Engine Derailed on WCML at Bletchley Junction - 3 February 2012

[whole diary]

[EBrown]

From the BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page):

A freight train engine has derailed on the West Coast main line at Bletchley leaving no services running between London Euston and Milton Keynes.

There are major delays for rail passengers with London Midland, Southern and Virgin rail services all affected.

London Midland has advised passengers not to travel as all lines are blocked.

However, tickets are being accepted on Chiltern, East Midlands and First Capital Connect services.

Network Rail hopes that two of the four lines will be cleared by "early" afternoon.

Driver injured
The Freightliner engine, being operated on behalf of Virgin trains, derailed at Bletchley south junction shortly before 02:30 GMT.


The driver was the only person on board and is being treated for injuries.

The engine was not pulling any freight or carriages.

The engine is upright but blocking the line, and damage to the running tracks and overhead power lines has been reported.

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch is conducting an investigation.

Robin Gisby, from Network Rail, said that although they hoped to clear two of the lines later, services would still be affected.

"It is likely that severe disruption will continue for the remainder of the day as we work to repair the more significant damage," he said.

"Unfortunately there is quite substantial damage to the tracks and overhead lines."

Engine 'on loan'
Southern services are only running between Croydon and Watford Junction, Virgin and London Midland services are not running south of Milton Keynes, but London Midland is running between Bletchley and Bedford.

Nicola Moss, from London Midland, said: "We do strongly advise passengers not to travel if at all possible.

"But anybody who can get to Bedford for First Capital Connect services or over to Wellingborough for East Midlands Trains services or west to Aylesbury for Chiltern Railway Services, can use our tickets on those trains.

"Network Rail and the freight company are working really hard to get the line clear but that is unlikely to be before lunch time."

A spokesperson from Virgin Trains said the engine was on loan to the company in order to haul some of its older trains.

Passengers are being advised to consult National Rail Enquiries if they intend to travel.

[EBrown]

Derailed train "going too fast" - BBC^» (British Broadcasting Corporation - home page)

Bletchley derailed train 'going too fast' says Network Rail

A freight train engine which derailed on the West Coast mainline at Bletchley may have been going too fast, Network Rail has said.

The line has partially reopened after being closed for more than 12 hours, causing major delays.

Rail passengers are warned to expect further delays, which could run into the weekend.

The Freightliner locomotive appeared to have approached a set of points at high speed, a Network Rail spokesman said.

He said that this caused the tracks to buckle, damaged wooden sleepers and brought down some overhead cables.

"You are meant to approach points at a relatively low speed," the spokesman said. "But it looks like that move was taken at a high speed and, as a result, the train has derailed."

Two lines open
Limited rail services between London Euston and Milton Keynes have resumed.

All London Midland, Southern and Virgin rail services were cancelled after the incident at Bletchley south junction shortly before 02:30 GMT.

Two trains an hour will run from London to Manchester Piccadilly and Birmingham until further notice. One train an hour will run between London and Liverpool Lime Street

The driver was the only person on board the electric locomotive and is being treated for injuries.

The engine was not pulling any freight or carriages.

Engineers have now cleared two of the four lines damages in the incident, which has allowed some services to begin running.

The engine is upright but blocking the line until heavy lifting equipment can be brought in later to remove it from the tracks.

The Rail Accident Investigation Branch is conducting an investigation.

The Freightliner engine was being operated on behalf of Virgin trains, which had loaned it to haul some of its older trains.

Passengers are being advised to consult National Rail Enquiries if they intend to travel.

[eightf48544]

Rumour has it 50 over 15.

[bobm]

Can locos lose braking efficiency when there are sub zero temperatures?

[chrisoates]

Can locos lose braking efficiency when there are sub zero temperatures?

Apparently so

Deutsche Bahn ICE train brakes freeze
Published: 8 Jan 09 08:47 CET^▸ (Controlled Emission Toilet)
Share
 
A German ICE train^s brakes froze on Wednesday evening, jamming rail traffic and forcing some 300 passengers to disembark, national rail operator Deutsche Bahn said Thursday.

The train was travelling between Berlin and Hannover when the conductor^s computer informed him that the brakes were frozen. He stopped the train just outside Immensen and attempted to solve the problem over a Deutsche Bahn hotline, the company told news agency DPA.

