Cornwall woman gets payout after suing Great Western Railway for 'poor service'

[whole diary]

[grahame]

From Cornwall Live

A woman who has embarked on a crusade against Great Western Railway (GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway)) has been awarded a pay-out after taking them to court for problems she has faced while travelling.

Law student Rema Ince has been awarded a payout after using consumer rights laws to take the train company to court.

Mrs Ince who each day travels between her home in Redruth and St Austell workplace complained of 63 late trains, allegedly being trapped on a train in a station for over an hour when there was an explosion and assaulted twice by drunks. After being attacked Mrs Ince was told criminal action could not be taken because the CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) request by the police was refused.

GWR told police that Hitachi owned the rights to the CCTV and GWR could not access it.  Mrs Ince claimed that the train service was not ‘performed with reasonable care and skill’.

[Rob on the hill]

GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) told police that Hitachi owned the rights to the CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) and GWR could not access it.

Interesting fact, and if correct, could affect any future legal cases.

[stuving]

GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) told police that Hitachi owned the rights to the CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) and GWR could not access it.

Interesting fact, and if correct, could affect any future legal cases.

This was in the IEP^▸ (Intercity Express Program / Project.) requirement:

The Saloon CCTV system must incorporate the following functionality:
• each IEP Vehicle shall contain sufficient CCTV cameras to view all public accessible areas (excepting inside toilets) and to minimise blind spots. The passenger areas to be covered shall include vehicle saloons, doorways, vestibules, gangways, publicly accessible catering areas and other public spaces;
• cameras fitted shall, so far as possible, be resistant to tampering and vandalism;
• the CCTV system shall record, without overwriting, for a minimum of 1 months IEP Train service operation;
• the recorded picture shall be in colour and shall be of sufficient clarity to enable the
DIdentification of individuals to the same standard as that defined in clause 7.6 of BS TEN 50132-7:1996 ‘Alarm Systems – CCTV surveillance systems for use in security applications – Application guidelines’;
• recorded images may need to be used as evidence in a prosecution. To facilitate this the system shall be able to support a clear evidential trail so as to allow the integrity of the recording to be demonstrated;
• the system shall be able to be operated so as to comply with the legal requirements with regard to data protection;
• the CCTV picture capture frame rate shall be sufficient to allow the visible actions of persons within all public accessible areas to be identifiable. Consideration shall be given to increasing this frame rate after an 'emergency event' trigger, such as a passenger alarm handle being actuated; and
• the CCTV system shall allow the following to be viewed in a secure train crew area:
  o live (i.e. a delay of no more than two seconds) images from any CCTV camera; and
  o recorded images from any CCTV camera.

There may be more in the MARA^▸ (Master Availability and Reliability Agreement)/TARA^▸ (Train Availability and Reliability Agreement)/Franchise (with the empahasis on "more"), but that would need to flatly contradict the requirement for CCTV images to be unavailable just because Hitachi say so.

[Pb_devon]

It only takes a bit of dithering or misunderstanding for the one month time limit to be exceeded, and images overwritten.

[ChrisB]

GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) told police that Hitachi owned the rights to the CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) and GWR could not access it.

Interesting fact, and if correct, could affect any future legal cases.

GWR can't access it - the Police need to go to Hitachi direct & request it....is how I read that.

[Pb_devon]

GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) told police that Hitachi owned the rights to the CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) and GWR could not access it.

Interesting fact, and if correct, could affect any future legal cases.

GWR can't access it - the Police need to go to Hitachi direct & request it....is how I read that.

Hence my comment.....if no-one told BTP^▸ (British Transport Police) that contractual issue, they probably sent the CCTV request to GWR, who then found it was an IEP^▸ (Intercity Express Program / Project.), so sent it back, and by the time it got to Hitatchi the images were gone. Classic!!!

