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Title: RAIB witness appeal - incident at Holland Park, 18:35 on 25 August 2013 Post by: Chris from Nailsea on October 23, 2013, 14:48:58 From an e-mail I've received, from the Rail Accident Investigation Branch:
Quote Can you help? Were you caught up in the accident at Holland Park on 25 August at 18:35 hrs? A train departing Holland Park station was stopped by the operation of a passenger emergency alarm after smoke was seen to enter the train. Passengers tried to open the doors and some climbed out using the car-end doors. Were you on the train? Did you operate a passenger emergency alarm? If so, the RAIB is keen to hear from you as part of its independent safety investigation. If you have any information please email (http://enquiries@raib.gov.uk?subject=Holland+Park) in confidence. Title: Re: RAIB witness appeal - incident at Holland Park, 18:35 on 25 August 2013 Post by: Brucey on October 27, 2013, 19:29:01 There is a video of the aftermath on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9UmzucFNwmk
It just goes to show how humans are "programmed" to panic. Just look at how many people press the red "train stop" button, which obviously won't do anything as the train has already stopped. And the people climbing out of the inter-carriage doors could have easily fallen and been electrocuted. A question which I have always asked myself is why don't London Undeground trains have passenger operated emergency door releases? All mainline trains do and as half the tube network is out of tunnels, it clearly makes sense to have a method of releasing the carriage doors. There are "butterfly cocks" on the outside of each carriage, but this is no use if you are stuck inside. Title: Re: RAIB witness appeal - incident at Holland Park, 18:35 on 25 August 2013 Post by: ChrisB on October 28, 2013, 11:57:14 Coz silly pax would operate them anywhere - stopped in tunnels, stopped in rural areas on steep embankments etc etc
Title: Re: RAIB witness appeal - incident at Holland Park, 18:35 on 25 August 2013 Post by: IndustryInsider on October 28, 2013, 12:12:48 Coz silly pax would operate them anywhere - stopped in tunnels, stopped in rural areas on steep embankments etc etc Modern trains get round that problem by having emergency egresses that won't open until the train has stopped, and the driver can temporarily override the operation of them and then bring the train to a stand at a suitable location. Having said that, there aren't as many suitable locations on the underground network apart from the stations and the more rural areas out of London, and there would no doubt be plenty of 'silly pax' operating them and causing delays. Does anyone know what the arrangements are with the new 'S' Stock regarding emergency egress? Title: Re: RAIB witness appeal - incident at Holland Park, 18:35 on 25 August 2013 Post by: Southern Stag on October 28, 2013, 12:59:07 I believe they have the same arrangements as other tube stock, the designated emergency egress is through the cabs and out the emergency front facing doors. This probably wouldn't be too much of a problem on S Stock with there open gangways but on every other tube stock where you'd have to contend with all the carriage to carriage doors first it would take a long time to get out.
Title: Re: RAIB witness appeal - incident at Holland Park, 18:35 on 25 August 2013 Post by: Chris from Nailsea on July 28, 2014, 19:52:26 The Rail Accident Investigation Branch (http://www.raib.gov.uk/publications/investigation_reports/reports_2014/report162014.cfm) (RAIB) has released its report (http://www.raib.gov.uk/cms_resources.cfm?file=/140728_R162014_Holland_Park.pdf) into the uncontrolled evacuation of a London Underground train at Holland Park station on 25 August 2013. The RAIB has made six recommendations.
Quote Summary At around 18:35 hrs on Sunday 25 August 2013, a London Underground train departing Holland Park station was brought to a halt by the first of many passenger emergency alarm activations, after smoke and a smell of burning entered the train. During the following four minutes, until the train doors still in the platform were opened by the train operator (driver), around 13 passengers, including some children, climbed out of the train via the doors at the ends of carriages. The investigation found that rising fear spread through the train when passengers perceived little or no response from the train operator to the activation of the passenger emergency alarms, the train side-doors remained locked and they were unable to open them, and they could not see any staff on the platform to deal with the situation. Believing they were in danger, a number of people in different parts of the train identified that they could climb over the top of safety barriers in the gaps between carriages to reach the platform. A burning smell from the train had been reported when the train was at the previous station, Notting Hill Gate, and although a request had been made for staff at Holland Park station to investigate the report, the train was not held in the platform for staff to respond. A traction motor on the train was later found to have suffered an electrical fault, known as a ^flash-over^, which was the main cause of the smoke and smell. A factor underlying the passengers^ response was the train operator^s lack of training and experience to deal with incidents involving the activation of multiple passenger emergency alarms. The report observes that London Underground Limited (LUL) commenced an internal investigation of the incident after details appeared in the media. The RAIB has made six recommendations to LUL. These seek to achieve a better ergonomic design of the interface between the train operator and passenger emergency alarm equipment, to improve the ability of train operators to respond appropriately to incidents of this type, and to ensure that train operators carry radios when leaving the cab to go back into the train so that they can maintain communications with line controllers. LUL is also recommended to review the procedures for line controllers to enable a timely response to safety critical conditions on trains and to ensure continuity at shift changeover when dealing with incidents. In addition, LUL is recommended to review the training and competencies of its staff to provide a joined-up response to incidents involving trains in platforms and to reinforce its procedures on the prompt and accurate reporting of incidents so that they may be properly investigated. This page is printed from the "Coffee Shop" forum at http://gwr.passenger.chat which is provided by a customer of Great Western Railway. Views expressed are those of the individual posters concerned. Visit www.gwr.com for the official Great Western Railway website. Please contact the administrators of this site if you feel that content provided contravenes our posting rules ( see http://railcustomer.info/1761 ). The forum is hosted by Well House Consultants - http://www.wellho.net |