Great Western Coffee Shop

GWR Help ‏@GWRHelp
No trains in or out of Paddington at the moment because of a partially derailed non-passenger train. 

Full details still awaited but appears to related to Turbo unit forming 3H52 16+25 Reading TCD to Paddington outside platform 1.

NR advise "numerous track circuit failures in the station throat area and possible damage to overhead masts."

Update from Paddington: don't come here. It's a mess. No staff on concourse naturally.

The BBC's Tom Edwards has tweeted a photo of the derailed Turbo taken from the rear looking forwards.

Totally different to what this tweet seems to suggest:

Cross Rail ‏@cr_rail  17m17 minutes ago
A comment from me that @gwrhelp staff and other front line #GWR doing an excellent job at #Paddington . Good luck and hope nobody hurt 👍👍

The BBC's Tom Edwards has tweeted a photo of the derailed Turbo taken from the rear looking forwards. The photo is at the link below, it appears that the front of the unit has hit an OLE mast which is leaning over:

https://twitter.com/BBCTomEdwards/status/743510824371748864 (https://twitter.com/BBCTomEdwards/status/743510824371748864)

(The photo is too big to embed I think?)

Well all I can say is that I hope the driver is OK as the cab seems to have hit the OLE upright head on.

Nick, was more to show the other view. Unfortunately of course there are only so many staff available, but those that are at station will be doing what they can to help.

I take it the only reason we haven't heard from TaplowGreen on this one is because he's stuck at Paddington. Thoughts with all those who are and the staff trying to deal with this situation.

I thank you for your thoughts.....I am sure they are genuine rather than sarcastic....

Customers travelling beyond Reading today should not attempt to travel from London with us. Your ticket will be valid tomorrow.

Hi Craig, you should travel tomorrow your ticket will be valid -Andy

It's a very quiet Twitter feed indeed.


One reply to an affected customer...


No comments on what you're meant to do through the night... no mention if GWR will reimburse unplanned hotel bills.

........surely they're not brass necked enough to start trawling out the usual "we're not responsible for consequential losses" line? Of course this incident would appear to be totally down to GWR, so they'll have more of an eye on cost as they won't have a fat cheque from Network Rail to cover their costs.......down sleeper also cancelled....so what happens to those passengers?

Gwr Twitter are advising that travel to Paddington will be affected tomorrow too. Would anyone here like to speculate on the level of impact? As a related question whereabouts was the incident and how did it affect all lines? Thanks.

Hang on a minute.  Speculation there. We don't know yet if the protecting signal was falsely in the clear to proceed postion.  This is called a 'Wrong Side Failure' and I can reassure you that all such incident investigations are held with an open mind.  In my (perhaps too long) S&T career I have investigated many incidents like this and you would be very supprised as to the outcome of some of them. :o

I won't pretend to understand the fine details but Network Rail have described it as "Empty train travelled past red signal". Maybe they've spoken too soon but that sounds pretty clear cut?

https://twitter.com/networkrailPR/status/743514804606894082

Network rail have confirmed it was a SPAD on their Twitter feed,

Elsewhere online reporting it was a class A SPAD whatever that is.

A Catergory 'A' SPAD (Signal Passed At Danger) is one caused by driver error.
A Catergory 'B' SPAD is caused by a signalling equipment failure where a signal reverts to danger in an uncontrolled manner and a train passes it at danger in consequence.

All comes down to cost.

The train came from a siding where there are catch points which are designed to derail the train. A system whereby the train brakes are automatically applied may not have stopped the train in time before it fouled another line where potentially another train could be moving

Some lines now open, but hourlys to Wales & Bristol & no Cheltenhams this morning

Cancellations to services between London Paddington and Reading
Due to a train derailment yesterday between London Paddington and Reading fewer trains are able to run on some lines.
Train services running to and from these stations may be cancelled, delayed by up to 30 mins or revised. Disruption is expected until 02:00 18/06.

