Car hit by train at Athelney Level Crossing - man killed - 21 March 2013

[whole diary]

[Chris from Nailsea]

See also http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=9450.msg97871#msg97871 

[Chris from Nailsea]

From the Yeovil Express (newspaper):

Tributes to rail crash victim Dennis William France looking forward to retirement

The 65-year-old motorist, who died after his car was in collision with a train at a level crossing in Athelney, was due to retire this week.


The train pushed the vehicle half a mile down the tracks.

Keen countryman Dennis Wallace France, of Curload, Stoke St Gregory, worked on the front desk at Debenhams^ Bedford House offices in Taunton for 20 years. Today (March 28) would have been his last day and friends and colleagues said they had had plans to celebrate his retirement.

Good friend Tim Duxbury said: ^It^s a cruel irony that Den was due to retire from work today and had many grand plans mapped out for both his garden and the rest of his life. Those plans will sadly remain unfulfilled as will his desire to see his beloved Manchester United lift the Premiership trophy again.^ He said Dennis was always smiling and joking, adding: ^He was kind, generous, thoughtful and sensitive with an incorrigible sense of humour only just kept in check.^

Chairman of Stoke St Gregory Parish Council Heather Venn spoke of the village^s shock. She said: ^It^s affected people in Curload and I know he was close to his neighbours here. It has also affected the community in witness terms.^

Dennis moved to the area several years ago to fulfil his dream of rural life and those close to him say he loved the quiet location and his garden and chickens were his pride and joy.

The incident happened shortly before 6.30am last Thursday on the line between Taunton and Castle Cary, less than a mile from Dennis^s home. It is believed the half barrier was already closing when he drove on to the tracks.

British Transport Police say the accident is not being treated as suspicious. An inquest was opened and adjourned by West Somerset Coroner Michael Rose on Monday. The cause of death was given as traumatic injuries.

[The SprinterMeister]

Makes you wonder if he was actually able to cope with the concept of retirement. Time will tell....

In response to an earlier poster a 2+8 HST^▸ (High Speed Train) will reach easily 100 mph by Milepost 136 (from the 90 mph speed restriction at Cogoad Jn onto the Up Athelney) which is just over 1 mile Taunton side of Athelney AHB. Driver seemed ok last time I saw him, other member of personnel in cab is already back at work.

[ChrisB]

From the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch)

Fatal accident at Athelney automatic half barrier level crossing, near Taunton, Somerset
 
At about 06:23 hrs on Thursday 21 March 2013, train 1A73, the 05:46 hrs First Great Western service from Exeter St. Davids to London Paddington struck a car which was crossing the railway at Athelney level crossing near Taunton, Somerset. The driver of the car, who was its sole occupant, was killed in the collision.

The crossing is of the automatic half barrier type. At such crossings one barrier on each side of the railway is automatically lowered to block half of the road and thus prohibit approaching vehicles from passing through. The lowering of the barriers is preceded by the operation of flashing road traffic signals, which then continue to operate until the barriers are raised.

Evidence gathered to date suggests that the car had been detained at the crossing with the barriers down and the road traffic signals working correctly. The car was then driven round the crossing barriers and onto the crossing where the collision occurred.

The crossing closure sequence would normally be automatically initiated by an approaching train. For trains approaching at the maximum permitted speed of 100 mph (160 km/h), the warning lights start to flash around 27-28 seconds before the train arrives, and the barriers start to lower around 20 seconds before the train arrives. However, on this occasion the crossing closure sequence commenced earlier. This was because the previous train, an engineers^ on-track machine, had passed through the crossing in the opposite direction to normal. Under these circumstances, the configuration of the signalling controls at the crossing meant that the closure sequence started when the signaller set the route through the crossing for train 1A73.

 
Image showing Athelney Automatic half barrier crossing


The RAIB^s investigation will examine the sequence of events and the factors that may have influenced the actions of the car driver. It will also include an assessment of the design of the signalling controls for Athelney level crossing and a review of the arrangements made to manage the risk from automatic level crossing barriers being in the lowered position for variable periods of time.

Looks as though he saw the engineer train pass, and as the barriers failed to raise as he would expect, started to drive round, not thinking another train was approaching....?

