Great Western Coffee Shop

Personal opinion.

Network Rail are failing left, right and centre. It's time for Andrew Haines to start by, at the very least, making public apologies.

We only really highlight problems on GWR, and to a lesser extent SWR, lines on this forum, but there have been far too many instances of infrastructure failures in this part of the world in recent weeks. The weather can't be blamed for all of them. Looking wider there has major disruption in all parts of the country recently where the cause has been infrastructure related.

Under no circumstances should people should be stranded on trains for four hours plus, on a mainline in a densely populated part of the country. Tonight's fiasco wasn't on a rural branch line miles from anywhere. I fully understand the self-evacuations that took place. I would've done the same. Mealy mouthed apologies in the media from a nameless 'Network Rail spokesperson' just isn't good enough.

It's time Andrew Haines was in front of a Select Committee explaining himself. Preferably before there's an infrastructure failing that costs lives. I believe the situation currently really is that serious. Also, if it's budgetry constraints that are part of the cause of these failings then whoever is this week's SoS for Transport needs to be hauled before Committee too.

The network is falling apart. And I'm bloody angry about it.  >:( >:( >:(

Even more worrying when you consider the Haines/Hendy combination is of two highly respected individuals.

What is happening on the Western and Wales Region specifically in the Thames Valley area recently is not wholly representative of the rest of Network Rail.

Andrew Haines if he were to appear before a select committee he would say give the Rail Industry GBR.  By the way he does has regular meetings with the Rail Minister, I suspect he and the Regional Managing Director were on conference calls with the Minster last night.

The decision to evacuate passengers is not one taken lightly, track level is a very hazardous environment, track ballast is not easy to walk on, there are cables, catch pits and much more which is a challenge to experienced track workers. There has to be a plan of where do you take people to exit the railway and then you need to assist them to a safe place.  
Where people left to long, yes.
Could water, food have been provided probably  
The fact that the public address on the Elizabeth Line train stopped working fairly quickly needs to be looked at.
There are no "Thunder Birds" for class 387 and 345 trains unlike class 800 which have engines so can self rescue.  Should there be a "Thunder Bird" based at Old Oak Common, Northpole or Reading

Water and biscuits should be provided on the 345/387 fleets (and others) as they are in IETS.  Space is certainly available on the 387s for such supplies.

It appears that, despite promises to learn the lessons when events like this occur, few lessons are learnt.

Once again the default mantra of the railways that gets paraded across social media, this morning by GWR - DO NOT TRAVEL.

On another forum it's stated that GWRs class 57 was requested as a rescue loco as it has a universal coupling available, however as the ASLEF bruvvers are taking industrial action this request wasn't met.

I was under the impression that some Managers who are qualified drivers could have taken a rescue loco out to assist.
In any dispute, the managers seem to work normally.

I dunno, I have a feeling that using a single loco to rescue multiple trains one at a time might have taken longer to complete than the 3 hours before evacuation took place.

Apparently a 57 was out this morning rescuing a stranded HEX train.

I think they were doing more than that - probably all those qualified to drive trains were out driving trains. Not having a manager who can take on a 57 does not sound so unlikely.

The Telegraph reporting that Andrew Haines was on board the train involved in the incident with the overhead wires, the 1830 1C28 Paddington to Cardiff with 900 passengers onboard. So he would have had firsthand experience how it was all handled.

900 passengers…the train must have been absolutely packed.

Almost certainly. Even two or three 57s would take ages to rescue multiple stranded trains.

When there’s no power, Class 387s load shed as follows:

30 seconds:
Toilet water heater lost
Non drivers side light, windscreen wiper and heater lost

60 seconds:
PIS displays lost

10 minutes:
2/3rds lighting lost (so down to ‘emergency’ lighting only)

60 minutes:
Half door controls lost
Emergency lighting lost

90 minutes:
Saloon HVAC lost

180 minutes:
All door control lost and unit will AUX off.

After that, it’s a dead duck aside from the driver having up to three five minute periods of GSMR operation to communicate with the signaller.

Elizabeth Line Class 345s are likely to be similar as they are built by the same manufacturer…though no toilets obviously.

“We’re sorry that the damage caused to Network Rail’s overhead power lines by another rail operator’s train has caused significant disruption to our Elizabeth line customers as well as all train operators out of London Paddington."

This response from TfL perfectly sums up the state of the UK rail network. Fractured. Broken. Blame shifting.

It wasn't our train that done it guv.

RTT reports
No departure time from Paddington.

Lest you should get the idea that this kind of thing is a local speciality ... this is different, but also a single point of failure:

Yesterday at midday a burst pipe at Châtelet-Les Halles (Paris) flooded a room full of signalling equipment, putting it out of commission and stopping all trains on this key central section of RER lines A, B, and D. Services did restart on each side fairly soon, but that left a huge number of people needing to change at Châtelet-Les Halles. Through services did restart on a limited basis after 18:00, by which time that station, and its neighbours, and the Métro lines that had to serve as back-up, were all massively overcrowded and took hours to recover.