* Customer Advice

An empty train derailed in a siding outside London Paddington station at approximately 18:15 on 16/06/2016. This has resulted in damage to infrastructure which means that we are unable to operate a full train service between Reading and London Paddington until further notice.


Customers travelling in and out of London Paddington are advised to check travel details before their journey. Passengers may encounter delays and cancellations to services until further notice.


Great Western Railway ticket holders may travel on Chiltern Railways, CrossCountry, South West Trains, London Underground via any reasonable route in order to complete their journey. Customers seeking to travel between Reading & London Waterloo are advised that with Royal Ascot Races taking place today that they should seek to avoid travel via that route but travel via Guildford or Basingstoke instead.

Heathrow Express will accept pre-booked Heathrow Connect tickets only.
Chiltern Railways, Cross Country, South West Trains, Transport for London and London Underground are conveying passengers via any reasonable route until further notice.
Arriva Trains Wales and London Midland are conveying passengers via any reasonable route until further notice.

* Further Information
An update will follow within the next 1 hour.
Last Updated:17/06/2016 05:31

In that case no further discussion should be had around that element as potentially someone's lively hood at stake, it's mentioned on the above linked Twitter feed about it being a class A. 

I'd rather a "livelihood" a stake than lives if,as it seems, this is the case?

Customers seeking to travel between Reading & London Waterloo are advised that with Royal Ascot Races taking place today that they should seek to avoid travel via that route but travel via Guildford or Basingstoke instead.

Also the Bedwyns starting at Reading.

Information in more detail:

What really surprised me about this was there was no mention of it on the morning BBC breakfast local news travel update.

I would be pretty sure the RAIB will be taking a look at this.

Safe to say "looks like a Class A SPAD"; surprised at stating that it IS such, or is there a shorthand in the SPAD text for "appears like"?   I know there are automatic checks for bulb failures, etc, but there remains a small 'unconfirmed' element.   I am minded of an unfortunate incident reported on here she a car was hit on a level crossing ... 'we' we quick to blame the driver but it turned out to be a signalling operation issue.


Totally agreed, except it's not a comparison / tradeoff. If immediate discussion here saved lives at the cost of putting someone out of work, I would be saying "go for it".   Not sure that's what you were saying, though??

Ah - cost - of course. Yes - get catch points to derail a train straight into a supporting gantry of power-lines carrying thousands of volts - just enough to cause a major fire of spilt diesel fuel. Ah - but we had that a few years ago didn't we?

It appears that lessons have not been learnt. It doesn't exactly enhance any feelings of safety when such an incident occurs - by deliberate design. I wonder what the cost for all this will be?

And I might put in a Freedom of Information estimate as to the costs to thousands of intending Heathrow passengers who have missed their flights and the ensuing consequences due to the incompetence of Network Rail / Crossrail and their contractors with regards to all of the stoppages over the last five years or so.

CJB

There was on BBC Wales opt out in the Breakfast programme at 8:30.

True, but how much did speed did that stanchion absorb?  I know its not its job, and it probably wasn't even considered when the line was electrified but where would that unit have ended up if the stanchion had not been there. It'll be interesting to read the outcome of the investigation and the recommendations made.  It could prove very costly if a review and changes are needed to catch points up and down the country.

True, but how much did speed did that stanchion absorb? 

If the driver has held his hand up & GWR have communicated that to NR, with all the delays being attributed to NR these days, I suspect NR wanted to get this one apportioned quickly.

If coming from a shortish siding, surely not that much?....

edit - or was it using the link line?

Assuming the catch points were there long before the stanchion, it is fair to ask if their "operation" should have been reviewed. I suspect that somewhere in the huge volume of engineering standards is a requirements to do just that - triggered by any change in the area a derailed train might end up in. However, it would be background task, and it seems no-one ever got round to doing it.

The BBC London local opt-out at 0755 led with the news of the derailment but in the travel section the presenter said that there was no service into or out of Paddington even though the on-screen caption said 'limited service'.

