Having read the report, I feel the key 'casual factor' was the type of junction indicator fitted to that signal.
Is that not just speculation though? The
RAIB▸ said this was only a
possible factor in the incident and is the only part of the report that questions the infrastructure. So I'd disagree with 'key'. Who's to say the incident wouldn't have occurred with a 'feather' route indicator? The driver has been shown to have speeded elsewhere in the journey, at one point by nearly 30% above the speed for that class of train. He was also in excess of (and accelerating) the long standing
TSR▸ of 50mph through Bletchley station.
Perhaps I didn't word that quite as well as I could have done. The phrase 'I feel' was meant to indicate that, yes, I
am speculating based on knowledge of similar signalling situations and my own experience of driving - which I should stress doesn't include driving trains through Bletchley - though I am reasonably aware of the track layout there.
All of the evidence points towards it being the drivers fault and I don't dispute that for one moment, but what I meant was that of all the other mitigating circumstances that did, or might, have led to the driver making that mistake, personally I think that the most significant was the type of route indication provided at that signal. This is discussed in points 78 and 79 of the report - and my opinion is that at a location where you are not routed somewhere routinely, if you get five lights effectively showing you an arrow pointing in the direction you're going, you're far more likely to register that fact rather than just seeing a letter displayed.
With evidence of poor driving and the failure to have noted from the Weekly Operating Notice (that he'd signed for to say he would read it) that the slow lines south of Bletchley were closed, I think, as a layman, the majority of blame lies with the driver. The driver had had 4 days between signing for the WON▸ and the incident. Was that not time enough to have read and digested it? Also if daily operating notices are to be issued how would that work with drivers booking on by phone, as was the case in this incident? If the WON is seen as irrelevant by most drivers then that does need addressing, but in the meantime if it is crucial to the safe operation of the railway then I think it's dangerous to dismiss it as an irrelevance.
There are probably about 40-50 entries in a typical WON just concerning possessions. Unless you are directly involved in the possession, i.e. you're driving one of the trains within it, then 99% of them are pretty irrelevant to a driver, as you should always be aware that you might be routed from and too different lines on route - especially late evening and weekends. Hence my comments that, in the form it currently takes, it is pretty much an irrelevance.
If a driver books on by phone they should always receive, usually by fax, a 'Late Notice' before they drive. This notice contains details of things that may have happened since the WON was produced - i.e. emergency speed restrictions and emergency possessions and things like short notice changes to operating procedures. A Daily Operating Notice in the form I suggested would be combined with, or attached to that late notice along with the drivers duties for the shift.
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