And, as reporters have (all too gleefully) said, this is within a year of the Olympics, for which faultless public transport in Paris has been promised.

Unable to tell you why RTT is now showing no departure for 1C28. It wasn’t last evening showing it had departed Paddington.

No doubt he was comfortably ensconced in 1st class, but I do look forward to his explanation as to why 1000s of passengers were left stranded in cold, dark trains for up to 4 hours with no water or toilet facilities, and also how he intends to ensure that the infrastructure in the Thames Valley will be made fit for purpose swiftly, rather than its current state which resembles Coco the clown's car.

Perhaps he's put himself forward to be interviewed on tonight's news bulletins?

The service as a whole was entered yesterday as (from LiveRail):
22:59:27   Cancelled   At Paddington. Reason I1 [Overhead line/third rail defect] AT ORIGIN

That may not have been literally true, but then it hadn't got anywhere that was anywhere. I can see why RTT may show (since late last night) exactly what that says.

LiveRail also has TRUST data that still show:
Paddington     5                  Depart  18:30 On time      
ROYAL OAK JUNCTION          Pass     18:32 1 Late         
Portobello Junction (London) Pass      18:37 5 Late      
... then cancelled throughout.

That TRUST data may have been captured at the time and removed since, I don't know.

No doubt he was comfortably ensconced in 1st class…
[/quote]

Nobody would be comfortably ensconced on a train with 900 people on board.  Not even the manager driving the train.

Following the Beast from Lewisham. there was a lot of looking into how to manage strandings, especially multiple ones in the cold and dark. This is one of the results: "Guidance Note – Meeting the Needs of Passengers Stranded on Trains" (https://www.raildeliverygroup.com/about-us/publications/acop/269-meetingtheneedsofpassengersstrandedontrains/file.html).

It's full of common sense - more so than you might expect - though that doesn't necessarily make it easy to implement. To pick one random example:

Andrew Haines has issued a statement on LinkedIn. See it via this Twitter link of Ross Lydall? It is worth reading.

https://x.com/rosslydall/status/1733163335296659487?s=61&t=VlafMC5gF9tidw36b1Y8JQ

Photos of message now added

That is not his concern as Network Rail; TfL are responsible for the (lack of) response and facilities.


Whereas this is within his scope.

That may technically be true, but isn't the fragmentation of the railways, as you describe, a major problem and it gives to many people an excuse to pass the buck so that no-one takes responsibility and nothing changes.

I would hope that employees of NR, GWR, tfl, etc. worked together to ensure that those passengers on stranded trains were communicated with and evacuated as soon as possible.

Until the fragmentation of the railways is resolved then things will not improve for passengers and costs will continue to rise.

 Excuse my ignorance, but this 'overhead line problem' seems to be a regular occurance into
 Paddington.
 Does Euston/Kings Cross etc. have the same problems, or are their OHL any different to the one's
 at Paddington ?
 Once again, excuse my ignorance but being a 'Southern Man' my knowledge of OHL is limited !

As I understand it, the overhead lines from Paddington to Airport Junction were put in for the Heathrow Express, robust enough for a diddy little emu four times an hour.   They now have to take rather more than that.  I believe there may be a question relating to spans over all tracks so that one goes, all go.

Written from armchair - experts, please correct if wrong

Yes, that’s broadly correct.  Though the ‘headspan’ wiring was a cheap British Rail scoped design that was also used on certain sections of the ECML where much more electric traction was expected…and it’s failed on that line on many occasions, too.

Certain bits of the original design on the GWML have been strengthened, but some remain, especially in the 40/50mph sections out to Ladbroke Grove.

Though from what I’ve heard it wasn’t the direct fault of the infrastructure in this case.  I expect full details will be revealed soon.

The electrification out of Paddington through Portobello Jcn is actually portal and not headspan, although there are still across track spanwires but its not the same as the headspan used on the ECML.   It was not a "cheap" BR solution, the design and use of headspan was driven by the usual pressures from Government to reduce costs.