I thought we were calmly debating this in another topic.  Job for the moderators I think....... ::) :P

Looking at the picture in this BBC report (http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-36555082), you can see that the catch points didn't even do their job of protecting the following points. The train does appear to be lying foul of Platform 1 approach line.

The link line only leads to platform 1 in any case, which looks very limited in its usefulness. I'm sure it could contribute more to operations if its connections were changed. Is there any plan for that (I've not seen any)?

It's a "derailment" that initially led to a "total outage" of services. Seems reasonable

...err no its not.  The trap points did the job they were designed to do which is to divert the train away from a running line.  The track under the train is the connection from the sidings to Platform No.1 and the line and points immediately to the right are the running connection from Line 1 to Platform No.1 and the derailed train is not foul of that.  In any case when a train is derailed on trap points a special detector mechanism called a 'Track Circuit Interrupter' breaks a circuit to place to danger all signals for train movements that could potentially conflict.
...

A Network Rail spokesman said the driver of the derailed train had not been hurt and it was “too early” to speculate about why the train had jumpped [sic] the red light.

3H52 ECS Reading to Paddington normally hangs over at Old Oak Reception
 Sidings for 20 minutes before proceeding to PAD platform 1, due 1754.
 Yesterday it skipped the hangover and so approached platform 1 20 minutes
 early, i.e. well before 1G60, the 1742 HST to Cheltenham Spa was due to
 leave platform 1.
 
 Now how could that sequence of events happen?

No sympathy for the City worker though. Whatever happened, it is extremely unlikely to be anything to do with whoever he 'spoke' to.

Crank up the Way-back machine...
There used to be a set of points giving access from the Royal Oak sidings to line 1 at signal SN26, which meant that the Royal Oak sidings could access platforms 2-5 via line 1, as well as platform 1 via the link line.  After the post-Ladbroke-Grove remodeling, when all sorts of bells and whistles (TPWS, SPAD detection and mitigation etc) were added to the interlocking, some "space" was needed in the computer logic; so these points and their associated routes were removed.

Now that the SSI (solid-state-interlocking) has been replaced by a more-processing-power Smartlock, there's "room" to re-instate these routes and points.  The points are shown as being re-instated (although clipped & padlocked) at Christmas 2016; I don't know when the routes over them will be re-commissioned.

No sympathy for the City worker though. Whatever happened, it is extremely unlikely to be anything to do with whoever he 'spoke' to.

You may be right, in the sense that trains aren't wide enough to actually touch it. There is the usual difficulty of judging perspective at oblique view angles. But I still think it's closer the the protected line than the "design" of the catch points would call for. And yes, the distance it ran is clearly the reason for its ending up there, but that too is part of that "design".

In fact, on reflection, it could have been far worse. That stanchion took a lot of energy out of the train, so if it (the train) had been just a fraction of a metre less off line and hit a glancing blow it could have got a lot further and been pushed back outwards. And, given that the obvious reason for the signal to be red is that Platform 1 is still occupied, or its train is just coming out, a collision is quite possible. Given how busy Paddington is, automatically setting signals to danger leaves a significant residual risk. 

Seems as if that rule needs updating?...

Still a mess at Paddington this evening with a lot of cancellations. BTP on the concourse along with increased GWR staff.

The points to derail are reportedly some 100m back from the gantry. No obstacles permitted within 50 m of such points.

Is that some OHLE wires resting on the roof of the train? :o

Ah - cost - of course. Yes - get catch points to derail a train straight into a supporting gantry of power-lines carrying thousands of volts - just enough to cause a major fire of spilt diesel fuel. Ah - but we had that a few years ago didn't we?

It appears that lessons have not been learnt. It doesn't exactly enhance any feelings of safety when such an incident occurs - by deliberate design. I wonder what the cost for all this will be?

