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Greater Anglia and East Midlands trains in Norwich station crash

Eight people have been taken to hospital after two trains crashed in Norfolk.

The collision happened on Norwich station's platform six at about 00:10 BST.

The Greater Anglia Great Yarmouth to Norwich service and a stationary East Midlands Trains unit were involved in the "low speed" collision.

The ambulance service said all eight people - including four who were stretchered away - had minor injuries.

The two trains remained upright after the crash.

Both the Rail Accident Investigation Branch and British Transport Police are investigating the collision.

Police said the Great Anglia service was travelling at about 10mph when it collided with the second train.

A spokeswoman for East Midlands Trains said its train, which was empty at the time, has been removed from service because of the damage caused.

'Welfare'

"Our first thoughts are for the welfare of those who have been injured in the incident," she said.

A spokeswoman for Greater Anglia said: "The train arriving at Norwich was travelling at very slow speed.

"There were 31 passengers on board.

"Our first priority has been and remains the welfare of the passengers and train crew involved."

The injured were taken to the Norfolk and Norwich Hospital.

The RAIB^s preliminary examination found that the collision occurred because the train was travelling too fast when it entered the platform. Consequently, it was unable to stop in time and collided with the stabled train. The RAIB also found that the length of unoccupied platform could not accommodate the full length of train 2C45.

RAIB state....


Rap on the knuckles for the signaller....the driver probably expected the available space to at least take the full train length

The investigation will identify the sequence of events that led to the train being unable to stop in time when it entered a platform that was already occupied and the factors that influenced the behaviour of the driver. It will also include an examination the train operating company^s competence management system, the arrangements for signalling trains into this platform when it is occupied and the station operating regime.

The RAIB also found that the length of unoccupied platform could not accommodate the full length of train 2C45.

Please don't publish your own judgement and don't (however jocularly) suggest actions to be taken against those you consider to be responsible.

Might I suggest better guidance for this forum as I don't notice this instruction.

I think this clearly suggests that the signaller shouldn't have put it on that platform?

The RAIB concluded that the accident occurred because during the last 20 seconds of the driver^s approach to the station, he either had a lapse in concentration or a microsleep.

The RAIB identified some factors which may explain the driver^s possible lapse in concentration (ie the noise made by the passengers immediately behind his cab and the various thoughts occupying his attention at the time of the approach). The RAIB also found that the driver had a previous operational history indicative that he was prone to lapses in concentration, and that this had not been identified by Greater Anglia^s competence management system.

Greater Anglia^s investigations of the previous incidents that the driver had been involved in had not raised any concerns about the driver^s ability to maintain concentration. This was because the driver manager who carried out the investigation had not been trained to consider that incidents, seemingly different in nature, could be linked by underlying behavioural issues. Opportunities to formally review the driver^s operational history were missed and this was also not identified by the internal audits conducted by Greater Anglia.

Furthermore, the driver was tired through a short-term lack of sleep, and his performance might also have been affected by the prescribed medication that he was taking. These could have been other factors leading to a lapse in concentration, or they could have led to the driver having a micro sleep.

Recommendations

As a consequence of this incident, the RAIB has made five recommendations and identified two learning points.

Four recommendations are addressed to Greater Anglia with respect to its competence management system, its accident and incident investigation procedures, its auditing processes and its fatigue management system. A further recommendation is addressed to Network Rail, with the support of Greater Anglia, to understand and mitigate the risk associated with permissive train movements at Norwich station.

The learning points relate to the importance of reporting all incidents to signallers, and the importance of providing occupational health physicians with all relevant medical information during consultation.