[ChrisB]

Lack of communication within the BTP^▸ (British Transport Police)...pretty sure GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) would have informed them of the new arrangements for the IETs^▸ (Intercity Express Train)

[old original]

Lack of communication within the BTP^▸ (British Transport Police)...pretty sure GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) would have informed them of the new arrangements for the IETs^▸ (Intercity Express Train)

Wouldn't bet on it...

[grahame]

GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) can't access it - the Police need to go to Hitachi direct & request it....is how I read that.

In which case the signage inside the IET^▸ (Intercity Express Train) is confusing

[stuving]

According to the TARA^▸ (Train Availability and Reliability Agreement), GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) is data controller for the CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) (so that sign is correct) and Agility Trains West Ltd. (i.e. Hitachi) is data processor:

3.2 For the purposes of the Data Protection Act, the Operator shall be the data controller and the TSP^▸ (Train Service Provider) shall be the data processor of any personal data contained in the CCTV, FFCCTV and seat reservation data that the TSP may collect, retain and process pursuant to this Agreement. Any such personal data that the TSP may process shall be the Personal Data.

The bits about data protection and data processing by the TSP cover more than just CCTV data, and the main CCTV section starts off about making sure it works and there is a data cartridge in place to record onto:

On-Set CCTV or Forward Facing CCTV Systems
2.4 The Operator shall be entitled to access any of the Sets at any time during the Operational Day and remove any data cartridge from the on-Set CCTV and/or Forward Facing CCTV Systems on such Sets, provided that the Operator notifies the TSP Control Room Contact of such removal before the end of that Operational Day.
2.5 Following any removal of such data cartridge from the on-Set CCTV and/or Forward Facing CCTV Systems on such Sets, the Operator shall return any such data cartridge to the TSP as soon as reasonably practicable.
2.6 If:
(a)  the Operator has removed any such data cartridge without providing the notification to the TSP pursuant to Paragraph 2.4; and
(b)  such Set is Handed Over by the TSP on the following Operational Day without the necessary data cartridge for the relevant on-Set CCTV and/or Forward Facing CCTV Systems but such Set would otherwise comply with the requirements as set out in Paragraph 1.4 of Part B (Handover) of Schedule 2 (Availability),
such Set that is made available shall not be regarded to have suffered any Category Three Handover Failures or Presentation KPI Standards Failures that are wholly or mainly attributable to an insufficient number of data cartridges for the relevant on-Set CCTV and/or Forward Facing CCTV Systems.
TSP Information
2.7 To the extent the TSP Contract Manager collects any of the following information, the TSP Contract Manager shall retain:
(a)  any downloads of on-Set CCTV or FFCCTV footage (which shall include footage from the passenger area, forward and rear facing and external body side cameras) for such period and in such manner as may be required by Applicable Laws and Standards and in accordance with this Agreement;
(b)  any 'On Train Monitoring Recorder' downloads for such period of time as may be agreed by the parties;
(c)  downloads of each Set's fault-monitoring systems, sufficiently frequently to ensure an accurate and complete history of each Set's fault history is maintained for such period of time as may be agreed by the parties; and
(d)  such other information in relation to the management of performance and reliability of the Fleet as may be agreed by the parties.
2.8 The TSP Contract Manager shall, at the reasonable request of the Operator Contract Manager, make records of each of the matters listed in Paragraph 2.7 (whether information retained by the TSP Contract Manager in accordance with Paragraph 2.7 or the corresponding contemporaneous information held on a Set at the time of such request) available to the Operator Contract Manager and any other relevant person or authority that may reasonably require access to such records in such format as the TSP Contract Manager and the Operator Contract Manager may reasonably agree from time to time.
2.9 The TSP Contract Manager shall, at the reasonable request of the Operator Contract Manager, make available any other information reasonably required, and/or reasonably incidental to the services provided to the Operator, by its insurance advisors or insurers that the TSP holds to the insurance advisers or insurers of the Operator (subject, where such information constitutes Commercially Sensitive Information, to the provisions of Schedule 13 (Confidentiality)).
2.10 The TSP Contract Manager shall maintain a server and shall provide the Operator with access to such server to enable the Operator to retrieve the following information:
(a)  GPS location data in respect of the train location as described in item 7 of annexe W of the Train Technical Description;
(b)  TMS remote data transmission as described in item 20 of annexe W of the Train Technical Description;
(c)  On-Train maintenance recorder data as described in item 11 of annexe W of the Train Technical Description;
(d)  Passenger count data as described in item 13 of annexe W of the Train Technical Description;
(e)  Energy consumption data as described in item 5 of annexe W of the Train Technical Description;
(f)  Train maintenance recorder event data in respect of events onboard the train as described in item 18 of annexe W of the Train Technical Description;
(g)  Daily timetable data as described in item 2 of annexe W of the Train Technical Description;
(h)  Seat reservation data as described in item 8 of annexe W of the Train Technical Description; and
(i)  Passenger information system real time messages as described in item 12 of annexe W of the Train Technical Description.