90 cancellations today and 125 service alterations. The joys of being up early means seeing journey check for the whole day, rather than just remainder of seen later.

Journey check now saying disruption till 0200 20/6, unable to run a normal service "until further notice"-whatever that means.

I wonder if the ORR Inspectorate have released the scene to NR yet?

The derailed train its self is not the problem. although it caused the problem!  The problem is the OLE structure which is a twin track cantilever which not only registers the wires into plat 2 which would normally be dealt with by pulling the wires out of running with strops and pull lifts; the main problem is this structure J/00/42 is also the counter balance anchor for the crossovers in the area, this is a little more tricky to deal with, I suspect the canopy of plat 1A will be used as a temporary anchor.

The damage to the foundation of J/00/42 will need to be assessed once the unit has been recovered new foundation bolts will almost certainly be needed these are normally 22mm dia but can be 32mm.

I remain fully aware of two thread - and aware of repeated notifications to that effect. Somehow the two thread, same topic stuff feels trivial tonight - see http://www.firstgreatwestern.info/coffeeshop/index.php?topic=17162.msg197342#msg197342 . I'll sort it in the morning.  In the meantime, please feel free to carry on posting in this thread.

A word of praise for your separating of these two threads - well done, and many thanks!

.......you took the words right out of my mouth!  ;)

I forgot to mention on Friday that I saw a Greenford service in the new (and what I thought was the still unfinished) bay - Platform 5 - at West Ealing.  Was this use planned or was it brought forward because of the derailment? RTT shows it in use today.

Thanks for the thanks.  :-[

It was indeed something of a challenge - but not perhaps as much of a challenge as fixing the physical damage caused by the incident itself.  ;) :D ;D

Derailed London Paddington train is finally moved

(http://ichef-1.bbci.co.uk/news/660/cpsprodpb/10A6A/production/_90020286_mediaitem90020285.jpg)
Network Rail said engineers would carry on working at the site following the incident.

A train that has been stuck on the line at Paddington since Thursday evening causing disruption has been moved, Network Rail have said.

The empty train was automatically derailed after passing a red signal outside Paddington.

Although the train has been shifted, engineers will continue to work on the site throughout the night to repair damage to the line, Network Rail said.

A damaged gantry which the train crashed into was removed earlier.

Platforms one to five remain closed at Paddington, and in total Network Rail has so far deployed 50 engineers to work on the incident.

Network Rail had originally hoped to remove the train at about 22:00 BST on Friday.

(http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/DE5A/production/_90022965_mediaitem90022641.jpg)
The two carriages have been separated and are being placed on the track one at a time

(http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/471A/production/_90020281_trains.jpg)
The damaged gantry which has hit by the train when it derailed was removed earlier this morning

A Network Rail spokesperson said earlier that work would be ongoing throughout Saturday now that the "complicated" work to clear electric power cables had been completed.

With the train lifted clear, the track will be inspected for damage and the electrical cabling will be reconnected, he said.

No timescale has been given for when a full service will be running again.

(http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/901B/production/_90019863_mediaitem90019861.jpg)
The derailed train has severely disrupted services into and out of the station

(http://ichef-1.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/6D12/production/_90022972_traincomp.jpg)
Engineers are using a jack to lift the train and move it back on the track

Great Western Railway have advised passengers to "travel only if necessary and arrive in plenty of time", although a limited service is running.

The derailment has been referred to the Rail Accident Investigation Branch to investigate why the driver passed a red signal.

Network Rail has said it will "await the conclusion of the official investigation" before commenting on the cause of the crash.

(http://ichef.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/DE3B/production/_90019865_mediaitem90019864.jpg)
Engineers said clearing the electric power cables safely was "the tricky bit"

(http://ichef-1.bbci.co.uk/news/624/cpsprodpb/1AEB/production/_90019860_mediaitem90019859.jpg)
Electric power cables will be reconnected after the track is inspected for damage

Network Rails comments re: "awaiting the outcome of the investigation" are interesting bearing in mind that they have already broadcast the fact that it was caused by driver error in passing a red signal!

