer, obviously I hope it is of interest. In this case it's not just to draw comparisons, which applies in any serious accident - the "could it happen here" question - but also because what would ordinarily be the lead news item, and for several days in France, has been pushed down or out of the running order. "Interesting times" indeed, in the worst possible way.

[stuving]

SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways) have posted full English transcript of Thursday's press conference. I'd add a couple of notes to it:

These SNCF internal auditors are not accountants, they look at safety, project management, and other operational matters.

The French Plateforme means the trackbed or formation, but has been unidiomatically translated as platform.

Their version of Guillaume Pepy's sentence that I commented on before reads:

Finally, it surely reveals  errors  of  human  behaviour  in  the  driver's  cab  and  in  the communication between the cab and the rest of the trainset, which the investigation will examine.

I have read something about the test manager in the driver's cab being distracted by a long conversation on the intercom, though that doesn't sound very serious. Perhaps it was, and we will hear more about it later.

[SandTEngineer]

I also found this interesting (actually somewhat alarming):
https://ressources.data.sncf.com/explore/dataset/incidents-securite/?tab=table&sort=date

[stuving]

I also found this interesting (actually somewhat alarming):
https://ressources.data.sncf.com/explore/dataset/incidents-securite/?tab=table&sort=date

I'm inclined to agree, though it's hard to judge how alarming this list of accidents and incidents is without something similar from the British railway network to compare it with.

A lot of the incidents are minor, so a total of over 700 during the last year (i.e. 2 per day) may or may not be very high. The fact that more than 30% of them are graded "ESR^▸ (Emergency Speed Restriction )", meaning there was a potential danger to life, is what I find troubling.

[stuving]

The criminal investigation of this accident is still going on, and Le Canard Enchain^ is today suggesting that SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways) (now with added RFF) is schooling its staff in what to say to the prosecutors. On the evidence, it's pretty clear that SNCF/RFF are guilty of some kind of manslaughter. If there is still something SNCF fear, it is probably that the current charge (accidentally causing death) is replaced by one of recklessness or wilful causing death.

Is this a shock horror scandal story, or just the French way of doing things? It's hard to say, though some of its features (prosecutors tapping witnesses' phones, the leaking of what should be secret prosecution details to the press) are very French.

I can imagine that an employer would want to warn staff about what to expect - along the lines of:

• Just answer the questions. You'll have enough difficulty dealing with that, without volunteering information on extra topics.
• Be very careful what you say and how you say it. If you later correct something that's not quite right, they may still keep coming back with your incorrect version and saying it's "the truth" and the rest is all lies.
• Stick to what you know directly, and never mention rumours or things that "everyone knows".
• If you are asked about rumours, morale, or that kind of subjective stuff, make clear in every reply that it is just your impression and may be wrong.
• Remember that prosecutors are not objective, they have their own agendas - political, internal office politics, various prejudices, personal ambition, etc.

(The first of those was mentioned in the story as being part of the manipulation.)

Of course that could easily then go on to rehearsing the "story" and editing its text, which I guess we'd all call manipulation (or perverting of the course of justice, if wearing a suit). SNCF have refused to comment on a story based on leaked documents.

Le Canard Enchain^ is resolutely old-fashioned, and its accommodation of the internet age extends just far enough to put a facsimile of its front page on line. This story isn't on the front page, so there's only the like of this second-hand version.

[TonyK]

I read the French article about the accident, and agree, stuving. This doesn't look like the English way of doing things - a judge bugging the phone calls between an accused person and his company's lawyers? I know that major criminal matters are investigated by a judge in France, but I cannot imagine a Detective Chief Superintendent even asking for an intercept warrant from the Home Secretary in such a case.

As for coaching the witnesses, I can't see much wrong with what was said - "Come with nothing - you should wait for their questions" is probably what every solicitor tells every defendant before any court case. I spent a fair bit of time in courts, mainly magistrates, but Crown on more than a few occasions. I was told by the judge on one such occasion to answer the question, and only the question, telling the court only what I myself knew with certainty, not what I thought everyone knew. Apart from anything else, it saves the court time that could be spent arguing what was and what was not admissible. I had to explain this myself to witnesses in cases I was involved in, and it was nothing untoward. Manipulation of the evidence, or asking someone to give false evidence is another matter, never crossed my mind, and isn't alleged against SNCF^▸ (Societe Nationale des Chemins de fer Francais - French National Railways).

This is a huge case in France, but unless the judicial rules are vastly different to ours, this seems much ado about nothing. I assume that, like here, there is a fine distinction between "dangerous" and "careless" in driving offences, and between "negligent" and "dangerous" actions leading to manslaughter. The difference in sentence can be measured in years. This is before the company's reputation is called into question. I would be surprised if the employees had not been advised by the company's lawyers.

[stuving]

I read the French article about the article, and agree, stuving. This doesn't look like the English way of doing things - a judge bugging the phone calls between an accused person and his company's lawyers? I know that major criminal matters are investigated by a judge in France, but I cannot imagine a Detective Chief Superintendent even asking for an intercept warrant from the Home Secretary in such a case.

Bugging supposedly privileged phone calls with a lawyer is exactly what was done to Sarkozy - but that did smell strongly of political motivation. Examining magistrates still have the power to hold people in custody just for interview, which were almost unlimited before the recent(!) introduction of something like habeas corpus.

It is exactly at this initial instruction phase that the French system is so different. It is led by the examining magistrate, who is a judge but on loan to the prosecutor's office (parquet). Normally the leg-work is done by the Police Judiciare but in this case most of that's been done by BEA-TT. So they are nowhere near court yet, and the comparison is with an employer advising staff before a - rather formal - police interview.

[TonyK]

It is exactly at this initial instruction phase that the French system is so different. It is led by the examining magistrate, who is a judge but on loan to the prosecutor's office (parquet). Normally the leg-work is done by the Police Judiciare but in this case most of that's been done by BEA-TT. So they are nowhere near court yet, and the comparison is with an employer advising staff before a - rather formal - police interview.

Thanks for the clarification, stuving. We are talking similar to the Interview Under Caution here. I have conducted many of these. Some of those where the suspect was accompanied by a legal representative led to the answer "No comment" to every question except name and date of birth. All perfectly legal, given that I had just told the unfortunate subject of my attentions that he did not have to say anything, slightly frustrating, but I wouldn't be interviewing if I didn't think the evidence merited at least an explanation, and on more than one occasion disadvantageous to the suspect.

As it is nowhere near court yet, I can't see what advantage these recorded conversations could give to the prosecution. They remain no more than advice by a lawyer to a client, albeit with a rather fruity turn of phrase on one occasion.