Great Western Coffee Shop

10 November 2014

Former First Capital Connect train driver, Scott Walford, has received a three-month suspended prison sentence and been ordered to pay costs of ^500, after he ignored warnings and safety systems on the Cambridge to London train he was driving ^ placing passengers and staff on board in great danger. On 7 November, Mr Walford pleaded guilty following a prosecution brought by the Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) for a breach in health and safety law in October 2013.

On 8 October 2013, the 20:40 Cambridge to London Kings Cross, driven by Mr Walford, passed a red signal at Hitchin station ^ a signal which instructs a driver to stop their train. The train's warning safety system applied automatic brakes but Mr Walford deliberately reset the system and continued on without seeking the required authorisation. Prior to leaving Cambridge, Mr Walford had also failed to set up his Cab Secure Radio, which prevented any direct contact from the signaller. As a result of his actions Mr Walford's train ran "out of control" putting himself, passengers and train staff at risk of a serious incident, such as a collision with an oncoming train. Following the incident Mr Walford was relieved from all duties at First Capital Connect.

Sentencing took place at Stevenage Magistrates Court on Friday 7 November, following ORR's investigation into the incident. The investigation found that Mr Walford failed to take reasonable care of the safety of himself, passengers and other persons who might have been affected by his actions. Deliberate decisions to avoid safety procedures following a signal passed at danger, such as the choices made by Mr Walford, are rare but carry potential catastrophic consequences.

Donald Wilson, principal safety inspector, ORR said:

"Train drivers hold a position of great responsibility for safety on our railways. They must comply with health and safety law, and work in accordance with their licence and training.

"Mr Walford fell short of these standards, and, in doing so, showed a serious disregard for the safety of his passengers. His actions ^ ignoring warning signals and systems - could have led to a potentially catastrophic incident. He put his life, and the lives of others, at risk. This kind of incident is very rare, but where serious failings are found, those at fault will be held to account by the rail regulator."

Read the full press release: http://orr.gov.uk/news-and-media/press-releases/2014/train-driver-receives-prison-sentence-for-ignoring-safety-systems (http://orr.gov.uk/news-and-media/press-releases/2014/train-driver-receives-prison-sentence-for-ignoring-safety-systems)

One of the charges levelled against train driver Scott Walford which led to him
receiving a three month suspended prison sentence, was that he had not set
up his Cab Secure Radio (CSR).
^ The case summary states that his actions meant that he was ^in control of a
runaway train, placing railway passengers and staff at risk of serious harm
from a collision^ - an oxymoron. The intemperate and inflammatory language
used by the ORR is unbefitting an official industry body and is inappropriate to
the industry.

^ It also states that by failing to set up his CSR, he prevented ^direct contact^
from the signaller. This is simply inaccurate.

^ Setting up the CSR has two stages: First, logging on by entering the
appropriate area code. This puts the radio on the network. It means that the
driver is contactable by the signaller. The second stage is putting in a signal
number that identifies the train and produces a unique Train Reporting
Number (displayed on the radio). The signaller can then communicate with
the driver on a one-to-one basis.

^ Scott Walford had completed the first stage. His radio was therefore live on
the network. He was contactable through a General Call or Train Stop
message. A General Call or Train Stop goes directly to all the drivers on a
specified area within the network. When he received the General Call on his
radio, Scott Walford stopped his train.

One of the charges levelled against train driver Scott Walford which led to him
receiving a three month suspended prison sentence, was that he had not set
up his Cab Secure Radio (CSR).

^ The case summary states that his actions meant that he was ^in control of a
runaway train, placing railway passengers and staff at risk of serious harm
from a collision^ - an oxymoron. The intemperate and inflammatory language
used by the ORR is unbefitting an official industry body and is inappropriate to
the industry.

^ It also states that by failing to set up his CSR, he prevented ^direct contact^
from the signaller. This is simply inaccurate.

^ Setting up the CSR has two stages: First, logging on by entering the
appropriate area code. This puts the radio on the network. It means that the
driver is contactable by the signaller. The second stage is putting in a signal
number that identifies the train and produces a unique Train Reporting
Number (displayed on the radio). The signaller can then communicate with
the driver on a one-to-one basis.

^ Scott Walford had completed the first stage. His radio was therefore live on
the network. He was contactable through a General Call or Train Stop
message. A General Call or Train Stop goes directly to all the drivers on a
specified area within the network. When he received the General Call on his
radio, Scott Walford stopped his train.

Following the court^s decision that by not acquiring the train reporting number
on the radio and relying only on the area code Scott Walford had broken the
law, ASLEF has decided to ensure our members are not liable to prosecution
and are advising the following that as from 1st December 2014:
 
1. If you are unable to register the train reporting number on either the GSMR
or CSR radio system then the train should not enter service and if in
service the train should run at a maximum of 20mph.

2. ASLEF will advise Network Rail and all TOCs and FOCs that where there
is no cab radio working, ASLEF members will run at a maximum of 20 mph
in the affected area.

And the 20mph instruction is the fastest way to get that done.

If a train fitted with a GSM-R radio system must be registered and with a signal before a
train can enter service from a station?
If a GSM-R cab radio cannot be registered for any reason, but it displays ^GSM-R GB^,
indicating that it is attached to the network, it should be assumed that the train radio is
operative and capable of sending and receiving calls (including railway emergency calls).
Therefore the train can enter service.

Is this driver an ASLEF member I wonder?

If so, he was very badly advised. He should never have pleaded guilty to the radio offence & the ORR would then have had to prove it was indeed currently illegal.

But isn't that what ASLEF wants to confirm in instigating this action?

ALSEF should be concentrating their efforts on pointing out to their members the much more serious dangers and likely legal consequences of 'reset and go' without authority following a SPAD. Why they are fixated on the CSR/GSM-R issue is beyond me.

You have to be charged with an offence that is on the statute books or one that is common law.

Incorrectly/failing to setting up CSR/GSM-R isn't an offence in and of itself, so the driver would not have been charged with it.

It shall be the duty of every employee while at work to take reasonable care for the health and safety of himself and of other persons who may be affected by his acts or omissions at work

ALSEF should be concentrating their efforts on pointing out to their members the much more serious dangers and likely legal consequences of 'reset and go' without authority following a SPAD. Why they are fixated on the CSR/GSM-R issue is beyond me.