No timescale has been given for when a full service will be running again.

Meanwhile,


 ::)

.....an element of normality has returned today to be fair.......lots of cancellations due to staff shortages and "more trains than usual  needing repairs at the same time"........

The BBC have a video of the rerailing here:

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-36569006

Presumably the new electrification structure will have to go in the same place as the damaged one, since to do otherwise would require redesign.
That would seem to allow a small but real risk of a repeat incident and consequent substantial disruption.

Would it be worth installing a barrier to stop any derailed train before it strikes the mast ? perhaps something cheap  and simple like a pile of sand bags.
Running into a pile of sand bags would stop the train quickly, but NOT as abruptly as striking a steel structure, the risk to the driver would be reduced.

Worth considering not just at the site of this mishap, but at any other vulnerable locations ?

Have you tried tweeting GWR?

Nope - I hardly use Twitter but will give it a go.

Ta TG

I am trying to plan my journey from Reading to Blackfriers tomorrow and need to be there for 9am - anyone have any indications as to how services will be running in the morning or is it wait and see?

Might be better to use the SWT service to Waterloo ? It is very slow, but time is saved by avoiding crossing London on the underground, and more importantly no risk of being stuck on the underground due to LUL problems.

Blackfriars is just about walking distance from Waterloo, and taxis are readily available and much more affordable from Waterloo than from Paddington.

Heathrow EXPECT to resume tomorrow.

Is that Heathrow EXPRESS or Heathrow CONNECT?  I rather like "Heathrow Expect" for a semi-fast  ;D

, but he had only driven over the link line once during his training, and on one further occasion since qualifying.

Among the written special instructions to the signallers at TVSC is one that requires that, when a movement starting from a position-light signal requires to run via another position-light signal before reaching a platform, siding or main aspect signal, the signaller must clear all the intermediate position-light signals in the route first. When it is ‘absolutely essential to route such a movement as far as an intermediate position-light signal only’, the signaller is required to reach a clear understanding with the driver before the movement starts. Managers at TVSC said that strict compliance with this instruction is not possible at Paddington, because the station is very busy. However, the conversation between the signaller and the driver should have resulted in the driver understanding that his train could not enter the station until the 18:12 hrs departure had left.

The driver of train 3H52 told RAIB that he had woken during the night before the accident at 02:30 hrs, to eat a light meal, as part of his observance of Ramadan. He went back to bed at 03:30 hrs, slept for a further seven hours before coming on duty at 13:07 hrs, and had not had anything else to eat or drink before the accident occurred. From the evidence available, RAIB is unable to determine whether this interruption to his sleep, and subsequent fasting, was a factor in what happened on this occasion. However, RAIB observes that there is research showing that fasting can affect people’s concentration levels. RSSB has published guidance for the railway industry on the topic in document S220 ‘Effects of fasting on fitness to drive’.

Patch38 you are more than likely correct the media and in particular certain parts of the print media will focus on the human factor that being the drivers religion, as it grabs headlines

I don't understand why a signaller in a modern signalling centre should have to clear a route manually. Automatic route setting has been around for years. The down side of a computer system is of course the software. If something has been omitted then....you have to do it the old way.....the rule book is then written to cover the management's tail (whose omission it was).

Can anyone point me to another scenario where it is acceptable for a train driver to be dehydrated and have low blood sugar levels? If the driver of that derailed train had been drunk or hungover the book would've been thrown at him

I do not want to be in a situation whereby my train is at 125mph towards London Paddington and the driver has purposefully allowed himself to get low on fluids and blood sugar. The railways have always been about safety first.

Puerile references to the Daily Mail only serve to demonstrate the double-standard at play here. I ask you again: 550 passengers on a high speed train headed for London with a driver who has purposefully deprived himself of fluids and food...?