[Southern Stag]

The engineering train had probably passed over some time before the passing of the HST^▸ (High Speed Train), as they were using the same line. Because the engineering train had used the wrong line the barriers went down when the route was set across the crossing, not when the HST activated the sequence automatically, which could have meant the barriers went down earlier than they would have normally.

[81F]

This is worth a look, as I think it is possibly very worrying.
The report says that because the previous train over the crossing had been a wrong-direction track machine move, the operating sequence at this half-barrier LC^▸ (Level Crossing) will have been initiated when the road  for 1A73 was set. This could have been several minutes before the arrival of 1A73, instead of the usual 30 seconds. If I had been stopped at a known AHB where a 30-second wait was normal, I think I would have become impatient and perhaps tempted to assume the crossing had failed if no train had appeared within a couple of minutes.

[Southern Stag]

It is worrying. Of course the correct action, if you assume the barriers have failed, is to use the telephone to contact the signalman. I wonder if there were any signs suggesting that.

[Trowres]

I agree with 81F. There seems to be no instruction that explicitly covers this situation (premature operation) in the railway's rule "book". I'm not going to speculate further in advance of the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch)'s full report.

[grahame]

I'm not going to speculate further in advance of the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch)'s full report.

A very wise council ...

[ellendune]

I'm not going to speculate further in advance of the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch)'s full report.

A very wise council ...

Pedant Alert

perhaps it should be

A very wise council counsel ...

/Pedant Alert

[grahame]

Pedant Alert

Pedant duly alerted, thank you 

[The SprinterMeister]

It is worrying. Of course the correct action, if you assume the barriers have failed, is to use the telephone to contact the signalman. I wonder if there were any signs suggesting that.

There are direct dial telephones on the right hand side on each road approach. A sign under the left hand set of wig wag lights points to the phone on the right hand side.

The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) link in their current investigations register to the incident shows a picture of the crossing approach from the side the car approached, ie the down Athelney side.

[The SprinterMeister]

The engineering train had probably passed over some time before the passing of the HST^▸ (High Speed Train), as they were using the same line. Because the engineering train had used the wrong line the barriers went down when the route was set across the crossing, not when the HST activated the sequence automatically, which could have meant the barriers went down earlier than they would have normally.

AHB appears to have operated when the signaller cleared E93 signal (last Exeter controlled signal on the Up Athelney). The OTM having previously run over the Strike In point as it travelled 'bang road' back to the possession limits and crossover road at Cogload Jn. Where 1A73 was when signal E93 was cleared isn't yet known.

Will be an interesting read when it's published.

[The SprinterMeister]

I agree with 81F. There seems to be no instruction that explicitly covers this situation (premature operation) in the railway's rule "book". I'm not going to speculate further in advance of the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch)'s full report.

For 'Railway Rule Book' read 'Highway Code'. Motorists do not operate to the Railway Rule Book. They supposedly work to the Highway Code and whatever signage is provided at the crossing for their guidance, especially if it is suspected the AHB has failed safe in the 'closed' position.

[Chris from Nailsea]

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch has now published their full report on this incident on their website:

Summary

At about 06:23 hrs on Thursday 21 March 2013, a car drove around the barriers of Athelney automatic half barrier crossing, near Taunton in Somerset. This took the car into the path of a train which was approaching the crossing at high speed. The driver of the car was killed in the resulting collision.

The motorist drove around the barriers without waiting for a train to pass and the barriers to re-open. The level crossing was closed to road traffic for longer than normal before the arrival of the train, because of earlier engineering work that had affected the automatic operation of the crossing. The motorist may have believed that the crossing had failed with the barriers in the closed position, or that the approaching train had been delayed. He did not contact the signaller by telephone before he drove around the barriers.

The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) has made two recommendations to Network Rail. These relate to reducing the risk resulting from extended operating times of automatic level crossings and to modifying the location of the pedestrian stop lines at Athelney level crossing. A further recommendation is addressed to Network Rail in conjunction with RSSB^▸ (Rail Safety and Standards Board), to consider means of improving the presentation of telephones at automatic level crossings for non-emergency use. One recommendation is addressed to the Office of Rail Regulation, to incorporate any resulting improvements which are reasonably
practicable into the guidance it publishes on level crossings.