I am also informed that when running 'light engine' a Loco has less braking power than when hauling 'something' which also has brakes.

[grahame]

I am also informed that when running 'light engine' a Loco has less braking power than when hauling 'something' which also has brakes.

http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=9632.msg100409#msg100409

[SandTEngineer]

I'm fairly sure it would not have been driver error else the TPWS^▸ (Train Protection and Warning System) would have intervened.

[eightf48544]

I'm fairly sure it would not have been driver error else the TPWS^▸ (Train Protection and Warning System) would have intervened.

Interesting point, not knowing exactly which crossing and what signals control it, it is difficult to comment.

I take your point that if he was a on the main or slow line then the signal approaching the crossing should because of the large speed differential have approach control which should ensure the signal doesn't change to proceed aspect until sufficient time has alapsed for  the driver to reduce speed to the required 15 mph. If he didn't reduce speed then as you say the TPWS would have kicked in for a SPAD^▸ (Signal Passed At Danger) because the signal would still be showing a stop aspect. However, with 5000hp at his disposal I suppose he could have accelerated up to 50 after the signal not realising it was 15 mph crossing although one would expect a downward triangle with an arrow showing 15 some time before the crossing  and 15 with an arrow at the crossing.

It's funny simple incidents like this are actually far more complicated than they look and are classic examples of the man machine interface and the way safety critical information is conveyed to driver. 

I really shouldn't have done that OU course on human factors in system design, it makes me want to analyse incidents like this in detail. Be an interesting RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) report.

[thetrout]

I take your point that if he was a on the main or slow line then the signal approaching the crossing should because of the large speed differential have approach control which should ensure the signal doesn't change to proceed aspect until sufficient time has alapsed for  the driver to reduce speed to the required 15 mph. If he didn't reduce speed then as you say the TPWS^▸ (Train Protection and Warning System) would have kicked in for a SPAD^▸ (Signal Passed At Danger) because the signal would still be showing a stop aspect. However, with 5000hp at his disposal I suppose he could have accelerated up to 50 after the signal not realising it was 15 mph crossing although one would expect a downward triangle with an arrow showing 15 some time before the crossing  and 15 with an arrow at the crossing.

Considering though that the amount of railway signs that get the "graffiti" treatment...? Is it possible that the signs were obscured?

Sorry... I'm speculating... I'll stop now!

[Chris from Nailsea]

Be an interesting RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) report.

Well, eightf48544, the Rail Accident Investigation Branch have now published their report, available on their website:

Summary

At 02:27 hrs on 3 February 2012, an electric locomotive that was being driven from Crewe to Wembley, on the West Coast Main Line, derailed as it negotiated the diverging route at Bletchley Junction. The locomotive was travelling at a speed of 65.5 mph (105.4 km/h) when it derailed: the speed limit for the diverging route was 15 mph (24 km/h). The driver received minor injuries and significant damage was caused to the underside of the locomotive, the track and the overhead electrification equipment.

The driver of the locomotive correctly reduced its speed on the approach to the red signal before the junction but when this changed to green, with an ^ indication meaning that the locomotive was to take the diverging route, the driver applied full power in the belief that he was going straight on. It is likely that the driver only realised that he was to take the diverging route around the time he was passing the signal, by which time it was too late to prevent the derailment.

The RAIB found that the driver did not immediately observe and/or register what was displayed by the signal^s route indicator even though he understood its meaning. This was despite the fact that the approach view of the route indicator was found to be satisfactory, free of obstructions and with sufficient time for a driver to see and understand its meaning. The RAIB has concluded that the driver^s belief that he was continuing on the up slow line overcame the fact that the ^ indication was clearly visible to him.

The RAIB has made one recommendation to Virgin Trains covering the training and assessment of drivers^ route knowledge, and two recommendations to Network Rail. The first of these relates to the assessment of the risk from overspeeding at diverging junctions when the signal before the junction clears from red to a proceed indication, and the second relates to clarifying the status of the Weekly Operating Notice, an operating publication which is issued to drivers, and which contained information about engineering work south of Bletchley requiring trains to take the diverging route at Bletchley Junction.

[paul7575]

Is my memory playing tricks, or did the Virgin PR^▸ (Public Relations) machine at the time this incident occured do very little to correct the suggestion that this was an incident involving a Freight company?