From the evidence available, RAIB is unable to determine whether this interruption to his sleep, and subsequent fasting, was a factor in what happened on this occasion

As an aside, I question the wisdom of having trap points that will divert a train doing a SPAD away from other traffic, but into a cantilever mast that, if damaged, will cause huge disruption to the railway. Probably no-one ever thought the trap would be sprung one day when planning either that or the mast, whichever came second.

IIRC, the basic track layout dates from work that took place in the early 90s, with the electrification installed later in 1997.  Not sure if that particular gantry was installed from the outset though.

It has just struck me that never before in the Great Western Coffee Shop has the question of whether an accident could have been prevented by a cup of char (government strength 6 or above) and a bacon sarnie been debated at a theological level.

ARS doesn't operate for shunting movements, only for main timetabled signal routes.  It was designed to relieve the signaller from having to set main running movement routes and thus allowed him/her to concentrate more on such shunt movements and other things.  The trouble here 'might be' that the signallers overall workload is just to great an area to control at any one time when ARS has to be switched off or a train has to run out of pattern and that the ARS is not pre-programmed for #.

# My personal opinion only

I think that a BACON sandwich might have been particularly inappropriate ! a cheese roll perhaps more suitable ?

Important safety messages

This accident demonstrates the importance of:
•Drivers using the resources available to them to refresh their knowledge of the details of the track layout and signals on routes which they do not drive over regularly, and using reminders such as route diagrams to check what they are about to encounter, before setting off over the route.
•Assessing the risks of using trap points to protect lines and why assessments should include an examination of the potential consequences of derailing, such as the possibility of vehicles fouling running lines or encountering other hazards.
•Drivers being alert to the possibility that, when a position-light signal is cleared the route may only be set as far as another position-light signal, rather than to a main signal or buffer stops.
•Signallers complying with any local instructions applicable to clearing position-light signals when a route cannot be set all the way to a main signal or buffer stops.

2. Summary of the accident

At 18:12 hrs on Thursday 16 June 2016, a two-car diesel multiple unit train, operated by Great Western Railway (GWR), was driven through open trap points immediately outside Paddington station and derailed. It struck an overhead line equipment (OLE) mast, damaging it severely and causing part of the structure supported by the mast to drop to a position where it was blocking the lines. There were no passengers on the train, and the driver was unhurt. All the the lines at Paddington were closed for the rest of that evening, with some services affected until Sunday 19 June.

3. Cause of the accident

The daily station working at Paddington includes a number of instances in which trains are lengthened by attaching additional coaches to sets already in the platforms. One of these, in the evening peak, involves trains 5H52 and 3H52, which are planned to couple in platform 1 to form train 1H52, the 18:12 hrs service to Henley-on-Thames. Train 5H52 is formed of a three-car unit which, having arrived earlier in passenger service from Bedwyn, runs out of platform 1 into Royal Oak Sidings at 17:18 hrs, and should wait in the sidings until 17:42 hrs, and then return to platform 1. Train 3H52 runs empty from Reading depot, and is timetabled to wait on the reception line at Old Oak Common depot until 17:40 hrs, and then run directly to Paddington platform 1, arriving at 17:51 hrs and then attaching to 5H52. However, on occasions train 3H52 may be routed into Royal Oak sidings to wait there for the route into platform 1 to become available; this is what happened on 16 June.

(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/image_data/file/54698/Paddington_station_layoutv2.jpg)
The approaches to Paddington platform 1 showing the routes set and the position of the trains after the accident (not to scale)

Train 3H52 arrived at Royal Oak sidings at about 17:34 hrs, and soon after that there was a change to the planned workings. GWR decided at short notice, in response to increased passenger flows, that 3H52 should be used to lengthen train 1D61, the 18:18 hrs service to Oxford, rather than its planned use on 1H52. This decision was communicated to the signaller on the Paddington workstation at Network Rail’s Thames Valley Signalling Centre (TVSC) at about 17:40 hrs. At that time 5H52 and 3H52 were in Royal Oak sidings, and train 3D61, the empty carriages to form 1D61, was approaching the sidings from Old Oak Common. Platform 1 was occupied by train 1G60, the 17:42 departure to Cheltenham Spa.