Andrew Haines is regarded as the Rail Industry lead, not only CEO of Network Rail he is also CEO of GBR.  He will engage and work with other rail industry leaders from the ToCs, TfL, NR to learn lessons and ensure "we do better in the future"

I am sure he has had robust discussions with the Wales and Western Region senior team

I think its wrong to blame ASLEF that no class 57 was working. They advised GWR of the strike. Its the maintenance, and lack of toilets, Guards, all financial cost cutting effects which should be blamed. The railway is an investment, like roads, not a subsidy and it generates economic activity wherever it goes. The real fault lays at the hands of the DfT and Government in general

We have to presume there will be other incidents as well as OHL issues in the future and there will be a continuing need to evacuate trains on running lines. For me the major question coming from this incident is why does it still take a ridiculous amount of time to "free" the passengers. I would like to have an accurate and true diary of management action starting from the time the OHL problem was reported.
I ask this as someone who has "moons ago" been the manager on site evacuating trains on the South Western Division (time clue there) of the Southern Region. On one occasion I had to attend a review at divisional headquarters called solely to discover why it took 75 mins to evacuate a train near Shalford Junction.
With respect, I do not want to hear answers which major on health and safety, these restraints have always existed (more so on the third rail region!) Perhaps the sharing of the "emergency control management" structure might reveal the something.

A start. But mainly for the benefit of industry colleagues. Something much more public is needed from him.

This particular incident reinforces my long held view that ALL new electric trains should have a diesel engine or a battery, sufficient to move the train for at least an hour at much reduced speed when the wires come down, or able to power basic on board services for several hours if it can not be moved.
And that all new trains should have toilets.

Exactly. "Issuing a statement on LinkedIn" is roughly equivalent to sending an email to your colleagues/network.

He should be speaking to the public, this weekend, apologising for/ explaining the events of the last few days in the wider context of what he proposes to do about the shambolic state of the infrastructure in the area.

That still sounds like a ‘cheap’ solution to me.  It’s very telling that a high percentage of OHLE problems on the GWML occur in the first 12 miles out of Paddington done in the 1990s.

Though, as mentioned, it wasn’t really the fault of the OHLE in this instance from what I’ve been told.

I have been a member of a number of Rail Industry working groups where emergency evacuation of trains was to the topic.

• The train is considered a place of safety, but it does lack welfare
  To get passengers from a train with its floor 2 plus meters above the ground is very high risk to the passenger
  The track is a hostile environment, uneven surface, trip hazards, passengers footwear has to be considered
  The passengers need to be taken to somewhere, just abandoning them in the middle of nowhere is not an option even somewhere like Ladbrook Grove, laying on 50 busses to move a 1000 passengers would be a difficult to arrange at short notice.

There is much more that is looked at, last weeks incident will triggered Network Rail's "Gold Command" ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gold%E2%80%93silver%E2%80%93bronze_command_structure ) these are made up from all parts of the industry

There is a lot more I'm sure could have been done in this particular incident, which I am certain Andrew Haines will be looking at 


From what I know of Andrew Haines he will want to appear on the media, but he will want facts first, what went wrong, what was the decision process, what he plans to do.

Then of course the media will want to interview him, Sunday may be the day he appears on the TV and news papers

This statement from him quoted on the BBC this morning;

"We failed as a system. Too many individual actors seeing risk from their own perspective meant it was harder than it should have been to get things done whilst maintaining safety. Multiple self-evacuations, because of the pace at which we were able to move or even access trains, cannot be regarded as good safety practice.

Lastly, we have gone backwards on customer service. Tools to look after passengers that I would have used as a station manager in 1987 – before I’d even seen a mobile phone – were not available and we were hardly great at it then. We can do better than we did last night when we take customers’ legitimate concerns seriously.”

In terms of evacuations and stranded trains, the safest place to be is on the train.  The only exception to that IMHO is extreme heat or cold on board.

Next safest thing is a controlled evacuation.  Leave it too long and then the least safest thing, an uncontrolled evacuation, is going to happen - especially if the train has no toilets and/or has lost all power.

Ideally you want systems in place to try and ensure you maintain the safest option, but passengers don’t bypass the middle option and head straight to the least safest option.

Even if passenger behaviour is largely predictable, it’s a very difficult balance to get right.  Especially if several trains are involved and/or those trains are very full.  Even the controlled evacuation option can vary massively in terms of its implementation, depending on where the train is.

And 4 hours on a train in pitch darkness, cold, with no communications, no water, no toilet facilities is far too long. There are no ifs buts or maybes about that.

I wonder how many lessons have been learned from the comparable incident in Lewisham almost 6 years ago. The RAIB recommendations following that are interesting and were comprehensive but few, if any seem to have been reflected in the way this one was managed.

No.


I guess that’s a question for TfL, who so far AFAIK have said nothing other than to apologise, but blame someone else.

Given that thousands of passengers were stranded on GWR trains, HEX trains and Elizabeth Line trains, I'd say it's a question for all concerned.

Perhaps something Haines will address in the context of his comment "Too many individual actors seeing risk from their own perspective" and ensure that in future there is one, coordinated approach to this type of incident with clear lines of ownership, authority and accountability.

True.  But I don’t think any GWR trains were left without power and toilets, which makes a big difference.

