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A mother-to-be has spoken of the terrifying ordeal she underwent when trapped on a First Capital Connect train for over three hours last Thursday night.

The woman, who asked to be known only as Mrs Roberts, is five months pregnant. She was eventually attended to by paramedics but not before the frantic commuter attempted to escape the sweltering conditions on board the stranded train by jumping from her carriage.

The train, which had suffered a power failure, had ground to a halt close to Kentish Town station with half of its carriages inside a tunnel. Commuters on the overcrowded carriages were left frustrated when no information was forthcoming and many turned to FCC^s Twitter feed for information.

Mrs Roberts says she asked, via Twitter, for help after the situation became unbearable but none was sent. When a fellow passenger broke a door to get fresh air into the carriage, the pregnant commuter decided she would have to get herself off the train.

She said: ^The heat was unbearable and with just one window per carriage in these new trains, which opened just five centimetres, the condensation was dripping down the windows.

^It was pitch black and we were there for over three hours. The driver spoke to us just once, very early on, to tell us that there would be a train along in 10 minutes. I had some phone signal and ended up communicating with FCC through Twitter.

^I know I shouldn^t have got off the train but I was feeling dizzy and desperately needed some water. I was shaking. I was asking for help and being told by FCC to ^sit tight^

Her train had ground to a halt close to Kentish Town after a loud bang and what Mrs Roberts described as an explosion further down the train. Soon after stopping, the lights went out.

The Twitter feed responded to individual questions but when Mrs Roberts asked for assistance, she says she was told an ambulance would be waiting for her on the platform.

Dehydrated and beginning to feel claustrophobic, Mrs Roberts described jumping from the train and then watching in horror as the train began to move. ^I was really conscious of being between the train and the wall and of course, the line could have been live, but I was that desperate.^

Staff encouraged her to get back onto the train and when she did, she collapsed and was assisted by other passengers.

She added: ^The only reason the paramedics eventually came was because my husband, who had driven to the station to get me and was on the platform with them, demanded that someone come and get me.^

The dramatic events began when the FCC train first pulled into St Pancras and some passengers described hearing an explosion and seeing people on the platform running away from the train. Worried passengers on board tried to open the doors but found them locked.

An announcement then advised all passengers heading to Luton or Bedford to take an alternative route but many St Albans-bound commuters remained on board, only to be told as the train pulled out of the station that it would terminate at Kentish Town.

When Mrs Roberts spoke with customer services last Friday she says she was informed that FCC staff had known the train would terminate at Kentish Town before it pulled out of the station, but had failed to tell passengers.

A tired and frantic Mrs Roberts was eventually reunited with her husband at Kentish Town but chaotic scenes meant it took them 20 minutes to get off the platform. Unable to face train travel on Friday and weakened by her ordeal, she was forced to take the day off work. ^FCC really need to learn from this but I bet they won^t.^

A spokesperson for FCC said: ^We^d like to sincerely apologise to any customers who experienced delays on Thursday evening. A train failed near Kentish Town which caused major delays throughout the evening for our Thameslink route customers.

^Any customers who experienced delays should contact a customer relations advisor or visit our website for information on how to claim their compensation.

^There will now be a full review carried out by an independent railway consultant, the findings of which will be made public.

^We made every effort to keep customers updated and our Twitter manager was busy talking directly to customers affected. Our customers^ safety was our number one priority throughout this disruption. We apologise for any inconvenience caused.^

The RAIB is investigating an incident which took place between London St Pancras International (Low Level) and Kentish Town stations, on 26 May 2011.  At approximately 18:00 hrs the 16:30 hrs Brighton to Bedford service, formed of two Class 377 units (a total of eight carriages), stopped close to the northern portal of Kings Cross Tunnel with the rear two carriages within the tunnel.  The train had stopped because of an electrical problem on the train itself that had caused the overhead line^s electrical protection equipment to trip, cutting off power to several trains in the area. At this time the train, which had a seating capacity of 476, was fully loaded, with many standing passengers.
Another train of the same type was sent to assist the failed train, and was eventually coupled to it at 20:20 hrs. By this time some passengers had used the emergency release handles to open the train doors in an attempt to improve ventilation (the air conditioning and lighting systems were no longer functioning). The train began to move at 21:03 hrs but this movement was immediately stopped because passengers were getting out onto the railway from the carriages within the tunnel. The passengers were escorted back onto the train, which was then authorised to move forward again at 21:12 hrs. Three sets of doors towards the rear of the train were still fully open while it travelled approximately one mile to reach Kentish Town station, where all the passengers left the train. 