The signaller routed 5H52 out of the sidings and up to signal SN6004, to make space in the sidings for 3D61, while waiting for 1G60 to depart, which it did at 17:50 hrs, eight minutes late. 5H52 then ran into platform 1, to become 1H52. The driver of 3H52, who was still expecting to follow 5H52 into the platform, then called the signaller on the radio to ask what was happening. The signaller told him about the change of plan, and said that train 3H52 would have to wait in the sidings for another twenty minutes, until 1H52, the 18:12 hrs departure, had left Paddington, and then go into platform 1.

At 18:11 hrs the signaller set the route for 1H52 to depart from platform 1. One minute later he cleared ground position-light signal SN6006 for 3H52 to leave the siding. The signal displayed two white lights to the driver, which authorised the train to run along the link line as far as the line was clear, up to a similar position-light signal, SN6004. Train 3H52 would then be ready to run into platform 1 as soon as 1H52 had departed.

The driver of 3H52 started his train a few seconds after signal SN6006 cleared. He drove along the link line towards the station, reaching 25 mph (40 km/h), which is the maximum permitted speed on that line. Although he had not seen a train leave platform 1 since his conversation with the signaller, the driver had formed the impression in his mind that the clearance of signal SN6006 meant that the route was set all the way into platform 1. Signal SN6004 was clearly visible, but the driver did not realise that it applied to his train, so he drove past it although it was showing two red lights, meaning ‘Stop’.

Immediately after he passed the signal the driver realised that his train was being diverted to the right, off the track, and so he made an emergency brake application. However, it was too late to prevent the derailment, and the first three bogies of the train ran off the end of the rails. The right-hand front corner of the train struck the mast of a cantilever structure (J 00 42) which supports OLE on line 1. The impact distorted the mast, and the cantilever dropped far enough to become a hazard for trains travelling on lines 1 and 2. The train was still moving at about 8 mph (13 km/h) when it struck the mast. The trap points diverted the train itself clear of the other running lines, and the derailed vehicles did not obstruct any other routes, so there was no risk of collision with another train.

(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/image_data/file/54534/train_and_OLE_mast.jpg)
The front of the derailed train and the OLE mast, after the accident

Train 1H52, departing for Henley-on-Thames, had begun to move along platform 1, when the derailment caused the signal at the end of the platform to revert to red. The driver stopped his train before reaching that signal, and the passengers on the train were able to disembark onto the platform.

The driver of 3H52 had been trained by GWR, and qualified to drive trains in October 2015. During his training he had learned the routes out of Paddington, including the link line and Royal Oak sidings, but he had only driven over the link line once during his training, and on one further occasion since qualifying. He had copies of the line diagram for the route in his bag, and could have referred to them during the period that his train was waiting in the sidings. While his train was waiting in Royal Oak sidings, the driver of 3H52 sat in the passenger accommodation and used an electronic device to access the internet. There is no evidence that this device was used while the driver was in the driving cab of the train, or that it played any part in what happened next.

Among the written special instructions to the signallers at TVSC is one that requires that, when a movement starting from a position-light signal requires to run via another position-light signal before reaching a platform, siding or main aspect signal, the signaller must clear all the intermediate position-light signals in the route first. When it is ‘absolutely essential to route such a movement as far as an intermediate position-light signal only’, the signaller is required to reach a clear understanding with the driver before the movement starts. Managers at TVSC said that strict compliance with this instruction is not possible at Paddington, because the station is very busy. However, the conversation between the signaller and the driver should have resulted in the driver understanding that his train could not enter the station until the 18:12 hrs departure had left.