Andrew Haines comment about to many "actors" and the lack of coordination is consistent with his Great British Railways message and his frustration with Government dragging their heals ii passing the require legislation.

The railways in the UK are fragmented, it takes a lot of work to coordinate response to an incident especially where there are multiple TOC's.

The Network Rail teams available to respond, MOMs (Mobile Operations Managers) and Maintenance, are thin on the ground, and the TOC's are the same situation.

Andrew Haines reminds me of another railway manager who was present on a failed train: the somewhat famous Gerry Fiennes, on a failed Hastings DEMU unit outside London Bridge. His second autobiography describes how he entertained his fellow passengers with an account of what happens (or should not happen) when the railway encounters a failure.

The punchline is that his train was rescued, and in motion again, after seventeen minutes.

Of course, the circumstances were different; for a start this was a single train, not seven.

But I think that no amount of reorganisation at the top is going to compensate for the fact that the railway has undergone a creeping, long-term metamorphosis into something that is less robust, less versatile when challenged; more burdened by layers of complexity...with some strange attitudes on risk and service to passengers.

It seems to be a feature of railways that, both among staff and customers, one gets people who live and breathe railways; people who have long term commitment. I feel for those staff who are struggling at the current time with a system so flawed.

Not just the railway, Trowres. This applies to the banking system and almost anything else we encounter where once a person and their skills and discretion were valued and important. A lot of the appliances and machines we buy are the same. There's a huge societal problem with IT upon which we rely but when it doesn't work the old fashioned manual work-arounds are not there. The availability of "manual" back-ups to these systems is discouraged by cost control. And while Health and Safety (and other regulations) are generally well-intentioned, and founded on experience of things that went badly wrong before, they can sometimes (often?) be an obstacle to the swift resolution of problems.

Two matters strike me - the lack of any available rescue locomotives and staff to help resolve this incident, and the appalling regulatory regime that results in TfL being able to run 9 coach trains from Abbey Wood to Maidenhead and Reading with no toilets, yet GWR cannot run a 2 coach train with toilets (but ones not suitable for the disabled) over short branches in the Thames Valley, Greater Bristol area or the Cornwall and Devon branches.

The first casualty?

Michelle Handforth resigns

https://my.newzapp.co.uk/t/view/1649491895/115581571

Looks like that is for internal consumption TG I trust you have permission given to share?

Paul Clifton has announced it on X
https://x.com/paulcliftonbbc/status/1734608936316404020?s=61

A brief, but lucrative appointment.  Perhaps the ability to fly around the country at the expense of the taxpayer meant she took her eye off the ball when it came to the railway......I'm sure that money could have been better spent....

https://www.railtech.com/all/2023/08/08/uk-industry-deeply-frustrated-by-network-rail-air-travel-policy/

Too right this does. Do we know the split of failed trains by TOC on this incident? However long it takes (within reason), a train with power & toilets is better than any evacuation until eventual rescue. So just TfL services then?

I'm surprised however that the power wasn't switched off.

The Class 800's have diesel engines, so can self power,

The GWR class 387 if there were in the effected area would have the same problem as the TfL Class 345

I think there were:

The original train that got snared near Acton, and another that left Reading a little after that and got to Stockley Junction and hung about for ages before going back. Both had 80xs auxiliary power from their own engines.

Two HEx 387s, operated by GWR, which happened to be close to Acton when power was lost. That should have made it relatively easy to get to them quickly, perhaps using the same staff for both, and keeping in touch with those near the first train (and Andrew Haines?).

All the other trains were TfL's 345s, spread out over the route - five, as I recall. Getting to all of those was the big challenge. I'm not sure how much TfL's own staff were able to contribute to the process.

Of course if it wasn't a GWR strike day there would have been more than two of their services.

Once the location of the de-wirement was known the isolation could have been shorten back, trains could have then at east moved to the next station or set back to one. 
The limiting factor preventing the Electrical Control Room from shortening back remotely is not all of the required remotely controlled earthing devices between Paddington and Maidenhead have been fully commissioned as yet, therefore the Earthing would need to be done manually by the OLE Maintainenance teams which takes time.

It is a requirement under an emergency isolation of the 25kV OLE the power is discharged between Neutral Sections, until an isolation and Earthing is done in the local area of the incident. Neutral Sections are located at Maidenhead and Royal Oak (Elizabeth Lines)

In its previous guise (as Railtrack) costs got seriously out of control without addressing long term problems.  Now as a public body under a government that believes in "small government" of course it is going to fail because they wish to prove - despite the evidence of history - that only private sector can deliver value for money. That is why GBR is on hold. To assist them in this they get economists to do crude comparisons with other railways that are not as densely trafficked, have adequate diversionary routes and which (I suspect) don't have to pay operators for disruption during engineering work.  So NR has to do in short night and weekend possessions what other railways can do more efficiently in the daytime.