Opinion piece, Morning Star

[whole diary]

[grahame]

http://www.morningstaronline.co.uk/a-0bf6-Star-Comment-Who-will-end-rail-madness#.U6Eu116DRuY

TRANSPORT unions are once again accused by the government of ^irresponsible scaremongering^ for daring to tell the truth about the state of Britain^s privately operated railways.

^Safety is the number one priority for all operations on the railway,^ states an anonymous Department for Transport spokesman, as though simply saying it makes it so.

Authorising privateers to reduce numbers of safety-critical staff on trains and in stations does not encourage confidence in the spokesman^s cosy words.

It rather confirms that the real number one priority of the private consortiums handed new franchises for about a third of England^s passenger network is boosting profits and shareholder dividends as quickly as possible.

The Tories, who initially privatised our railways two decades ago, still claim that the private sector can run this major industry more efficiently than a publicly owned company.

This flies in the face of the experience of the East Coast Main Line, which has been run successfully by Directly Operated Railways subsidiary East Coast and will return an expected ^900 million to the Treasury by next year.

Followed by criticism of Labour for failure to re-nationalise when in government, and not to back the idea now, and then followed by support for Caroline Lucas's position

The government ^should accept that privatisation has clearly failed and gradually return the railways into public ownership,^ she declared.

[ChrisB]

Authorising privateers to reduce numbers of safety-critical staff on trains and in stations does not encourage confidence in the spokesman^s cosy words.

When's this happening? Oddly, they don't say......

[Southern Stag]

The new Northern and Transpennine Express franchises are both in favour of implementing DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard)) trains, and the TSGN franchise also looks likely to lead to more DOO services.

[JayMac]

And DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard)) compromises safety?

Successfully implemented in the south-east across countless lines. Used exclusively on the Underground. Is the jury really still out?

[Southern Stag]

Yes, it compromises safety. If there is an accident how is it going to be safer, or even as safe, to have one member of staff than two. What if the driver is incapacitated? DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard)) trains are safe, trains with guards are safer.

[JayMac]

So for over 30 years train/metro operators have compromised safety by having DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard))? 30% of all passenger train movements in the UK^▸ (United Kingdom) are running in safety compromised state?

Where's the public outcry?

[Red Squirrel]

I think it was David Learmount (of Flight International magazine) who, when asked why he preferred to fly in four-engined airliners, replied: "Because there are no five-engined airliners".

That was before ETOPS; few people think twice before hopping across the pond in a twin-engined aircraft now.

[Southern Stag]

So for over 30 years train/metro operators have compromised safety by having DOO^▸ (Driver-Only Operation (that is, trains which operate without carrying a guard))? 30% of all passenger train movements in the UK^▸ (United Kingdom) are running in safety compromised state?

Where's the public outcry?

Yes. I did a quick search in the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) website with the term 'dispatch'. I have found 4 reports since the start of 2011. (This is only a quick search, I don't claim it to be comprehensive.) 3 involved DOO services and 1, the tragic accident at St James Street, involved a service worked with a guard and driver. In all 3 of the DOO incidents I believe that if they had been worked with a guard and driver the incident could have been avoided, or the consequences less severe.

Charing Cross: One of the RAIB's recommendations was that platform staff should have a way of alerting the driver to an emergency once the train had been cleared to proceed. On services worked by a guard the guard will be observing the dispatch process throughout (as they don't have to concentrate on driving the train out of the platform) and they can either stop them train themselves if need be, or can stop the train if the platform staff signal to them that it needs to be stopped.

King's Cross: The service was dispatched by just one person who failed to notice a person trapped in the door. If the service had been worked by a guard there would have been an extra pair of eyes checking the train, and they may have spotted the trapped passenger. Again the dispatcher had no way of stopping the train once it started. Although the emergency alarm was pulled the driver did not stop the train immediately. If a guard had become aware of the dangerous situation and given the driver the stop signal over the driver/guard communication system the train would have been stopped immediately.

Brentwood: The positioning of the DOO equipment relative to the stop boards meant that the driver was unable to have a perfect view of the platform. A guard may have had a better view of the whole train, being able to view from the platform itself.


Another incident of relevance is the failure of a train at Kentish Town. This highlights the impossible task facing the driver of a DOO train when there train fails and they have to attempt to rectify the fault, keep in touch with control and signalling staff, keep passengers informed and manage passengers and the conditions they are in. This led to a lack of communication to the passengers, an increasing number of emergency alarms being pulled and eventually some passengers opening the doors and evacuating the train themselves. As the drive was unable to repeatedly reset the emergency alarms they had to override the safety systems and the train moved with some doors open and passengers near the track. The RAIB noted that the driver became overwhelmed as a result of the magnitude of the task facing them. The lack of support given to the driver was an underlying factor in the incident. Had there been a guard on board they could have focused on communicating with passengers and attempting to manage the conditions on board the train, allowing the driver to concentrate on rectifying the faults with train, liaising with operations staff and making arrangements for the rescue of the train.

[John R]

On modern trains though, once the doors are closed, any guard is simply trying to peer out of a window. So does that really help?

In the King's Cross example, although I haven't read it, from your description there was a dispatcher on the platform. So just how many people does there need to be to make it fail safe?

The Kentish Town example is much more relevant, and shows the extreme pressure that a driver can be under in an emergency situation. Though from recollection the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) also stressed the considerable management failures that put the driver in that position.

We're now 7 years 4 months since a passenger on board a train was fatally injured because of an accident.  For me, that statistic alone leads me to believe that the railway is infinitely safer than it was a generation ago.

[Southern Stag]

On modern trains though, once the doors are closed, any guard is simply trying to peer out of a window. So does that really help?

In the King's Cross example, although I haven't read it, from your description there was a dispatcher on the platform. So just how many people does there need to be to make it fail safe?

It depends. On many trains the guard will still dispatch from the cab, with an opening window, so will have a good view of the trains as it departs.

At King'a Cross there was just one dispatcher on the platform. Obviously the driver has no responsibility for observing the train in those circumstances. It does seem odd that at a busy London terminal just one member of staff is provided for dispatch. The main cause of the King's Cross incident was the failure of the dispatcher to realise that a person was trapped in the train. An extra pair of eyes can only be of help if identifying someone trapped.

[JayMac]

Yes. I did a quick search in the RAIB^▸ (Rail Accident Investigation Branch) website with the term 'dispatch'. I have found 4 reports since the start of 2011.

The most serious 'dispatch' incident in recent years occurred on a train with a guard. There's another ongoing investigation into a dispatch incident involving injury to a passenger at Newcastle Central on a train with a guard.

It's equally possible that the other three incidents could also still have occurred had their been a guard. That's why there are no recommendations from the RAIB saying a guard should be employed to prevent such incidents.

If passenger safety was being compromised because of a lack of a guard the RAIB would be saying so. None of the reports you mention cite lack of a guard as a causal or contributory factor.

[chrisr_75]

With regards to the Merseyrail fatality, the guard in question was convicted of manslaughter by gross negligence and was handed a 5 year custodial sentence.

Very atypical behaviour of a railway employee in my experience, and the gentleman in question apparently had a 20 year blemish free record as a guard before this incident, but nonetheless a stark demonstration of what can go wrong when human beings are involved.

Personally I think there should always be at least one member of staff on every train in addition to the driver as (as long as they're not too busy gassing to the buffet staff) they are a useful source of information, create an increased perception of personal safety on board and obviously help to manage situations on the occasion that things go wrong.