(https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/image_data/file/54535/signal_SN6004.jpg)
The train from the rear after the derailment. Signal SN6004 is at the bottom right

The driver of train 3H52 told RAIB that he had woken during the night before the accident at 02:30 hrs, to eat a light meal, as part of his observance of Ramadan. He went back to bed at 03:30 hrs, slept for a further seven hours before coming on duty at 13:07 hrs, and had not had anything else to eat or drink before the accident occurred. From the evidence available, RAIB is unable to determine whether this interruption to his sleep, and subsequent fasting, was a factor in what happened on this occasion. However, RAIB observes that there is research showing that fasting can affect people’s concentration levels. RSSB has published guidance for the railway industry on the topic in document S220 ‘Effects of fasting on fitness to drive’.

4. Previous similar occurrences

The secondary risks that can result from the use of trap points to reduce the risk from overruns are discussed in our Bury safety digest. These risks were are also referred to in our Carrbridge investigation report.

The OLE mast that was struck by the train is positioned 46 metres, the length of a two-car train, beyond the toe of the trap points. Network Rail’s standard for the provision of trap points (former Railway Group Standard GK/RT0064) requires trap points to be located so as to guide derailed vehicles away from other lines, structures, and any other hazards. In the congested area close to Paddington station, there is little scope for varying the relative positions of trap points and OLE structures, and the distance available beyond these trap points would normally have been regarded as sufficient for a train that derailed on them to be stopped. In this case, because the train was travelling at the maximum permitted speed, and its brakes were not applied until after it had derailed, the space was not sufficient and the structure was damaged.

The importance of route knowledge for train drivers, with reference to the Paddington area, is discussed in Lord Cullen’s report on the accident at Ladbroke Grove     on 5 October 1999. While train drivers may be able to regularly drive the running lines on the routes which they sign, it can be difficult to maintain familiarity with all the associated sidings and shunt movements. In such circumstances it is important that drivers have access to, and make use of, reference material such as diagrams of the lines and signals, to remind themselves of the signals applying to shunt moves before they start the movement.

RAIB have released a Safety Digest (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/paddington-safety-digest/derailment-at-paddington-16-june-2016) for this accident

Media correction: RAIB Paddington safety digest

Correction by The Sun following complaint to the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO)

The Sun – ‘Ramadan train driver in crash’, 20 August 2016

Background

The Sun ran a story following RAIB’s publication of a safety digest on a derailment that took place at Paddington (https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/paddington-safety-digest/derailment-at-paddington-16-june-2016) on 16 June 2016.

The article

The article reported that a Muslim train driver had run through a double red light, causing his train to derail, hit a gantry and bring down powerlines. It claimed that the driver “crashed after going without food or drink for 15 hours during Ramadan”. It reported that “rail accident experts claimed his fast caused the rush-hour derailment”.

The article went on to report that the Rail Accident Investigation Branch (RAIB) was “unable to conclude that fasting was a factor in the crash. But it pointed out studies showed not eating can cause ‘sleepiness and reduction in concentration which can result in safety concerns’”. The article also reported that the company operating the train in question had said that its drivers were “regularly briefed and monitored for competence”.

Action taken

RAIB was one of several complainants to IPSO.

Outcome

The complaint was upheld. The online version of the story was removed. On 19 November, a printed correction appeared on page 2 of The Sun.

"In a story ‘Ramadan Train Driver in Crash’ (20 Aug) we implied that Rail Accident Investigation Branch said the cause of the derailment at Paddington was that the driver had been fasting during Ramadan. In fact they were unable to conclude that fasting was a factor in the crash on evidence available, although they observed that there is research showing that fasting can affect people’s concentration levels. It was also stated that the driver of a derailed train ran through TWO red lights at London’s Paddington Station. In fact the two red lights were on the same signal. We are happy to clarify."

Read the full IPSO decision (https://www.ipso.co.uk/rulings-and-resolution-statements/ruling/?id=08089-16).