The RAIB investigation will identify the sequence of events that led to the movement of the failed train with open doors.  Factors for consideration will include the design and operation of the trains, the management of the incident and the information available to the passengers and staff who were involved.

The RAIB^s investigation is independent of any investigations by the British Transport Police or the safety authority (the Office of Rail Regulation).

The RAIB will publish a report, including any recommendations to improve safety, at the conclusion of its investigation. This report will be available on the RAIB website.

Immediate cause
189 The driver moved train 1W95 when it was not safe to do so, with passengers
standing in the vicinity of one or more sets of open doors (paragraph 48).

Causal factors
190 The causal factors were:
a. Despite the problems experienced on train 1W95 at St. Pancras, FCC allowed
it to continue to Kentish Town with passengers on board, despite the risk
that the train might fail (paragraph 55, see paragraphs 196a and 201i, no
recommendation).   
b. Foliage had become lodged around the rear pantograph of train 1W95 while
the pantograph was not in use, which caused electrical tripping after the train
left Farringdon with the pantograph raised and the subsequent immobilisation
of the train at Dock Junction (paragraph 50, no recommendation).
c. FCC gave only limited consideration to a range of possible strategies for
rescuing train 1W95 and its passengers and at an early stage focused solely
on the use of an assisting train for moving train 1W95 and its passengers
to Kentish Town (paragraph 59, see paragraphs 196c, 196d, 198a and
Recommendation 1).
d. The arrival of the train provided to assist train 1W95 into Kentish Town was
affected by a series of delays (paragraph 69, Recommendation 1).
e. The conditions for passengers within train 1W95 became increasingly
uncomfortable as time wore on.  In an attempt to make conditions more
tolerable, some passengers opened doors and, later, some alighted
from the train (paragraph 75, see paragraphs 196d, 201b, 198i and
Recommendation 2).
f. Only limited information was provided to the passengers on train 1W95
during the first 45 minutes of the incident and no information was provided
after that time (paragraph 92, see paragraphs 196d, 201b 201h, 202 and
Recommendation 1).
g. The driver of train 1W95 moved the train with some doors open because he
had been informed that train doors were closed and his in-cab display could
not be relied upon to establish the exact status of doors because it had been
affected by the loss of power (paragraph 100, see paragraph 201a, no
recommendation).
h. FCC^s policy for handling incidents involving stranded trains was not applied
(paragraph 114, see paragraphs 196, 201 202 and Recommendations 1
and 2).

191 The following factor was possibly causal:
a. The class 377/5 units were not equipped with screens to allow doors to
be opened without compromising passenger safety (paragraph 85, see
paragraph 201b, no recommendation).

Underlying factors
192 The underlying factors were:
a. The driver of train 1W95 was not given adequate support during the incident,
which affected his ability to manage the conditions on board the train
(paragraph 126, see paragraphs 196b, 198b, 201a, 201e, 201g and 202, no
recommendation). 
b. FCC had not briefed its policy on stranded trains to all key staff prior to
the incident  (paragraph 131, and see paragraphs 196d, 201d and
Recommendation 2).
c. FCC^s competence management regime did not equip staff involved in
the incident with the skills to perform some of the necessary key tasks
(paragraph 134, see paragraphs 196d, 197, 201a and Recommendation 2).
d. Between 2009 and 2011, FCC had investigated a number of incidents
involving trains becoming stranded for extended periods of time,
but had not implemented measures to improve its handling of such
incidents (paragraphs 146, 179, see paragraphs 196e and 201f, no
recommendation).
e. Relevant safety lessons had been identified in performance-focused reviews
on a number of occasions before the incident at Kentish Town on 26 May
2011, but no action had been taken (paragraph 163, Recommendation 3).
f. FCC^s management had not identified or addressed deficiencies in the
processes for emergency preparedness prior to the incident (paragraph 179,
see paragraphs 196f and 202 and Recommendation 2).

Factors affecting the consequences of the incident
193 A factor that possibly affected the consequences of this incident was the
availability and use of information from social networking sites by passengers
as an input to their decisions to self-evacuate from the train (paragraphs 182 to
184, see paragraph 201h and Recommendation 1).

just proves a guard is essential on all passenger trains,

Obviously the safety of the passengers is his responsibility but when a train fails the driver is going to be busy with other things so he won't be able to give as much time and attention to the passengers needs as guard would be able to.