So it appears that Hitachi can't supply data unless the controller - GWR - says so, but in that case must do so (if it still exists). Whether statute law, or any contract directly between Hitachi and HMG, gives BTP^▸ (British Transport Police) any supervening rights I have no idea.

[eightonedee]

Although this is a "it's easy to be wise after the event" comment - why did they not agree that all the data would be downloaded and copies made/supplied to both parties automatically, with each being responsible as data managers for the copy each had?

[stuving]

Although this is a "it's easy to be wise after the event" comment - why did they not agree that all the data would be downloaded and copies made/supplied to both parties automatically, with each being responsible as data managers for the copy each had?

And how would that help?

If you read down that CornwallLive article, it says:

Judgment was awarded against GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) on May 3 because the company didn't respond to the court papers in time.  Mrs Ince has been awarded £325 in compensation by the court and GWR has confirmed a cheque is on its way.

A GWR spokesman has said that Mrs Ince has been responded to regarding every query she has raised and been provided refunds when appropriate. He added that there a number of reasons why the company could have failed to respond to the claim but that it will honour the payment regardless.

So, once again, an award was made against a TOC^▸ (Train Operating Company) with no evidence heard or judgement made based on it. That means we have no idea what really happened, and all we get is a jumble of quotes and "facts" from outside sources.

We've all assumed from the mention of Hitachi that the CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) was in an IET^▸ (Intercity Express Train). But was it? Was her train likely to have been an IET in any case?  If the camera was involved for some other reason then maybe it was under Hitachi's sole control and we know nothing about the background to that.

That supposed GWR comment "GWR told police that Hitachi owned the rights to the CCTV and GWR could not access it." - must come to us via several steps of Chinese whispers, so it could be true (i.e. GWR said it ti BTP^▸ (British Transport Police) - if it was BTP) or not, or it might apply to some event not mentioned in the report. If it was about on-board CCTV on an IET, then it's not true (or the TARA^▸ (Train Availability and Reliability Agreement) isn't).

So, all in all, we know remarkably little about this!

[eightonedee]

Fair point Stuving - it may not have helped in this case.

However, if both Hitachi and GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) automatically received copies of all downloaded material it should make it easier for each to provide the footage promptly if required.

[nickswift99]

If BTP^▸ (British Transport Police) make a request for access to CCTV^▸ (Closed Circuit Tele Vision) then this falls into one of the purposes for which it is collected in the first place. As a processor or controller, refusing to supply it would render the organisation collecting images foul of the Data Protection Act if they don't provide it.

I have spoken to a Crime Manager from BTP who told me that GWR^▸ (Great Western Railway) have refused to supply video footage to support their investigations. If this is true (and my personal experience supports this - see my previous posts on this forum), then GWR have not only an issue under the Data Protection Act but also a moral issue towards their customers who would expect them to support the police force which they fund.