Paul

[Andy W]

I am surprised that given that train was taking a speed restricted changeover a green was shown rather than an amber. I can understand green being seen as full steam ahead however incorrect.

[JayMac]

I'm fairly sure it would not have been driver error else the TPWS^▸ (Train Protection and Warning System) would have intervened.

As it turns out it was driver error. Approach control insured the driver slowed, preparing to stop, for the red signal before the junction. But after the signal changed to green on approach the driver accelerated and continued accelerating. Following the green aspect there would have been no TPWS to intervene. As the report says:

45. TPWS is not fitted to permanent speed restrictions associated with diverging junctions fitted with approach control signalling. Therefore, while signal BY19 is fitted with TPWS to control the signal passed at danger risk, there is no TPWS to control the risk from exceeding the permissible speed for the diverging route on the approach from line speed. Even if TPWS had been fitted for this purpose, it would not protect against a train which accelerated to too high a speed following the clearance of the junction signal as occurred at signal BY19.

I am surprised that given that train was taking a speed restricted changeover a green was shown rather than an amber. I can understand green being seen as full steam ahead however incorrect.

With approach control the signal aspect would have been at red until the loco was at a specific distane from the signal. The preceding two signals would have been single yellow and double yellow respectively. It was on changing to green and showing the diverging route marker that the driver applied full power in the mistaken belief that he was continuing ahead rather than taking the diverging route.

The seriousness of this driver error is highlighted by the fact that there was a passenger train travelling in the opposite direction (on the down fast line) approaching the point where the loco had derailed. The derailed loco was fouling the line on which the passenger train was on. Had the derailment occurred just a little later the incident could have been far far worse.

[IndustryInsider]

Having read the report, I feel the key 'casual factor' was the type of junction indicator fitted to that signal.  Bearing in mind the very slow speed of the crossover at 15mph, having a letter (in this case an 'F') appear, rather than a Junction Indicator No.4 (right hand 'feathers' at 45 degrees), is a very strange set-up given the normal line speed.  I'm surprised that this wasn't picked up and changed.  If you get feathers, you are far more likely to associate that with the fact that you're crossing over to the main lines.

The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) are also right to highlight the usefulness of the Weekly Operating Notice in alerting drivers to expect unusual moves like that.  As it is, I can guarantee that virtually all drivers do not read and familiarise themselves with the content of these notices as they are supposed to.  This is mostly due to the size of the notice, which is usually well over 100 pages and full of stuff which is pretty irrelevant.  A much better system would be for a daily operating notice to be issued when a driver books on duty, attached to the drivers duty diagram, which only contains information relevant to routes they work over and that is relevant to that particular day.  The presentation of such information could also be improved on how it is currently presented in the WON^▸ (Weekly Operating Notice ) - removing the extra information which is of no concern to drivers.  The WON, in its current form, is a weighty and outdated document and largely seen as irrelevant by most drivers.

[JayMac]

Having read the report, I feel the key 'casual factor' was the type of junction indicator fitted to that signal. 

Is that not just speculation though? The RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) said this was only a possible factor in the incident and is the only part of the report that questions the infrastructure. So I'd disagree with 'key'. Who's to say the incident wouldn't have occurred with a 'feather' route indicator? The driver has been shown to have speeded elsewhere in the journey, at one point by nearly 30% above the speed for that class of train. He was also in excess of (and accelerating) the long standing TSR^▸ (Temporary Speed Restriction) of 50mph through Bletchley station.

With evidence of poor driving and the failure to have noted from the Weekly Operating Notice (that he'd signed for to say he would read it) that the slow lines south of Bletchley were closed, I think, as a layman, the majority of blame lies with the driver. The driver had had 4 days between signing for the WON^▸ (Weekly Operating Notice ) and the incident. Was that not time enough to have read and digested it? Also if daily operating notices are to be issued how would that work with drivers booking on by phone, as was the case in this incident? If the WON is seen as irrelevant by most drivers then that does need addressing, but in the meantime if it is crucial to the safe operation of the railway then I think it's dangerous to dismiss it as an irrelevance.

The immediate cause was, "that the driver drove the locomotive at significantly higher than the permitted speed when taking the diverging route." The only causal factor was, "when signal BY19 changed to green, the driver did not observe, and/or register the meaning of, the route indication that was displayed until it was too late." All other factors are either relevant to the above or merely possible.